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"It is known among the military, but less 
widely among the general public, that the object 
~ 
of war is determined by policy; that policy in 
turn is determined by statesmen, and that these 
statesmen are strongly influenced by public opinion. 
But it has not been generally appreciated that for 
this reason public opinion may give to strategy 
its initial direction and may color and even 
decisively influence the outcome of a war. 11 
••• J. M. Scammell 
Preface 
Little admitted, seldom supported, and rarely 
recognized for what it was, the United States Navy's 
adoption of a formal public affairs function followed 
a stormy evolution. Participation in international 
expositions, publicity campaigns on behalf of re-
cruiting, cooperation with the Navy League of the 
United States -- all played a part of in its develop-
ment. Despite popular misconception, the public 
affairs function did not grow, nor was it fostered, 
in a vacuum. It evolved because of the social and 
political forces which demanded a responsive and res-
ponsible voice in government. 
In any assessment of a nation is power, it is 
essential to begin with the temper, the will of her 
people. Military and naval forces form but an ex-
tension of that will, which, in operation, constitutes 
national purpose and dictates national policy. 
Factors which influence that will, then, are of 
great importance in determinations of national power. 
In this nether land of the indefinable, it is known 
that events and their perception are primary consider-
ations affecting popular thought and action. It is in 
this influence on public opinion that the public affairs 
function in government, and in the United States Navy, 




In the history of the development of the public 
affairs function in the United States Navy, the "turning 
mark11 at which the Navy shifted its course from early 
attempts to influence legislators to the mature con-
cept of direct responsibility to the nation and the 
people came in the Civil War. It was here that, in 
the jargon of the sailing ships, "the helm was put 
a 1 lee. 11 
While there is a wealth of literature written on 
naval subjects, there is a dearth of it dealing, even 
tangentially, with the subject of public affairs in 
the United States Navy. Even such an outstanding 
volume as Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer 1 s, Administration 
of the Navy Department in World War II, contains but 
a paragraph, in 950 pages of text, touching on the 
Office of Public Relations. 
The objective of this study has been to document 
the development of the public affairs function in the 
United States Navy from its earliest traceable beginnings. 
In setting the boundaries of this study, primarily it 
was necessary to consider aspects directly affecting 
the development of the public affairs function while 
noting other aspects of lesser bearing such as Navy 
actions with, and reactions to the mass communications 
media. Insofar as these operations were found to have 
exercised influence on the functional development of 
11 
public affairs in the United States Navy, they have been 
included. Also included in the same sense of relevance 
to this development was the tide of public opinion, 
reflected by the media and in Congress, and the movements 
which set political forces in motion -- the preparedness 
movement of 1915-16, and the peace movement in the years, 
1922-1928. 
Events were significant in the development of the 
public affairs function in the period under study. The 
Washington Naval Limitation of Arms Conference, 1921-22, 
and the bombing tests upon Navy ships conducted by 
General Billy Mitchell and a group of Army and Navy 
fliers, for instance, were events which led the Navy to 
establish an information function within the Office of 
Naval Intelligence in order to mount a counter-propaganda 
offensive. Events, too, by which the need for a strong 
Navy could be dramatized were pertinent to the func-
tional development of public affairs activities: the 
threats of the commerce raiders in the Civil War and 
those of the German submarines in World War I, and the 
cruise of the battleship fleet around the world, 1907-9. 
Executive leadership by the President and support 
either offered or withheld by Congress, too, had deep 
implications for Navy public affairs operations through-
out this study. 





Because of their nature, however, little has been written 
which would establish a link between interservice actions 
and reactions, and the influence of this stimulus remains 
obscure. 
There were many such areas of obscurity in dealing 
with such a politically oriented investigation: the 
role of the Secretaries of the Navy in their private 
meetings with individuals of the press and with officials 
of the Navy League; the influence of the President upon 
service actions carried by the Secretary of the Navy 
from decisions made in Cabinet meetings; the relation-
ships between the Secretaries and the Committees of 
Congress; the role of patronage, and the influence of 
spoils, and the relationships of Navy public affairs 
with the Committee on Public Information in World War 
I and, later, with the Office of War Information in 
World War II -- all remained outside the area of 
documentation. 
Also of importance to this study were the roles 
played by individuals such as John w. Jenkins, the first 
manager of the Navy'News Bureau. Though Jenkins conducted 
the day-to-day work of operating the Bureau, the policy 
decisions of what was released to the public and the 
manner and language of the releases seems to have been 
provided by Josephus .Da.niels himself. No documentation 
establishing the true relationship between the two was 
iv 
discovered and the activities of Jenkins remained obscure. 
The parameters of this study suggested many other 
areas of interest and pertinence which justified investi-
gation. Among these were: a study of the public affairs 
activities of Gideon Welles, and those of Josephus 
Daniels and Frank Knox, all of whom were former publishers 
who made significant contributions to the public affairs 
function in critical periods of the Navy's history; a 
study of the preparedness movement of 1915-16; and a 
study of Navy participation in exhibits, expositions and 
in international fleet reviews. Following 1941 were 
yet other subjects: the operations of the Office of 
Public Relations, whose beginnings were set in the period 
of this current study; the combat art program; and a 
survey of the censorship function in periods of national 
tension. These were but a few of the many parts of the 
total picture concerning public affairs in the United 
States Navy. The end point of the study was set at the 
establishment of the Office of Public Relations in May, 
1941, whose subsequent operations were a part or· the 
history of World War II. 
The methodology of this study centered upon a 
research plan which focused on two areas of primary-
source interest: the records of the Office Of the 
Secretary of the Navy, National Archives, and the Navy 





Histories, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Department. Additional material was sought in the 
files of the Bureau of Navigation, National Archives. 
The research in Washington was conducted in two ten-day 
periods during the summer, 1967. 
The guide to research used in the period to 1918 
was Harold and Margaret Sprout 1s, The Rise of American 
Naval Power, 1776-1918. Without its superb documen-
tation the project would have been infinitely more 
difficult since few, if an~ records predating 1900 
carry indexes which reveal the slightest trace of 
public affairs activity. Indeed, the whole problem 
of research through primary-source documents has been 
the difficulty in dealing with great volumes of leeter 
press, typewritten and manuscript materials to which 
no index in the area of public affairs has been 
compiled. 
The task would have proven impossible without 
the continued interest and active support of many who 
are fully qualified to call themselves historians. 
To each of them, and for whatever this study is worth, 
I owe a great debt. In guiding my first halting probes 
in shoal waters I must thank Admiral E. M. Eller, 
Director of Naval Histories Division, Navy Department, 
himself a former Chief of Information; his personal 
secretary, Miss T. I. Mertz, whose knowledge of the 
vi 
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intricacies of naval· histories has never ceased to 
amaze me, whose sailing directions have caused me to 
avoid innumerable uncharted reefs, and those patience 
has never worn thin despite any number of distress calls 
spread throughout a year of research; the staff in the 
Navy Department Library led by Mr. F. S. Meigs, and also 
the staff of the Operational Histories Division. 
Thanks, as well, are due and tendered to the 
staff of the National Archives, especially to Mr. 
Harry Swartz who spent unnumbered hours in obtaining 
the unobtainable and Mr. Lee Saegesser who pointed 
to channels through the shoals. 
To a special group of individuals whose personal 
experiences with the Office of Public Relations and 
its predecessors, the Public Relations Branch and 
the Information Section of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, contributed immensely to my understanding: 
Admiral (retired) Bernard L. Austin, Admiral (retired) 
John B. Heffernan, Miss Helen Philibert and Admirals 
Leland P. Lovette and H. R. Thurber, both of whom 
passed away before the research project could be 
completed; my sincerest appreciation. 
Debts of gratitude must also be accorded to 
Captain R. s. Jones, who got the project rolling on 
Navy tracks; Captain Pickett Lumpkin, captain Edmund 
L. Castillo, and captain William Thompson who contributed 
vii 
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generously of both their time and understanding of the 
development of the public affairs function. 
Special thanks are due, too, to the thesis committee 
who gave more than a full measure of patience, guidance 
and understanding: Professors Scott Cutlip, Richard 
Joel and James Fosdick. 
To my family, my deepest appreciation. It was they 
who bore the burden ••• 
viii I . 
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CHAPTER I 
The Beginnings of Public Affairs 
In the United States Navy: 
The Civil War and Beyond 
CHAPTER I 
The history of Public Relations in the United States 
Navy follows closely the evolution of the function within 
government. In the creation of the United States Navy 
itself can be seen the marshaling ot political support by 
the expedient of spreading the contracts for goods and 
services over as large an area and among as many indivi-
duals and companies as possible.1 The manner ot obtaining 
the needed support caused the riaval historians, Harold and 
Margaret Sprout, to conclude, " ••• it would seem a fair 
inference, trom official utterances as well as from cir-
cumstantial evidence, that the Administration aimed to 
popularize the Navy in a suft1cient number of states and 
communities, to insure legislation continuing it on a 
permanent basis."2 
or more marked influence upon public and Congressional 
opinion.however, was the press of international events. 
The depredations or the Barbary Corsairs and actions of 
the French privateers which later erupted into the Quasi-
Naval War with France combined to give proponents of an 
effective naval force leverage enough to enact the hotly 
debated NaVJ' Act of May 27, 1794,establishing the United 
States Navy.3 
With the election of Thomas Jefferson and the triumph 
of the Jeffersonian Republican party came a drastic change 
in naval strategy--a period or retrenchment and passive 
l 
2 
coast defense. 4 The cutback was in marked contrast to the 
active building program espoused by the Navy's first 
Secretary, Benjamin Stoddert5 and occurred in the critical 
period preceding the War of 1812. 
Failure of the Jeffersonian naval strategy was punc-
tuated by the nearly complete blockade of coast of the 
United States from Long Island Sound to New Orleans. The 
.futility of the gunboat defense policy and the bankruptcy 
of a militia system for national defenae was demonstrated 
6 to the American public in the burning of Washington. 
The function or Public Relations in the United States 
Navy was carried forth by the Navy's political leadership. 
In the Civil War, however, can be found the first halting 
steps taken by the Navy itself to provide the public with 
information about its actions. 
In the main, news or the Navy throughout the war was 
dependent upon battle reports. Secretary or the Navy 
Gideon Welles, himself a former newspaper editor, 7 would 
8 hand over the communiques to reporters in Washington. 
Not all of the reports were necessarily handed over, how-
ever, for the dictates of military security made certain 
disclosures inappropriate. In news of failures of the 
tJnion Navy's monitors in connection with the September, 
1863, attempts to capture Fort Sumter and Charleston harbor, 
release of information regarding deficiencies in the iron-
3 
clads was stricken by Welles from the reports, " ••• (it 
did not appear wise) to make any deficiencies in those 
vessels prominent 1n the official reports which were to 
be published ••• if monitors are weak in any part, there was 
no necessity for us to proclaim that weakness to our 
enemies ••• "9 
On several occasions Welles was distressed to find 
the Army garnering a major share of the limelight in actions 
which hinged on naval forces. He instructed Admiral Porter 
to make certain his battle reports were in ahead of those 
of the military commanders. Porter did at his next oppor-
tunity and the Navy, spurred by interservice rivalry, 
scooped the Army on news of the Battle of Vicksburg. On 
July 7, 1863, Welles wrote, " ••• Admiral Porter's brief 
dispatch to me was promptly transmitted over the whole 
country ••• I am told, however, that (Secretary of War) 
Stanton is excessively angry because Admiral Porter heralded 
the news to me in advance of General Grant to the War 
Department ••• He craves to announce all important information. 010 
The Navy and the Press 
It was common practice for correspondents to travel 
with Union armies and, to a lesser extent, with those of 
the Confederacy. News directly from reporters with the 
ships was rare. The difficulty of communicating with their 







between news from the front and the lack of it from block-
ade and river squadrons. 
A notable exception to this pattern was a New York 
reporter, B. s. Osbon,11 who accompanied the abortive 
relief expedition to Fort Sumter. The expedition was led 
by Gustavus V. Pox, later appointed the first Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. 
It was also Osbon who might, with some justification, 
be called the Navy's first public relations officer. 
Through certain connections, he won with Admiral Farragut 
a combination job as Signal Clerk and Secretary on the 
Flagship Hartford. In that position he was an eyewitness 
to the battle with the torts and the capture of New 
Orleans.12 He wrote and distributed the story to the New 
York papers. 
By the summer of 1864, Osbon had published a handbook 
on the Civil War histories ot ships of the Union Navy. It 
was an extremely useful reference work for news editors 
as well as for contemporary commentators. 13 By that time 
Osbon had established himself as a sort of clearing house 
for news about the Navy. He wrote Sunday articles which 
he sold to a group of 18 newspapers and claimed, at least, 
to have so established the first news syndicate in America.14 
-One of bis methods or operating this syndicate landed 
him in trouble in November, 1864. While the Powder Boat 
Expedition against Fort F1sher15 was being prepared, Osbon 
5 
obtained the details of the operation from Admiral Porter 
and wrote an advance for his newspaper subscribers with the 
understanding that it was not for use until after the 
expedition had been completed. 
On hearing a rumor that the attack had taken place, 
a Philadelphia editor printed the story prematurely, giving 
the enemy abundant information prior to the attack. The 
16 
editor reportedly was arrested and the paper closed. 
Following the successful attack more than a month 
later, Osbon was put under arrest and clapped into the 
old Capitol prison in Washington until nearly the end of 
the war. 17 
Information Versus Security 
One problem reporters encountered when they embarked 
in Navy ships was that of censorship. They found that 
Flag Officers of the Navy could censor their copy or, for 
that matter, oust :bhem without the story. 18 
The problem of censorship was not exclusive to the 
Navy, nor could the desire for censorship be laid to the 
ultraconservatism of naval officers. The problems of 
informing people through a public press without imparting 
useful and sometimes essential information to an enemy 
are myriad and worthy of several volumes. In a civil war, 
these problems became more complex. 
Perhaps the most damning of comments on intelligence 
6 
available in the press came from the log of the most 
successful of the Confederacy's commerce raiders, the 
CSS Alabama. Captain Semmes, upon capture of the merchant-
man SS Manchester bound from New York to Liverpool, studied 
a batch of newspapers found on board and wrote, "I learned 
from them where all the enemy's gun boats were, and what 
they were doing ••• Perhaps this was the only war in which 
the newspapers ever explained, beforehand, all the move-
ments of armies and fleets to the enemy. 1119 
Correspondents were not the sole source of news leaks 
of security information. Naval officers corresponding 
with the press caused Flag Officer s. F. DuPont to issue 
20 
an order prohibiting such correspondence to his South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron. On several occasions, vio-
lations of his order resulted in disciplinary action against 
the offenders. 
Rear Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the North 
Atlantic Squadron, also found it necessary to restrain 
his officers from corresponding with the press and issued 
a similar general order. It reflected a generally held 
view of the professional military dealing directly with 
the press, " ••• Th~ Commander in Chief is the person to 
communicate what it may be proper for the public to know, 
and it will be done in off~cial form. Writing for the 
press is not the right kind of employment for an officer 
"21 
of the Navy ••• 
7 
Information leaks in the Charleston campaign caused 
Admiral John Dahlgren to write to Secretery Welles, " ••• 
There are probably no means upon which the enemy has so 
relied for information as this insane propensity for 
22 
making public the most valuable items." 
For an Informed Public 
Meanwhile, the depredations of the Confederate commerce 
raiders, coupled with the threat of completion in :&igland 
of the Confederate-contracted ironclads, set the eastern 
23 
seaboard of the Union into near panic. 
The demand for warships to defend the harbors, to 
chase the raiders, and to patrol the fishing grounds and 
shipping lanes exerted extreme pressures on the President 
24 
and the Secretary of the Navy. Metropolitan editors, 
shipowners, mayors of port cities, governors of seaboard 
states and members of Congress urged, and none too gently, 
a departure from sound naval strategy or firm and unre-
lenting blockade in favor of helter-skelter pursuit of 
private or individual interests. 25 
Apart from the strategy of the war, there were 
several painfully learned lessons just as studiously 
ignored at war's end. One of these was the portent of an 
aroused but ill-informed public opinion and its resultant 






repeatedly found that it could not build, equip and man 
a fleet in times of emergency but had to build, maintain 
and train one over the years, it became just as unmis-
takably clear that it could not expect public understan-
ding of its mission and strategy without taking action to 
cultivate and roster that understanding. 
For nearly a generation following the Civil War the 
26 Navy languished and regressed. With little public 
interest in or concern for the Navy of the United States, 
there was no impetus for propagation of an information 
base to support naval programs, if, indeed, there were 
any naval programs. 
Exhibits to Inform the Public 
Yet another field o!'"~ublic relations activity was 
opened for the Navy by presidential fiat in 1874. President 
Grant, noting the upcoming exhibition in Philadelphia 
celebrating the lOOth anniversary of United States inde-
pendence, issued an executive order directing partici-
pation or the executive departments of the federal 
government, 
••• it is desirable that from the executive depart-
ments ot the government of the United States, in 
which there may '• articles aui~able tqr tbe pur-
pose intended, there should appear such articles 
and materials as will, wken presented in a collec-
tive exnib1tion. illustrate the functions and 
administrative facilities of the Government in 
time of peace and its resources as a war power, 
and thereby serve to demonstrate the nature of 
our institutions and tJ17ir adaptations to the 
wants of the people ••• · 
9 
The public relations intention of that order was carried 
forth in the direction ot many exhibits subsequently par-
ticipated 1n by the federal government. 28 
In Philadelphia, eight departments took part in the 
exhibit: Treasury, War, Navy, Interior, Post Office, 
Agriculture, and the Smithsonian Institution. The Navy 
contingent representing the Secretary of the Navy on the 
Exhibit Board was headed by Rear Admiral Thornton A. 
Jenkins -- in those days a figure of considerable rank 
for presentation of the Navy's message to the public. 
On the exhibition trail, federal participation, 
including that of the military services, continued through 
to the turn of the century and beyond. 29 
Perhaps the Navy's most elaborate exhibit was made 
as a part of the World Columbian Exposition held in 
Chicago in 1893. 30 A ship model of lathing was built on 
a brick foundation set on piles driven into Lake Michigan. 
It was open for touring and featured realistic interiors 
and exteriors, actual arms and equipment, and had fully 
dressed mannequins at various stations throughout the 
"ship." The total Navy exhibit oecupied nearly 50,000 
. . 
square feet of space and cost the Navy $125,468. A full-
time crew was detailed to set up and maintain the exhibit 
and a part of them, at least, actually lived in quarters 
10 
in the bottom-bound "ship." 
Aside from this rather small and fundamental activity 
there was little effort to interpret the Navy to the 
American public at large in the years described as 11The 
last years of the old Navy. 1131 
Naval progress of the 80 1s was advanced by the vigo-
rous leadership of Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt. 
One of the more notable tactics in Hunt's campaign to 
rebuild the Navy was to bring together selected Senators, 
Representatives and naval officers for discussion of naval 
policy. It marked a significant departure from previous 
( 
norms of professional action in the political realm and 
helped overcome mutual prejudices and misunderstandings 
between Congress and the Service.32 
The Navy's Oracle 
In 1890, an obscure Professor of naval history and 
tactics at the Naval War College published a book entitled, 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. The 
acclaim accorded Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan 1s theories 
of command of the sea propelled him to immediate fame.33 
Mahan had no connection with an information function 
34 in the Navy. Yet his books and articles, coming as 
they did at a propitious moment in naval affairs formed, 
in the opinion of the naval historians Harold and Margaret 
Sprout, the basis of an enlightened naval policy in the 
United States. 35 
11 
In Times of Tension 
When Theodore Roosevelt was appointed Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy in 1897, he brought to the Navy 
Department not only a thorough understanding of the use 
of naval forces in international affairs, but, also, a 
remarkable feel tor the public press and knowledge in 
how to use it. 
Perhaps the best example of Roosevelt's sagacity 
in press relations is given in Charles Brown's, ~ 
Correspondent's War, when the long delayed and eagerly 
sought message from Admiral George Dewey reporting the 
Battle of Manila Bay arrived in a Navy Department stuffed 
with some fifty news-hungry reporters. 
one of the officials on the scene was the Under-
secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt ••• 
Reading the message over the shoulders of deco-
ders, Roosevelt took it in instantly. While 
{Seereta~ of the Navy John D.)Long was tele-
phoning (President) McKinley for permission to 
make an announcement to the press, Roosevelt 
was giving out the news to reporters. Then 
Long emerged from his office, smiling as he 
faced the crowd to read in his musical voice 
the great news from Manila. He did not know 
that correspondents had already scribbled out 
their stories and messenger boys even then were 
pedaling wildly on their bicycles to the tele-
graph offices. Long's carefully censored 
version of Dewey's report appeared in the after-
noon papers alongside3~he more detailed account given by Roosevelt ••• 
The complete story told the colorful details, and there 
was no antmosity shown toward Roosevelt for having provided 
it. 
12 
The war with Spain gave the United States Navy a 
startling demonstration of the effects of public opinion 
upon strategy. 
Naval command of the Caribbean was the strategic 
key to the war in the Western hemisphere. 37 To counter 
the challenge of the Spanish Squadron under Admiral 
Cervera, Admiral William T. Sampson, Fleet Commander in 
the Caribbean, proposed two strategically sound plans: 
to take Havana before the arrival of Spanish reinforce-
ments; or to seize San Juan and subsequently locate and 
destroy the Spanish fleet upon its arrival in the West 
38 Indies. 
Sampson was given neither option. Public clamor 
fired by news reports, and congressional and group 
pressures compelled the Navy Department to direct him, 
instead, to confine his operations to blockade and 
cautious bombardments. The Navy Department further with-
held some of the best ships of Sampson's fleet and or-
ganized them into a "Flying Squadron" which was held at 
. . 
Hampton Roads against the obscure possibility of naval 
raids on the eastern seaboard of the United States. 39 
The approach of war built an increasing alarm. The 
Navy Department created a second defense force of several 
cruisers. This Northern Patrol Force was distributed 
along the coast from Maine to Virginia. 40 
The news that Cervera had sailed from the Cape Verde 
I . 
' i I 
13 
Islands on a Westward course brought panic bordering 
hysteria along the Atlantic coast as the days passed 
without further intelligence. 41 Congress directed the 
Navy department to mobilize the naval militia of the 
States. This Naval Auxiliary Force manned a makeshift 
"fleet" of Civil War monitors, and armed yachts and tugs, 
and to~k up defense stations from Maine to the Gulf. 42 
The resultant, nearly total disorder caused the naval 
historians, Harold and Margaret Sprout to comment, 
Only with the greatest difficulty did the Navy 
Department prevent the unreasoning and prepos-
terous panic from forcing a complete disrup-
tion of the fighting fleet, and the scattering 
of its units, to guard two thousand miles of 
coastline against wholly improbable, if not 
utterly i2tRossible, raids by Cervera•s decrepit 
cruisers. :.:S 
The role of the press in the Spanish-American War 
is unique in the annals of reporting. 44 The cooperation 
afforded correspondents by military and naval commanders 
was nearly limitless. 45 There were reporters with Dewey, 
dozens embarked in ships on blockade stations off CUba, 
and a fleet of them in dispatch boats darting about the 
ships, then flying off to Key West to file their stories. 
In the main, it was Navy Department policy to deal 
candidly with the newspapermen who were the represen-
tatives of the general public. In his diary Secretary 
of the Navy Long expressed the sentiment well after being 
14 
beseeched for additional details on the sinking of the 
Battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, " ••• the newspapermen 
cluster like bees about me ••• They are gathering infor-
mation for the public, and it is hardly worth while to 
be impatient with them when they are really the avenues 
through which the public, very properly, gets its 
information. 046 
Coverage of naval action off CUba, if not accurate, 
was certainly not wanting for number and activity of 
correspondents. The German Kaiser was reported to have 
been highly amused at the thought of the American fleet, 
accompanied by an entourage of press dispatch boats, 
awaiting an engagement with the Spanish. 
While the press "fleet" caused only a few problems 
. . 
to the maneuvering of Sampson's ships, its presence 
caused more than a few in the realm of military security. 
Press reports on fleet movements and possible intentions 
were relayed the same day to Madrid. The technological 
progress made in telegraphy had vastly complicated the 
problem of military security causing censorship units 
to be established at Key West, Washington, and at seven 
47 
cable offices in New York. 
Naval commanders furnished whatever information they 
could, 11 ••• Admiral Sampson fully recognized the demand 
of the country for the fullest information which could 
15 
properly be furnished, and placed no impediment in the 
way of this being supplied, beyond what military neces-
sity demanded. 1148 
Such were the faint beginnings of public relations 
in the United States Navy. The Spanish-American War 
had reinforced other trends developing in the society. 
As the United States stepped upon the international 
stage as a budding new power, her citizens were demanding 
more responsibility from their government. A part of the 
government's responsibility lay in keeping its citizens 
advised of its actions. At the turn of the century, the 
need for public relations was becoming apparent to the 
more astute naval leaders. 
16 
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CHAPTER II 
The Influence of Theodore Roosevelt: 
The Turn of the Century 
Chapter II 
The war with Spain had pushed the united States 
into the international arena of world politics. The 
turn of the century presented this country with over-
seas holdings. The Philippines, Guam, American Samoa, 
and Hawaii - each a significant acquisition in the 
larger view of an agressive mercantile policy in the 
Far :East. The occupation of CUba and Puerto Rico 
seemed to heighten the need for an isthmian canal to 
link the Atlantic and Pacific. 
For the Navy, the new responsibilities that these 
possessions demanded were enormous. The strategy of 
Mahan, which had been sufficiently advanced to cope 
with problems or the Spanish-American war, were 
capable also or including the advanced position of u.s. 
1 
naval posture required by these far-flung commitments. 
Advancing technology and new construction had ad-
vanced the Navy of the United States to a point where 
its sea forces were comparable to those of BJ.ropean 
2 powers, save, of course, those of Britain_ In large 
measure, this was due to the active appropriations in 
each of the years 1898-1900. Partly through the popu-
larity for the Navy whiqh had carried over from the 
war, and partly through the continued stress in inter-
national affairs this impetus continued until 1901 when 
21 
22 
Congress refused to authorize any ships at a11. 3 
Naval policy following the war, as it had many 
times in the past, reverted to the pre-war modus 
vivendi and little thought was given to new responsi-
bilities demanded of the Bavy. With the reelection of 
McKinley in 1900 and the continued secretaryship of 
Long, there was every indication that the Navy could 
4 look forward to a continued policy of drift. 
In September, 1901, an assassin's bullet took the 
life of the President and sent striding onto the inter-
national scene a man infused with the importance of 
naval strategy to national security and fully conver-
sant with naval problems, Theodore Roosevelt. 
In his first message to Congress, President 
Roosevelt revealed the philosophy which was both to 
define and direct5naval policy throughout his admir:d.s-
tration, 
••• The American people must either build and 
maintain an adequate Bavy or else make up 
their minds definitely to occupy a secondary 
position in international affairs, not merely 
in political, but in commercial matters. It 
has been well said that there is no surer way 
of courting national disaster thap6to be "opulent, aggressive and unarmed." 
It was characteristic of the man to link the national 
interest with national security and to state both in 
terms of the wants of the people of the nation.7 
l . 
23 
Roosevelt began immediately to build the Navy 
a drive which did not slacken until 1905. Within four 
years Congress had authorized ten first-class battle-
ships, four armored cruisers, and seventeen lesser ships 
with the whole totaling over a quarter million tons dis-
8 placement. In the same period naval appropriations 
had climbed from $85 million to $118 million, a peace-
9 time record. 
Roosevelt's leadership in the building drive was 
characterized by pressure on Congress, backed by direct 
appeal to the people of the nation. Reflecting the 
Commander-in-Chief's ambitions, the recommendations of 
the General Board and of the Secretary of the Navy 
pushed for increased construction in an effort to gain 
comparability with the navies of Blrope.10 
Navy reaction to press comment became evident in 
this same period. In July, 1904, the Chief Clerk of 
the Navy engaged a New York clipping service for_ 
•ooonotices referring to matters connected with the 
· ull Navy, special articles, editorials, etc... Here 
was some positive feedback. 
Personnel Needs 
With the increase in fleet tonnage, the require-
ment for greater numbers of personnel in the Navy 
placed additional emphasis upon recruiting. Somewhere 
I . I , 
j, 
I 
12 in this period, the Navy found it helpful to develop 
a publicity organization as an aid to recruitment. 
In 1902 Roosevelt pa.id special attention to the 
Navy's personnel needs in his annual message to 
13 Congress. In 1905, this same message had become 
almost a plea. 14 
For the Navy's part, recruiting went on at an 
accelerated pace, but not always without its problems. 
One recruiting team in the midwest repeatedly found 
adverse and non-factual stories and comments about the 
Navy appearing 1n the local press just prior to its 
saneduled visits. These occurrences caused special 
mention 1n the Secretary's annual report to the 
President, 
••• the Bureau (Bureau of Navigation, prede-
cessor to the current Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel) believes that a more thorough and 
more widely diffused knowledge of the con-
ditions of life in, and opportunities aff-
orded by, the naval service is the best 15 remedy against.unjust and harmful criticism. 
The type of criticism to which the Navy objected 
can be seen in the Saud.a, Colorado, Mail in noting the 
arrival of a Navy recruiting party, " ••• If your son 
is an incorrigible and you think he will either go to 
the gallows or to the penitentiary, send him to the 
24 
N nl6 avy. Taking up the gauntlet, the Army & Navy Journal 
replied, 
The representative, fair-minded newspapers of the 
United States could render a most helpful service 
to the country by reminding their readers on every 
proper occasion that the Army and Navy are open 
only to bright reputable, cleanly and ambitious 
young men, that they are not reformatory insti-
25 
tutions, but organizations in which character, 17 
manhood and merit are indispensible to advancement. 
Whatever the problems of Navy recruiters in gaining 
publicity for their drives, some success must have 
attended their efforts. In November, 1907, the Bureau 
of Navigation received a letter from a publicity 
organization in Rochester, New York, offering to conduct 
a publicity campaign on behalf of Navy recruiting. The 
Bureau graciously turned down the commercial off er 
replying, 
••• The methods now being employed in obtaining 
recruits for the Navy have proven efficient and 
the results are very satisfactory ••• It has been 
the Bureau's experience that interesting news 
articles are eagerly sought after and there has 
been no difficulty in having published any items 
of interest regarding the naval service.lb 
Considerations of Image 
Sensitivity to the image of the Navy and its men 
was not confined to recruiters. In 1905, an employe 
of the Navy Department was dismissed for refusal to 
carry out a contract to let a part of his house to a 
26 
sailor because, " ••• his wife feared her •social position' 
would be affected if a man in sailor's clothes were seen 
going into or coming out of her house." The incident 
was considered important enough to be noted in the 
Secretary's annual report to the President.19 
A similar but previous happenstance supposedly 
gave rise to the Navy's first newspaper in Newport, 
Rhode Island. In 1901, a yeoman from the naval base 
reportedly saw the sign in a downtown store window, 
"Dogs and Sailors Keep Out." He was repulsed when he 
- ' 
tried to enter forcibly and returned to the base to 
vent his frustration by publishing an underground news-
paper decrying the outrage.20 
Information With Purpose 
'United States Naval Intelligence at the turn of 
the century consisted of but seven officers in the 
Navy Department and tour naval attaches overseas. One 
of its annual publications, Motes ~ Naval Progress, 
was an interesting reference work for comparative 
statistics on the world naval powers. In January, 
1902, the Kew York Sun noted praise for the work by 
a correspondent of the London Times, 
••• The Admiralty conceals its knowledge even 
from the House of Commons ••• even when the 
Parliament insists on obtaining a return of 
the fleets of the Powers, the bare return is 
given without any attempt at summarizing the 
results, or any endeavor to make the infor-
mation furnished of practical use for pur-
poses of discussion. We have to go to the 
American Naval Intelligence •• 1to obtain a summary of this information.2 
A modicum of press praise was accorded to the 
information function in the.Navy, " ••• the difference 
(between British and American intelligence) is wholly 
to the credit of our small intelligence starr."22 
Press Tours 
27 
In the informal organization of the period, infor-
mation was imparted in a number of ways. One such 
instance was a tour of the Navy Yard at Puget Sound 
for seventy-five members of the Utah Press Club in 
June, 1902. 23 Sponsored jointly by the Press Club of 
Seattle and the Commandant of the Yard, the guests were 
given a list of "rules" to be followed. Some of them 
were enlightening: 
Rule 2. Refrain from using unnecessary violence 
to persons not in government employ._ Take a 
fall out of anything in uniform, but abuse non-
combatants only after returning home, and then 
only on the editorial page. 
Rule 3. Do not pull the tail of the bull 
terrier belonging to the Commandant. Said 
terrier has no sense or humor, but has.been 
brought up to scrap first and leave arbitration 
to the United States Senate. 
Rule 4. Do not think that because you are a 
taxpayer and therefore a part owner of the 
t:Jnited States Navy, that you can carry the 





Rule 8. Coming from the interior, you may 
with perfect safety observe to the officers 
of the Wisconsin that the Oregon is a wonder. 
But don •_t get angry if an ~fficer replies that 
you don't know a camel from a cruiser. 
Ru.le 11. Don't ask if the band can play "suwanee 
River." They can play anything from the ~Dead 
March in Saul" to table stakes in the guard 
house. 
Rule 12. Walk on the grass, the walks, the 
regulations or on anything else except the 
water. 
The "rules" were made by the Yard Commandant, captain 
' ' William T. Burwell. 
The Navy League 
In December, 1902, a potentially formidable and 
certainly less inhibited agency for publicity was 
founded outside the confines of government, the Navy 
. 24 League of the United States. The League was fonned 
28 
by men who believed, 0 ••• the American people would have 
' to be educated to appreciate the cormection between sea 
power and America's new international responsibilities. 
Thus educated, they would exert pressure upon Congress 
to provide with generosity and promptness for a suit-
able peacetime Navy."25 
The extent of the Bavy•s involvement itself in 
formation of the League is not laloWD.. The Navy•s Office 
of Naval Intelligence had been following closely the 




The actual proposal for an American league was made at 
an annual meeting in New York of the Naval Order of the 
United States in November, 1902, presided over by Rear 
Admiral Albert Barker, Commandant of the New York Navy 
Yard. 27 Barker urged creation of the League as an 
adjunct to the Navy "to enlighten (the) people ••• on 
naval matters and tell them what a Navy means to the 
country and what it ought to mean to them."28 Approval 
for the group was obvious. 
In the League's creation was an organization which 
could bring to the attention of the American public and 
to Congress the salient issues which demanded a first-
class naval force and could challenge, as well, the 
anti-preparedness propaganda of the peace groups. 
To bring its message to the public's attention, 
the League planned to use several devices. 29 It 
foresaw speakers touring throughout the country; issu-
ance of press releases and information pamphlets to 
selected editors, Congressmen and opinion leaders; 
wide distribution of the League-produced magazine and 
local sections meeting regularly to discuss naval matters 
and celebrate commemorative oceasions.?O 
On October 6, 1906, the Navy League section in 
Philadelphia created one such occasion which was called, 
"Navy Day." Later in its history the Navy League would 
hold an annual celebration on October 27, the birthday 
or Theodore Roosevelt. This first gathering on "Navy 
Day" attracted over 2,000 members to Atlantic City 
where the featured speaker, Secretary ot the Navy 
Charles Bonaparte, vigorously attacked "talse and mis-
leading statements by peace groups" and a hostile 
press. 31 
In his annual message to Congress in December, 
1906, Roosevelt requested sweeping personnel changes 
tor the Navy but only one capital ship per year.3lA 
Here was a place where the League might use its influ-
ence to effect. The Navy, the League's magazine, 
32 
called for the League to act. In February, the 
League convention met 1n Washington and endorsed the 
President's program. Roosevelt's address to the dele-
gates who called at the White House revealed his hopes 
for concerted League action, 
••• The President and the Congress both need to 
be remipded that it is neqessary for the sake 
of America to encourage the upbuilding and the 
maintenance of the 'United States Navy ••• I want 
all ot you in your ~espective homes, through 
the organs of public opinion, by your influence 
upon your representatives at every branch at 
Washington to see that the needs of the Navy 
~re not forgotten in the future. The Navy has 
no one to speak tor it save those who speak tor 
it because or their devotion to the honor and 
the integrity or the 'United States; and I ask 
that you and those like you ~ake your voices 
heard for the general welfare amid the din of 
voices that speak only for special interests.33 
30 
31 
For all of the expectations visited upon the League, 
its initial performance proved disappointing. Hamstrung 
by financial difficulties, defied by public apathy for 
the subject of increasing the nation's arms, opposed by 
both peace groups and an increasingly hostile Congress, 
the League's operations until 1908 fell far short of 
its potential.34 
Membership in, and support for the League had been 
expected from industrialists and wealthy businessmen. 
The expectation never materialized. American industry 
and commerce were thriving and a big navy might have 
led to international tensions and ultimately to war. 
The disruption of commerce would have far offset the 
short term gains from increased defense spending.35 
Jlecommendations For A Bureau of Information 
In December, 1905, the President of the General 
Board, Admiral George Dewey, recommended to the 
Secretary that the Navy and the Army consider seeking 
legislation which would prohibit the publishing, in time 
of war or when war was imminent, " ••• any information of 
. 
a military nature which is not f'urnished for publica-
tion by the War or Navy Departments."36 The recommen-
dation presupposed, but did not specifically address 
the details of an information organization. 
Following a conference with War Department offi-
cials, Sec~etary Bonaparte replied that the time was 
32 
inopportune for such legislation. He did consider the 
recommendation appropriate, however, in time of national 
peril and directed the Board to draft a bill for sub-
mission at a later date.37 He admonished the Board to 
care.fully consider, " ••• any measure which would seri-
ously and inJuriously affect the legitimate business 
of the press or interfere with the natural, and indeed 
patriotic desire of the general community for prompt 
and reliable information respecting public affairs in 
time of war."38 
The General Board returned the proposed legis-
,' 39 
lation to the Secretary in April. Contained therein 
was a provision for presidential designation of officers 
for special duties in the preparation and release of 
military information, including the creation of what 
40 
might be called a Bureau of Information. The pro-
posal evidently was shelved to await a propitious 
moment, but thinking had progressed to an active interest 
in the problem in times of emergency if not in times of 
peace. 
Exhibitions and Naval Reviews 
For Blropean naval powers, the 18901 s were marked 
by international naval visits and naval reviews in great 
41 
races for prestige and popular support. The United 
States abstained from these extravaganzas until 1902 
33 
when President Roosevelt's invitation brought Germany's 
newest battleships into New York for display. The 
following year, four American cruisers under Rear Admiral 
Charles s. Cotton appeared in succession at Marseilles, 
Kiel and Portsmouth, England. In 1904, Roosevelt sent 
six battleships and eight cruisers to tour and call at 
the ports throughout the Mediterranean. 42 
In 1905, fleet visits were exchanged with the 
French, and the British Navy sent a contingent of six 
battleships to New York, where, interpersed with 
American ships, they formed a line in the Hudson 
stretching from Fifty-fourth Street to Grant's Tomb.43 
In the same year Roosevelt inaugurated a series of 
naval reviews in front of his home on Long Island Sound 
where, according to Hart, " ••• the President's lawn was 
packed with important guests. Wanting a good press 
for the Fleet, Roosevelt asked journalists to the 
parades to get them 1under the naval spe11.1 11 44 
In 1906, the President sent eight battleships to 
the Algeciras Conference which was meeting to settle 
the Moroccan dispute between France and Germany. The 
ships next went to the International Exposition at 
Bordeaux and then on to Portsmouth for the British-
Russian pageant. 45 The ships had just time enough to 
return to the United States for the April, 1907, 
34 
convening of the Jamestown Exposition 
The display, according to Collier's Weekly, "sur-
passed anything the Western Hemisphere had ever accom-
plished in that line ... 46 Squadron's of ships repre-
senting thirteen nations joined the entire Atlantic 
Fleet in Hampton Roads on public display. 47 General 
visiting aboard the ships to afford the public the 
opportunity to examine the vessels, parades, inter-
ship boat races and other sporting events -- all were 
included in the plan to familiarize the public with 
and to popularize the Navy. 48 Navy participation in 
49 the St. Louis Louisiana Purchase Exposition, where 
a full-scale mock-up of a U.S. Navy man-o-war was 
constructed, paled when compared to the full exhibition 
of the real thing. Navy,recruiters were on hand to 
take advantage of the spectacle. 
The Cruise of the Great White Fleet 
As the ships of the fleet rode at anchor in 
Hampton Roads, a rumor cropped up that the Jamestown 
display was nothing compared to what was coming -- a 
'round the world cruise of the battle fleet. 
The news of the cruise was announced by Secretary 
of the Navy Victor Metcalf in an interview in San Fran-
cisco in July50 Editorial and Congressional reaction 
to the announcement was immediate. Along the eastern 
seaboard voices were raised against stripping the 
Atlantic of its first line of defense in favor of a 
"Training Cruise" to the Pacific.51 
35 
The Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 
:Ellgene Hale of Maine, went so far as to declare that 
the fleet could not go because Congress would refuse to 
appropriate the necessary funds. Roosevelt countered 
the threat by replying that the Navy had sufficient 
funds to carry them to the Pacific and that if Congress 
should decide to leave them there, that was Congress' 
problem. 52 
Reaction in the international press fanned the 
flames in the Yellow Journals of the United States. 53 
Meanwhile, the Navy made preparations for the cruise 
and Roosevelt selected the journalists who would 
accompany the ships and tell the story the President 
wanted told. 54 According to Hart,55 
••• favorable accounts could be expected from 
writers who were also naval officers. The 
high-circulation Harper's Weekly was the out-
let for the stories of Lie~tenant Commander 
Philip Andrews and Marine Captain Henry c • 
.Da.vid ••• correspondents from big New York 
papers and the press associations (however) 
presented a problem. Men like R. H. Patchin, 
N. Rose, R. Zogbaum, J. R. Crowell, R. Berry 
and R. Bennett insisted that they were repor-
ters, n.ot publ1c1 ty men. '?o win berths on 
the cruise, however, all had to agree that 
every word would be passed upon by duly 
appointed naval officers. 




news by the wire services clicking word of their depar-
ture, the sixteen battleships which comprised the 
Great White Fleet weighed anchor and proceeded slowly 
in column past the Presidential yacht Mayflower and out 
to sea. 
Extravagant publicity had preceded the fleet's 
departure. It continued to accompany its every move 
as it sailed around the Horn into the Pacific, called 
at coastal ports and then proceeded on to the Far F.ast, 
thence to the Mediterranean and finally returned home.56 
The effect upon world opinion left in the wake 
of the ships was significant.57 United States and 
foreign press which had criticized the cruise at its 
inception heralded its success upon its termination.58 
The tributes, however, were not without reservation. 
"Publicity," said Hart, "was, in itself, a part of 
the voyage's history -- and also a source for it. 11 59 
The accounts of the correspondents who accompanied the 
ships can attest to the statement. The newspapermen, 
needing colorful stories to file, " ••• were creating 
what, in the jargon of the future, might be called an 
image. 1160 The "image," was not without its effect, 
however, and "veteran officers were beginning to under-
. 61 
stand the rudiments of public relations." 
One of the immediate effects was in the boost to 




to ~he publicity surrounding the voyage. 62 The overall 
popularization or the Navy was more important. 
As Roosevelt later recalled, " ••• My prime purpose 
was to impress the American people; and this purpose 
was fully achieved ••• Ho single thing in the history of 
the new United States Navy has done as much to stimu-
late popular interest and belief in it as the world 
cruise."63 
. 
That particular effect to dramatize a cause had 
been forecast by the London Spectator before the cruise 
began, 
••• All over America the people will follow the 
movements of the fleet; they will learn some-
thing of the intricate details of the coaling 
and the commissariat work under warlike con-
d1 tions; and in a word their attention will 
be aroused ••• we are sure that, apart from 
increasing the efficiency of the existing 
fleet64th1s is what Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. 
Certainly tb.at was true. If the effect did not 
get the message across to Congress in the waning ~ys 
or Roosevelt's administration, perhaps it wasn't lost 
on the American public at large. 
38 
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Building for War and Establishment of 
the Navy News Bureau 
Chapter III 
With the departure from the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt and the succession of William Howard Taft, 
the question arose whether the naval policy of Roosevelt 
would carry over to his chosen successor. 
There was little question that Taft's foreign 
policy bordered on isolationism. 1 The import upon 
naval policy, which is so inextricably tied thereto, 
remained obscure. Taft's steps on the naval scene 
seemed to be governed by fear of a failure to keep up 
in the naval race with F.u.rope. 2 The result was that 
the ship construction program advanced by Roosevelt 
gene;ally was continued by Taft.3 
The naval policy of the ad.ministration did not 
enjoy Congressional support, however, and the recom-
mendations of the Navy General Board for four battle-
ships in both 1910 and 1911 were pared to two by the 
President in an effort to gain legislative support. 4 
Seeking to take his cause directly to the people, 
Taft staged dramatic fleet reviews in both San Diego 
and New York which provided platforms for public 
appeals by both the President and his Secretary of 
the Navy, George von Lengerke Meyer. The reviews 
were timed for November, 1911, just prior to the 
opening sessions of Congress. The efforts appeared for 
nought, however, for the Democratic-dominated House 
Naval Affairs Committee reported a naval appropriation 
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bill without provision for even one battleship.6 The 
administration's proposals were in considerable 
difficulty. 
Arousal of the Navy League 
44 
The Navy League, stirred to new life, began support 
for a continued building program in 1909. In February, 
following the convention held at Fortress Monroe to 
welcome home the fleet from its world cruise, the League 
released a resume of its convention platforms to the 
press of the nation. By March, ninety-five articles 
had appeared in fifty-eight newspapers. 7 
In April, the League's new secretary, Henry H. 
Ward, set out, with approval of the Board of Directors 
and the informal endorsement of the Secretary of the 
Navy, to publish for the first time a comprehensive 
book.let enumerating the planks of the League's plat-
8 form. Entitled, "Patriotic Reasons for the Navy 
League of the United States,• it was intended for 
release to editors and opinion leaders. Initial dis-
tribution was made in July to 5,000 carefully chosen 
individuals.9 Before year's end an additional 20,000 
were distributed as well as 40,000 pieces of three 
other pamphlets_. lo 
In 1910, League action was active in combating 
propaganda of the peace groups. In the upcoming debates 
on the naval appropriations bill of 1910-1911, the 
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League foresaw a major test. Two weeks before the vote 
was taken, the League sent letters to members in thirty-
three states with a listing of Congressmen known to be 
opposed to or not favoring the increased budget. The 
letters urged members to put pressure on their Congress-
men and to agitate in their local press.11 When the 
bill passed the House, the League stood to sha;re in -
some of the credit. 
By the time the bill had gone to the Senate in 
May, 1910, the League had held its annual convention 
and made wide distribution of yet another pamphlet 
urging increased appropriations for ship construction. 
The Senate measure passed increasing the number of shi.ps 
authorized by the House.12 While credit could not be 
laid solely to League efforts, the success attending 
their labors in pushing for greater preparedness did 
serve to increase their self-confidence and offer some 
assurance that League drives could expect tangible 
results. 13 
At the end of the fiscal year on March 30, 1911, 
League officials could look back with considerable 
gratification. Membership had grown to 7,000; over 
80,000 publicity releases had been issued with a high 
incidence of their use; and membership sections had 
become more active.14 The League was able to receive 
the congratulations of the Secretary of the Navy with 
15 
a feeling of accomplishment. 
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The League's annual convention was held in Washington 
in February, 1912. Guests attending included the 
President, the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of 
the Navy, and the Chairmen of the House Appropriations, 
Naval, and Foreign Affairs Committees. The delegates 
endorsed the President's two-battleship program in spite 
of the fact that the Democratic caucus in the House had 
16 gone on record in January against any capital ships. 
In March the League sent letters to its entire 
membership urging support for the building program and 
sent like information to about 200 selected editors 
suggesting ed1torials or news items. Press response 
was gratifying as a large number of newspapers came 
out in favor of the two-battleship program. 17 The bill, 
however, cleared the House as it had been reported out 
of the Naval Affairs Committee -- without provision for 
a single capital ship. 18 The Senate, however, inserted 
the two-battleship provision, and the bill went into 
conference. 
While the Senate-House committee was meeting, 
the League continued to press for the program. It 
sent a circular to 250 small country newspapers, to 
twenty larger papers and news services and to each 
Senator and Congressman. The Committee compromised 
on one capital ship. The bill of 1912, moreover, 
47 
provided for a personnel increase of 4,000 sailors and 
400 marines and for the construction of six destroyers, 
eight submarines, and four supply vessels. The total 
bill represented the largest naval appropriation in 
American history to that date. 19 
As the lame-duck Congress met to consider funds 
for the 1913•14 budget, the League was setting out 
again to provide support for an increased building pro-
gram designed to keep the United States Navy on a 
footing comparable to that of the major Ellropean powers. 
The Navy League of the United States had begun to~rform 
20 
with effect. It did so with the active cooperation 
of the Navy. 
It is noteworthy that, in the Taft administration, 
Congress significantly increased naval appropriations 
some sixty million dollars over the last four years 
of the Roosevelt administration. 21 At the same time, 
ship construction was curtailed. The difference lay 
essentially in pork-barrel legislation and patronage. 22 
Restriction on Information 
In November, 1911, a British magazine published23 
a lengthy and detailed article on the construction and 
operation of United States' submarines. The Navy Depart-
ment began an 1nuned.1ate investigation to determine who 
was responsible for the release of security information. 
I 
! ~ 
While later investigation pointed to a civilian 
24 
employe at the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, 
Secretary Meyer issued an order in December virtually 
stifling the free flow of any information to the mass 
media. 
General Order No. 139 
December 16, 1911 
No person belonging to the Navy, or employed 
under the Navy Department, shall convey or dis-
close by oral or written communications, pub-
lications, or any other means, except as may 
be required by his official duties, any infor-
mation whatever concerning the naval or mili-
tary establishment or forces, or concerning 
any person, thing, plan or measure pertaining 
thereto, or any information that might be of 
possible assistance to a foreign power, with-
out the express approval of the Navy Depart-
ment, and all articles containing detailed 
information concerning the naval establish-
ment or forces shall be submitted before 
publication to the Navy Department, Division 
of Operations of the Fleet, Office of Naval 
Intelligence for scrutiny. 
George von Lengerke Me~er 
Secretary of the Navy2' 
The test for the order was not long in coming. 
The following month, an explosion in the Navy Yard at 
Mare Island, California, brought immediate inquiry from 
the press. The Yard Commandant, acting under General 
Order 139 refused to give out information concerning 
the incident. The Vallejo Evening Chronicle, through 
its representative in Congress, complained of the 
repressive measure. Replying to Representative J. R. 
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Knowland, the Assistant Secretary outlined the reasons 
for the Commandant's refusal to give out the information. 
In a separate letter to the Yard Commandant, The Secre-
tary of the Navy amplified the intent of his instruc-
tion, "It was not the Department's intention ••• to 
forbid giving information of no military value to 
persons or newspapers: it is left to the judgment of 
commandants and commanding officers to decide what 
properly may be withheld.•26 Regardless of the inten-
tion, the statute remained on the books without modi-
fication. 
The schizophrenic nature of the Navy~s desire 
on the one hand to win support through the publicity 
activities of the Navy League and on the other to 
deny the press access to worthwhile subjects of interest 
seems anomalous. In February, 1912, while cooperating 
with the League's convention in Washington, the Secre-
tary of the Navy turned down a request from Gilson 
Gardner of the Washington Bureau of the Newspaper 
lihterprise Association for permission to place a 
correspondent on board a flotilla of torpedo boats 
during a cruise down the west coast. 28 The reasons 
for the denial were, "hardship·of the cruise and con-
siderations of security." The Secretary did offer, 
however, to have one of the officers of the flotilla 
50 
write the article.9 
In actuality, news of the Navy had traditionally 
emanated from the Navy Department; specifically from 
the Office of the Secretary. In February, 1910, F. R. 
Low, the editor of Power magazine, had written directly 
to the Navy's Bureau of Steam lmgineering asking to be 
put on the mailing list for news made publ1c.30 The 
Chief of the Bureau replied that "1nformat1on ••• g1ven 
out from any Bureau of the Navy Department must, under 
the order of the Secretary, come directly from his 
off1ce ••• n3l Low•s second letter to the Secretary was 
answered by the Assistant Secretary, 
The Department keeps no mailing list for the 
purpose of distributing news items. Any news 
for the press is given out verbally to various 
newspaper correspondents and to the represen• 
tatives of the various press associations, who 
make it a practice of calling at the Department 
daily for the R~rpose of gathering news in the 
manner stated.~ 
While it isn't obvious why t~e first reply couldn't 
have given Mr. Low the information he needed, it is 
clear that the function of informing the public through 
the mass media was firmly vested in the Secretary of 
the Navy. Perhaps, with a view toward press interest, 
\ the incident inspired the Secretary to stir the 
Bureaus for more information, " ••• with a view to 
supplying the public press ••• with items that may come 
I 
up of possible interest ••• the Department desires to be 
furnished with brief statements of such items ••• as can 
properly be made public. 11 33 
Wilson, Daniels, and the Navy 
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The succession of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency 
installed Josephus Daniela as Secretary of the Navy. 
Former publisher of the Raleigh News and Observer, 
Daniels had been, as well, Chairman of the Publicity 
Bureau of the Kational Committee and had served actively 
in Wilson's campaign. The importance of news was 
familiar to the new Secretary even if the Navy wasn•t.34 
On March 6, 1913, the day after he took office, 
Daniels sent a memorandum to the Bureaus and Offices 
of the Navy Department requiring that all articles 
intended for the press be submitted to him.35 The 
order was repeated in Apri136 and reemphasized in 
September: 
The Secretary of the Navy directs that 
all articles tor the press be submitted to 
him before they are given out. It is directed 
that all memoranda for the press prepared in 
the various bureaus or offices be sent to the 
Secretary of the Navy through his private 
secretary. 
It is further directed that initials or 
' identifying marks be placed at the top of 
press notices so as to indicate the Bureau 
or office preparing same. 
While the utmost publicity consistent 
with existing regulations and the National 
Defense is desired; it has become necessary, 
in view of certain recent unauthorized 
publications, 37 to insist upon a strict and 
careful compliance with the broad general 
requirement that all articles or information 
intended for publication or the press be 
revised in the Secretary's office. 
Chiefs of Bureaus and heads of offices and 
divisions will take such steps as may be 
necessary to fully acquaint the personnel ••• 
with the requirements of this order.3~ 
The last two paragraphs were additions to the 
first two memoranda, and an unequivocal announcement 
that Secretary Daniels intended to handle the public 
relations of the Navy Department himself, through the 
person of his private secretary, Howard A. Banks. 
Banks, a former North Carolina journalist, is 
known to have handled many public relations functions 
for the Secretary, not the least of which was coor-
dination of Navy participation in the Panama-Pacific 
Exposition in San Francisco, 1914-191639 
Naval Aspects of Wilsonian Policy 
Following Wilson's election, navalphiles and 
others interested in military preparedness had 
expected the President to follow in Taft's footsteps 
in advocating an active building program for the Navy. 
The expectations were based both on the Democratic 
party's platform and upon Wilson's published philo-
sophy concerning the utility of strong naval power 
in the protection of neutral rights. 40 
In his 1913 message to Congress, however, the 
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President made no mention of naval policy, but simply 
endorsed the annual reports of the executive depart-
ments. 41 For his part, Secretary Daniels made no signi-
ficant departure from the proposals of.the previous 
administration but did scale down the recommendations 
of the General Board for tour battleships and a large 
number of smaller warships and auxiliaries to two 
42 battleships, eight destroyers and three submarines. 
The action was more surprising for its apparent 
lack of perception of growing world-wide armaments 
and their implications for u.s. foreign and naval 
policy. 43 While the Anglo-German naval equipoise and 
limitations of physical distance promised territorial 
security for the Western Bemisphere, the machinations 
of the Great Powers in the Far East portended a clash 
with American interests there. For the Navy, the 
implications pointed to the necessity of increased 
fleet strength and readiness.44 
Daniels, meanwhile, turned his major attention 
to the limitation of armaments, to the expansion of 
the domestic shore establishment and to welfare mea-
45 
sures for naval personnel. Nowhere did he address 
the strategic implications confronting the Navy, which 
was all the more surprising for in that year, the 
General Board was allowed to place its recommendations 
46 
upon the public record. For the first time this 
naval planning and advisory group was allowed to 
include an appendix to the Secretary's report and 
permitted to have a representative testify before the 
naval committees of Congress. 47 
The memorandum. of the Board focused upon the lack 
of orderly development of the Navy and the need for a 
long-term policy, " ••• founded on our national needs 
and aims." To this end, the Board favored "giving 
the widest publicity 11 to its own views on policy, 
"taking the people and the Congress into ••• full con-
fidence ••• inviting intelligent criticism as well as 
support.u48 In its first such statement, the Navy's 
planning body had enunciated a fundamental public 
relations policy admirably. 
The naval appropriations bill, after spirited 
debate in both House and Senate, was signed into law 
essentially as the administration had recommended it 
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-- just two days after the assassination of the 
Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914.Gon-
tributing to its passage had been the newly found 
voice of the professional Navy speaking with recog-
nition of the effects of public opinion upon national 
and naval policy. Captain Alfred T. Mahan had voiced 
the principle several years before, " ••• public opinion, 
55 
in operation, constitutes national policy ••• 1149 
Perhaps Secretary Daniels had played a role in the 
Board's expressed philosophy, although there is no 
evidence which might confirm such influ~~ce. On March 
10, 1913, an entry in his diary reads,HConferred with 
Naval (General} Board about the necessity of publicity 
--about the ways to secure accurate news to the people 
about the doings in the Navy. Too little is published 
and I planned to see that the public is acquainted 
with all that happens of interest. 11 50 
With Ellrope at War 
War in .Ellrope brought to America an anxiety as 
well as a sense of urgency. The traditional feelings 
of security which had marked American attitudes in the 
pre-war period crumbled before the spectre of unpre-
paredness. The drives of the preparedness groups, 
beginning in late 1914, gathered momentum during 1915 
due largely to public interest in the subject. 
The interests of the administration, however, 
were at considerable variance. The recommendations 
of the General Board for the building program in 1914 
exceeded only slightly those of the previous year.51 
Still, Daniels pared them down drastically to conform 
' 
to the economies of the adrninistration.52 In the 
Board's considerations of the deficiencies in enlisted 
personnel strength, the Secretary refused to publish 
I 
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the report until all specific references to the shortages 
were stricken from it. 53 
While a Literary Digest poll of newspaper editors 
revealed considerable support for increasing the armed 
forces,54 it was weighted in favor of the seaboard states 
whose natural interest ran in that direction. Inland 
opinion, according to a contemporary poll conducted 
by the Columbus {Ohio) Citizen, showed popular senti-
ment on the side of the administration.55 
The Great Preparedness Movement 
In the winter of 1914-15 the movement for pre-
paredness sponsored by private societies acting in all 
conceivable avenues began a great educational drive to 
bring Americans to the realization of the inadequacy 
of the nation's arms. Organizations such as the 
National Security League, the Army League, the Navy 
League, and the National Defense League began campaigns 
to agitate for greater preparedness on the part of the 
United States.56 
For their parts, both the Army and the Navy con-
tributed to the preparedness drive.57 11 ••• The Admini-
stration, reversing its earlier policy, came forward 
with a great armament program of its own and a 
supporting propaganda that equalled that of any 
pressure group in the field."58 
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Of the press activities of the Secretary of the 
Navy, little is written. l)l.niels did begin to hold 
twice-daily press conferences in his office for Washington 
newsmen. The beginning date of this procedure is 
uncertain. In addition, items of interest to newsmen 
during the period 1914-1917 were posted in the Navy 
Department. Normally, these notices were of a routine 
information nature and were titled, "Press Notices, 11 
or "Memorandum for the Press."59 Many of the news 
rel~ases60 began, "Secretary ianiels has announced ••• " 
or, "The Secretary of the Navy has authorized the 
announcement of ••• tt, leaving little doubt as to the 
authority for the release of information in the Navy. 
Several of the news releases provided verbatim 
transcripts of Daniels' speeches. But most noteworthy 
was the tempo and extent of the press release activity 
which picked up significantly in m.id-1915 and con-
61 tinued to do so through to the end of the war. This 
accent coincided roughly with the administration's 
decision to accelerate the strengthening of the nation's 
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military forces. 
A statement made by Daniels during the Congressional 
Investigations of 1917 concerning the Navy's lack of 
readiness for war is revealing of the Navy Secretary's 
philosophy of the function of information 
in government. Questioned whether the proceedings of 
the Committee should be made public, Daniels replied, 
Yes, it conveys facts that I think people would 
like to know and facts that they properly should 
know. My feeling in this war is that it is our 
high duty to give out to public information 
concerning everything we are doing, omitting 
only what expert military opinion says should 
not be made public ••• That is a duty that we 
owe to the public and there are good reasons 
why we must give that information out. 6The public should know everything possible. 3 
The application of this philosophy remained to be 
questioned. 
58 
In the years just prior to U.S. entry into the 
great war, both the activities of preparedness groups 
and international developments dramatized by events of 
the war combined with public opinion to secure legis-
lation supporting a record-breaking military estab-
lishment. 64 For the Navy, the appropriations act of 
1916 served as a milestone in the development of a 
modern seagoing force worthy of the name. While the 
building program received the major share of publi-
city, there were other significant provisions: the 
enlargement of the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, authorization and funding for the creation 
of a naval flying corps, major increases in both 
officer and enlisted strengths, and the establishment 
of an elaborate reserve organization. 65 Within that 
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naval act was sewn also an endorsement for the principle 
of disarmament -- a factor which would find larger sig-
nificance after the war. Perhaps, most important, how-
ever, was the long-sought mergence of foreign and 
military policy into an indefinable thing which could 
be called National Policy.66 
Daniels Versus the Navy League 
In August, 1917, a traditional tie was severed 
when Secretary Daniels issued the order, 
Directions are hereby given that after this 
date no officer, agent or representative of 
the Navy League is to be admitted to any ship, 
naval station or any naval reservation unless 
specifically directed by the Secretary of the 
Navy. Officers and men are enjoined to ~eceive 
nothing whatsoever from the Navy League.o7 
])lniels had long chafed under League critic is~ but 
an accusation made by the League implying complicity 
with certain labor elements during an investigation of 
a navy yard explosion in Mare Island was enough to dis-
rupt relations between the two totally. 68 
At stake was the vitality of the League itself. 
Though overtures were made by Robert M. Thompson, 
President of the League, the dissociation continued to 
the end of Daniels term. 
The Last Da.zs, Then War 
Appropriations do not establish fighting fleets 
they just provide for them. The building of the 
' _>'. 
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ships and the training of their crews take years. The 
Naval Act of 1916 gave recognition to the problem by 
establishing a five-year program for systematic develop-
ment and training of naval peraonne1. 69 
In the critical field of personnel, the shortage 
which Secretary Da.niels had denied existed in 1914 was 
partly compensated tor in 1917 by an emergency personnel 
measure authorizing an increase of 6,500 men.70 
Within hours after the President's signature, 
Daniels sent telegrams to more th.an a thousand news-
papers in the 'O'nited States asking them to print rront-
page notices of the Navy's need. According to Daniels, 
most of them wrote editorials as we11.71 
Appointment of Belknap 
The accelerated pace of events involving the Navy 
in early 1917 worked a burden upon the information 
function. In February, the Army and Navy Journal noted, 
The Secretary of the Navy has turned over to 
Lieutenant Charles Belknap, Jr., of the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, the work of 
reviewing Havy Department advises and making 
public those which do not fall under the ban . 
of military secrecy. The Secretary will 
continue his daily conferences with the press 
representatives. Lieutenant Belknap will aid 
the press, however, in ob~aining quick action 
on questions that ariae.7 
From scattered entries in his diarr' Daniels reveals 




In deed, if not in name, the Navy had appointed its 
first public affairs officer. 
Jenkins and the Navy News Bureau 
On April 17, 1917, eleven days after the United 
States had declared war, the Secretary of the Navy 
asked John Wilbur Jenkins74 to come to Washington to 
take over the duties of Civilian Director of Infor-
mation. 75 Jenkins took over his new duties just three 
days later.76 
Within a few more days, the same arrangement was 
made with Marvin Hunter Mcintyre, City Editor of the 
Washington Herald to become Jenkins' assistant.77 Both 
Jenkins and Mcintyre, though paid by and carried on the 
books of George Creel's Committee on Public Information, 
worked for the Navy and established the Navy News 
Bureau. 78 The Bureau was staffed by several newspapermen 
called to active duty. 
Throughout the war Jenkins provided the principal 
liaison with the War and State Departments as well as 
with the Committee on Public Information. He kept the 
new organization small, believing that a large staff 
would serve only to inhibit the speedy relay and release 
of news.79 
In the news releases there was little pattern in 
the subject matter to indicate what kinds of infor-
mation released by the Navy were of interest to the 
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Committee. 80 In nearly all cases, the Committee left 
news and security judgments to the War and Navy Depart-
ments, providing only policy guidance. If there were 
problems in authority, they seem to have been solveq 
81 between Daniels and Creel by private discussion. 
As for President Wilson, his criticisms or suggestions 
concerning the release of Navy information were made 
directly to Daniels without reference to Creel or 
82 his Committee. 
The work of the Navy News Bureau during the war 
concentrated on news of the convoys and the anti-sub-
marine operations -- the major naval activity. The 
Bureau also prepared and distributed transcripts of 
the Secretary's daily press conferences. In the main, 
the more important items were announced by Daniels 
in his twice-daily sessions83 With feature materials, 
stories were released in advance of publication time to 
allow the newspapers ample opportunity to set them in 
type. One series of features, prepared by Jenkins, 
contained biographical sketches of prominent naval 
officers and Navy Department bureau Chiefs.84 
Coordination of the work of the News Bureau within 
the professional naval circles of the Navy Department 
was accomplished by Lieutenant Commander (formerly 
Lieutenant) Charles Belknap, Jr., working in the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations.85 Major 
determinations concerning the release of information 
were subjects of discussion between the Secretary and 
Admiral Wil~am s. Benson, the Chief of Naval Opera-
86 tions, although Belknap was often a party to the 
discussion. It was Daniels who made the ultimate 
decision. 
At War's Fnd 
The termination of hostilities left the Navy 
News Bureau with a big job yet to be done -- the news 
of returning our forces from overseas. The organi-
zation had proved equal to the task of wartime demands. 
Few would criticize the work it had done. 87 Though 
the Creel Committee was disbanded without the recog-
nition it had earned, the public affairs function in 
the Navy went on to build a yet more effective place 
in the military service. 
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At War's End: 
The Reogranization 
Chapter IV 
War's end had produced a strange conflict of 
political ideologies and practical realities. President 
Wilson's objective in entering the war was to produce 
an enduring peace. Against this purpose were the hard 
facts of Japanese occupation of, and subsequent pre-
eminence in the German holdings in the Western Pacific 
and Great Britain's sea dominance in Bl.rope by virtue 
of the destruction of the German High Seas Fleet. 
To complicate the problem, political and military 
planners were confronted by rising expectations on the 
part of the American :Public for a lasting peace with-
out armaments. 1 
Of lasting implication, too, was the astounding 
development in military and industrial technologies 
for the Navy, the portents of submarine and aerial 
warfare upon the current naval strategy. 2 
Noting the dramatic rise of both Great Britain 
and Japan. as naval powers, and potentially naval rivals 
of the United States, naval planners in 1918 and 1919 
advocated a return to battleship construction which 
had been held in abeyance during the war in favor of 
increased destroyer production to cope with the German 
submarine menace.3 Continuation of the 1916 naval 
bill's construction rate would, by 1925, make the 
American Navy the equal of any in the world. 4 
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In December, 1918, the proposals of the naval 
General Board received President Wilson's endorsement 
72 
in his annual message to Congress. Secretary Daniels, 
as well, included support for the increased construction 
program in his annual report.5 This advocacy, however, 
was seen in different perspective from that of the 
naval planners. The administration intended to use 
these proposals as cnunsubtle influence for the Ell.ropean 
allies to conform to Wilsonian desires for the stabili-
6 
zation of world order and the reduction of armaments. 
Six months later, Daniels appeared before the House 
Naval Affairs Committee to reconunend abandonment of his 
previous proposal for a huge three-year building 
program, predicating the reversal on a renewed faith in 
the League of Nations. 
The operations of the Navy News Bureau, meanwhile, 
had continued uninte:rupted. In December, 1918, a 
fleet review in New York provided the Navy a fine oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its publicity operation. 8 Detailed 
advance planning; provisions for press, dignitary, and 
general ship visits; speeches and special events all 
were included in the p~try. Advance features on 
the ships and their conunanding officers, with the 
Bureau's imprimatur were issued to insure press interest 
in the event. 9 For John Wilbur Jenkins, it marked one 
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of his final projects with the Bureau. He was succeeded 
10 in April, 1919, by his assistant, Marvin Mcintyre. 
With the dissolution of the Committee on Public Infor-
mation in June, 1919, Mcintyre became formally an 
11 
employee of the Navy Department. 
The Popular Revolt Against Navalism 
Set against the accelerated building proposals of 
the Navy was the post-war tide of public opinion. Not 
only was the temper of American people to be measured 
in the nation's press, 12 but, perhaps more accurately, 
on the floor of the House in bitter debate over 
appropriations,13 and in other indicators such as the 
rapid and drastic decline of interest in the Navy 
League. 14 
From its high-water mark of preparedness and war-
time prosperity, the tide ebbed to low water--to post-
war depression and abiding concern for the cost of arma-
ments to keep the United States, unnecessarily in the view 
of many, on a par with Great Britain. When next the tide 
flowed, in 1920-21, it flowed with the strength of the 
peace movement, carrying upon its crest a popular fervor 
which washed across the nation, floating a platform which 
ended in the international limitation of arms con-
ferences in Washington. Influential newspapers, 
peace societies, churches of all denominations, 
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women's groups, labor groups -- all had a voice in 
affixing their support for an international detente. 15 
They had fought a war to end all wars! 
The Internecine Naval War 
In December, 1919, the Secretary of the Navy 
published a list of medal awards for wartime service 
16 
as a part of his annual report. On December 15, the 
Washington Post published a page one story bylined by 
Albert w. Fox $uggesting that Congress investigate 
the discrepancy between the actual awards and those 
17 
recommended by the Naval Awards Board. On December 
17, Admiral William s. Sims, the war's foremost naval 
commander and, then, President of the Naval War College, 
declined his medal. Sims' declination, tor alleged 
injustices in the awards, precipitated a rash of similar 
refusals from deserving officers and, with it, a storm 
of controversy. The aftermath was a Congressional 
investigation. 
The underground river which had been running at 
cross purposes to the Secretary came boiling to the 
surface. The question of just awards served to 
raise further and more fundamental inquiries into the 
administration of the Navy Department, questions which 
had been raised but not satisfactorily answered in the 
\ 
1917 probes. 18 Included were the Navy's inability to 
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exercise military command through an effective Chief 
of Naval Operations, failure of the Department to make 
adequate preparations for war, preoccupation of the 
Secretary with trivia and politics to the disregard of 
strategic considerations, and, as well, the propaganda 
campaign of Daniels, his News Bureau and his technical 
Bureau Chiefs to convince the general public that the 
Navy had been prepared for war in all respects. 19 
The internal strife in the Navy Department was 
paraded before the Senate Naval Affairs sub-committee, 
whose Chairman, Senator .Eugene Hale of Maine, took 
great care in cross examination to raise fully the 
points of relevance to future organization and 
operation of the Department. 20 Many of the Admirals 
who headed Bureaus in the Navy Department during the 
war, whose opening statements to the Committee were 
subject to Daniels' scrutiny, modified their positions 
during Hale's cross examination. 21 
As to the information aspects of Daniels' 
administration Kittredge felt compelled to write: 
••• (when the war came) ••• automatically the 
curtain was dropped, so far as the public was 
concerned, over the activities of the Navy 
Department. One of Mr. Daniels' first acts, 
on assuming office in 1913, had been to issue 
orders in the Navy Department that henceforth 
all public statements would be issued by his 
office. After war began, this order was more 
rigidly enforced than ever before. The 
country knew only what Mr. Daniels wanted it 
to know of what was going on, --and surely 
Mr. Daniels was painting a picture roseate 
enough for even the most belligerent citizen. 
Day after day a flood of notices poured out 
from the Navy Department of all the things 
that the Navy had done, was doing and was 
going to do. From the day that we declared 
war one would have imagined, from Mr. Daniels' 
official statements, that the whole of the 
Navy at once, 1~so facto, was transformed to 
a war basis ••• 2 
The vacillation of Secretary Daniels which had for so 
long festered in the breasts of many professional 
officers was recalled. The propaganda cover for the 
Navy's inadequate preparations had been an additional 
source of frustration for naval officers. 23 
The hearings themselves, according to Kittredge, 
were slanted in their press coverage by a Secretary 
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who knew how to take advantage of the press operation. 24 
In Sims' opening statement he noted Daniels' advantage, 
"In view of the public presentation of this case, which 
has resulted from no intent on my part, I am perhaps 
handicapped by lack of any connection with the press 
or experience in manipulating that important instrument 
of public opinion. 1125 That lesson was not to be lost 
on the professional Navy which had heretofore shown 
ultraconservatism in public affairs. 
Though rancor, dissension and recrimination 
characterized the hearings, a larger principle had 
been enunciated by Sims in his final conclusion of 
lessons learned in the war, 
The country must take a more active interest 
in the welfare of its first line of defense. 
It must insist on having full and correct 
reports of the condition of the Navy. It 
must demand and exact a full responsibility 
from the officials entrusted with the 
direction and administration of the Navy. 
Naval officers should be permitted a greater 
liberty of expression in order that the 
repetition of such a demoralizing tyrann~6 as that of Mr. Daniels may be prevented. 
The pronouncement made a good case for an open public 
affairs function in the Navy. 
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Daniels, in a term longer than any Secretary before 
him, had made many reforms in the service. Not all were 
popular, nor were all necessarily good. He had insti-
tuted a formal organization for the dissemination of 
news; however, the control he exercised over that 
operation was not above criticism. Within his tenure, 
the United States Navy had grown to a second rank 
among the world's naval powers -- though many events 
propelled the development in spite of the Secretary 
rather than because of him. Nonetheless, the information 
bureau created by Daniels was to continue on unbroken 
to the present day, largely through the efforts of 
subsequent civilian and naval leaders who saw, in the 






Harding and D1sarmament27 
President Harding entered the White House on 
March 4, 192~ with public commitments to undertake 
steps toward international agreements in limitations 
of armaments. In early April, his special message 
to Congress reflected this philosophy in a call for 
28 
a reduction in defense expenditures. On April 20, 
however, the administration disclosed its opposition 
78 
to curtailment of the building program authorized in 
1916. The apparent procrastination caused an immediate 
reaction in the disarmament movement, the proponents 
of which resumed their publicity campaigns. 29 
Noting the disparity between preparedness and 
disarmament news coverage, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. recommended to 
Navy Secretary Edwin Denby in March that the Navy 
undertake a program to select and send newspaper 
correspondents to a special course at the Naval War 
College.30 The purpose of the proposal was to increase 
the newsmen's understanding of the Navy. The recom-
mendation was forwarded to the General Board by Denby 
for further consideration. In April, the Board 
recommended31 that the War College ~nstitute such 
a program noting additionally, 
••• The war and movies and the Recruiting Service 
with its publicity bureau have done much to 
bring the Navy prominently before the people. 
But the Navy Department needs the active and 
continuous aid of the American press through 
the agencies of the Sunday paper and the 
illustrated popular weeklies to furnish 
serious information as to broad policies 
in an interesting manner to combat the 
efforts being made to reduce and even dis-
pense with the Navy. Popular articles by 
naval officers on live topics would also be 
of value. 
Though the problem was addressed from the lack of a 
broad base of information, no mention was made of 
the then functioning Navy News Bureau which continued 
its operation until September,192~ when it became the 
Navy Press Room. A lack of funds had forced abandon-
ment of the War College plan.32 It was also a funding 
problem which had forced a curtailment of the News 
Bureau's operation and staff.33 
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In September, the name Navy News Bureau was changed 
to Navy Press Room, 34 and a Naval Reserve Lieutenant 
Commander, Wells Hawks, became the Information Officer 
of the Navy?5 He was also the information staff. 
The Washington Naval Conference 
On November 12, 1921,the naval limitation of· 
arms conference convened in Washington. In a dramatic 
and calculated. announcement Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes proposed not only the disarmament plans 
for the United States, but offered commensurate 
measures for the other naval powers as we11.36 In a 
stroke, the leadership for the disarmament movement 
had been placed in the hands of the administration.37 
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Popular enthusiasm and support for the American proposal 
swept the United States.38 
The chief architect for the proposal in this 
fashion had been Hughes. He was ably assisted on 
the technical details by just three men in the Navy 
Department--Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore 
Roosevelt, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert 
E. Coontz, and his assistant, captain William v. Pratt. 39 
Coming as it did as a compl~te surprise, information 
regarding the proposal of the United States was at a 
premium. The details, together with their ramifications 
for other navies, were supplied mainly by Secretary of 
the Navy Denby in his daily press conferences. 40 It 
was no mean task. Several hundred journalists repre-
senting both the U.S. and foreign press were on hand 
for the conferences. 41 This method for the release of 
1nf ormation directly from the primary source was 
continued throughout the conference. 
The Fight for Naval Aviation 
During this s~e period, with public sentiment 
running high in support of limitations of armaments, 
the Director of the War Plans Division within the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a 
memorandum in January, 1922, to the Chief of Naval 
Operations recommending the establishment of a Press 
42 Relations office. The purpose of the office, as 
envisioned, would be f ourtold: 
To furnish correct information; to actively 
and definitely contradict incorrect public 
statements; to familiarize the people of 
the United States with the work and needs 
of the naval service, (and) to promote 
interest in the Navy. 
The rationale supporting the recommendation continued, 
" ••• it is but necessary to refer to the recent bombing 
tests to show the power of propaganda and the weakness 
of the lack of propaganda." 
The Office of Naval Intelligence concurred in 
the recommendation, which proposed location of the 
press relations office within Naval Intelligence, and 
added, " ••• information that is inconsistent or anta-
gonistic to the policy or views of the Department 
would ••• be more harmful than no publicity at all ••• 
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the closest liaison would be necessary between the 
publicity office and the head of the Navy Department."43 
The recommendation smacked of policy control for other 
than military security. However, the endorsement for 
an office of press relations included the suggestion 
for ordering an officer 
••• of special talent, rank and experience 
to Operations to act as publicity officer ••• 
where he would maintain close contact with 
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence and 
the Bureaus and be responsible44or all information and news releases. 
Considerations of aviation and its effects on 
naval strategy had been of concern in the Navy 
Department for several years. In its recommendations 
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for construction in 1918, the General Board had requested 
an aircraft carrier, envisioning the advantages of 
airpower as an adjunct to fleet operations. 45 In 1919, 
provision was made for an air arm and permission granted 
by Congress on a proposal for conversion of a collier 
to a primitive aircraft carrier. 46 In 1920, the Board 
proposed to construct four large, high speed carriers 
in a three-year building program. 47 
While the propaganda activities of General William 
48 Mitchell captured the popular imagination and head-
lines, advocates of air power within the Navy were less 
vocal in their criticisms of the conservative elements 
within their service which inhibited aviation's progress. 
The Navy was sensitive to Mitchell's activities. During 
the fall, 1919, hearings conducted by the House Military 
Affairs Committee on a separate air service, Secretary 
of the Navy Daniels sent a letter to the Committee 
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Chairman asking that the Navy Department be given ample 
opportunity to present its views. He included a copy 
of a letter he had sent to Secretary of War Baker 
refuting in laborious detail many of the statements 
made by Mitchell. The whole package was the subject of 
a six-page news release distributed by the Navy News 
Bureau. 49 
As noted above, a press relations office had been 
recommended, partially, it would seem, to fight the 
public battle over air power. Following the bomping 
tests made against target ships and the sinking of the 
"impregnable" Ostfriesland in the Spring and Summer of 
1921, the press had heralded the doom of the battleship. 
The event forced upon naval planners a painful reevalu-
ation of naval strategy, a process all too reluctantly 
undertaken by many senior officers. 5° Counter-propa-
ganda was not the answer, although it made sense why 
the proposals for a press relations office contained, 
in a period of deep doctrinal controversy, provisions 
for policy guidance. It was also at this time that 
the Arms Conference, in December, recommended statutes 
imposing limitations on construction of aircraft carriers. 
Information tJnder Intelligence 
By February, 1922, the decision upon previous 
recommendations had been reached. The information 
function in the Navy was placed under Naval Intelligence.51 
1. In order to supply general Navy infor-
mation constantly requested from various 
societies and newspapers throughout the 
United States, an information section has 
been established under the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 
2. In order not to increase overhead expenses 
the work of this section will be delegated to 
the various Bureaus and Offices under the 
general supervision of the Director of Naval 
Intelligence. This delegation of special 
work for the present will be as follows: 
(a) Daily press handled by the Aide to 
the Secretary and an officer of the 
Information Section. 
(b) General Navy information to ~e collected 
and mailed as routine to such societies 
or papers requesting it. This work is to 
be handled b~ the Morale Division in 
Navigation.5 
(c) Information on specific subjects as 
requested. This work to be handled by 
Morale Di.vision in Navigation. 
(d) Pictures. This ~ork to be handled by 
the photographic section of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics. 
~. The Di.rector of Naval Intelligence in 
addition to supervising the work enumerated 
above will lend his assistance to individual 
writers on naval subjects and naval stories, 
in order that facts given may be correct. 
4. All Bureaus are requested to lend full 
assistance in providing accurate naval 
information not considered as confidential. 
5. No policies shall be enunciated by any of 
the agencies mentioned. The Secretary deter-
mines and announces policies. 
6. No statements derogatory to, or criti"cal 
of, other branches of government shall be 
issued. 
/s/ Edwin Denby 
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In March, 1922, Denby directed the Bureaus and 
Offices of the Navy Department to detail an officer 
and necessary clerical assistance to assist the Infor-
mation Section. "Officers so designated will meet 
at such times and.places as the Secretary may d1rect.u53 
On the first of May, a similar letter was sent to 
Fleet Commanders, District Commandants, and to 
Commanders of overseas stations directing them to 
appoint an officer to collect information and photo-
graphs from ships and stations under their respective 
commands and forward them weekly to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence. 54 · For the first time, the infor-
mation netWOJ'k had been spread throughout the military 
chain of command of the Navy. 
The first head of the Information Section was 
Commander Ralph A. Koch, who assumed his duties in 
54A February. At Koch's suggestion, two lieutenants, 
John B. Heffernan and w. F. Dietrich, were appointed 
as assistants. The precepts of the Information Section's 
operations with the press were to provide complete 
and factual answers to press queries. There was 
little activity in the initiation of press releases, 
but those that were provided were distributed to all 
on a strictly equal basis. The major portion of the 
news came from Secretary Denby himself who was avail-
able to press representatives every afternoon, or in 
I 
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the mornings by appointment. Liaison was maintained 
with the Secretary by Koch, who also maintained close 
contact with the publicity bureau in New York. 55 
Repairing the Rift 
By the fall of 1921 when the Limitation of Arms 
Conference was convening, the Navy League of the 
86 
United States had become all but defunct.56 Desperately, 
its leadership held on to see what results the Conference 
would have upon the United States Navy. They were 
appalled at Conference's end in February, but deter-
mined then more than ever to find an active role in 
building up the Navy.57 
To maintain the sea forces at full treaty strength 
became the League's objective. Powerful peace groups 
were on hand in Washington to urge further cuts in 
military appropriations.58 When the General Board 
recommended personnel strength below the level necessary 
to man a treaty-strength fleet and Secretary Denby 
further pared the figure in an economy move, the issue 
was drawn -- the Navy League had a worthy cause.59 A 
further cut by the Naval Affairs Committee brought an 
eventual compromise figure between that body and Denby 
which was far below fleet requirements. Though the 
League was highly reluctant to accept this figure as 
being in the best interests of the Navy, the 
'i 
realization that Congress would probably approve none 
greater and reassurances from the Secretary that it 
represented a temporary expedient, the League closed 
ranks behind the Secretary -- aware that internal 
dissension at this critical period would dismember 
any effort at concerted action. 60 
The League embarked immediately upon an educa-
tional campaign reminiscent of its operations of old 
-- publicity and editorial suggestions to newspapers, 
letters to the full membership urging them to exert 
influence upon their Congressmen, literature to 
influentials and legislators. -- all aimed at 
securing passage of the bill over opposition moving 
for increased appropriation cuts. The manpower bill 
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did pass, although an estimate of the League's influence 
cannot be made. 61 The small but loyal membership had 
returned to a program of action. 
In August, 1922, according to Navy League historian 
Armin Rappaport, the president of the League sounded 
out the Navy Department on a proposal for the estab-
lishment of an annual day "on which the people of the 
country would be reminded, through the concerted efforts 
of numerous patriotic organizations, of the Navy and 
its value to them. 062 The project was approved by 
then Acting Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and 
the cooperation of the Navy assured by a directive 




October 27 was selected, being the birthday of Theodore 
Roosevelt and the reported anniversary date of the 
submission of the first naval bill, and preparations 
for the celebration got underway with the blessings 
64 
of Denby and Roosevelt. The enmity between the 
League and the Navy Department which had come in the 
Daniels administration was thus healed and both the 
Department and the League could look forward to further 
cooperation such as was demonstrated in the League's 
first official Navy Day in 1922. 65 
In fact, cooperation with the League in 1923 
became firm. 
The connection between League and Navy pro-
ceeded directly from the society's head-
quarters to the Navy Secretary's office. 
The connection ••• was constant and con-
tinuous. The League's secretary, president 
and individual directors solicited advice, 
accepted suggestions, submitted releases 
for approval prior to publication, and 
generally kggt in close touch with the 
Department. 
Press Relations 
In February, 1923, a year after incorporation of 
the information function within naval intelligence, 
Denby issued a directive throughout the naval service 
pointing out the principles of the Department's concern 
for continued active operations with the press:67 
1. It is the right of the Congress and the 
people of the United States to be fully 
informed concerning the ships, men and 
operation of the Navy. 
2. The press of the country is the most 
important vehicle by which information can 
be disseminated. It is interested in placing 
before its readers through news columns and 
editorial comment, the condition of the Navy 
and the operation of its ships. It is, 
therefore, of importance to the country and 
to the Navy, that the press should be placed 
in possession of all facts in connection 
with the service except such as are military 
secrets. 
3. It is directed that all commandants of 
Naval Districts, Nayy yards and naval stations 
and Flag officers, recruiting officers, and 
officers on detached duty, take steps to 
establish and maintain cordial relation-
ships with the press of their localities 
and to keep in mind the Department's 
policy and guide themselves accordingly. 
4. The Director of Naval Intelligence has 
been instructed to cooperate with the various 
offices concerned and to furnish them with 
such information and suggestions as he may 
feel will further this object. 
5. The Commander-in-Chief, Commanders of 
Forces and squadrons and commandants or 
naval districts will take appropriate steps 
to bring these instructions to the attention 
of all officers and men under their command. 
/s/ EDWIN D»mY" 
Despite the increased emphasis by the Secretary, 
another proposal by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt 
for a course of instruction for selected press repre-
sentatives at the Naval War College met with failure 
again in 1923 through lack of funds. 68 
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In the winter of 1923-24, Denby found a new method 
for acquainting members of the press with naval operations -
embarkation with the fleet during maneuvers. 69 It was 
a program independent of funding restrictions. A press 
party of eighty-five editors and publishers embarked 
in fleet units during annual maneuvers in the Carribbean. 
Following the cruise, the newsmen wired their appreciation 
to the Secretary: 
The memories of this delightful voyage from 
Charleston to Culebra are indelible. It 
marks a contact between our Navy and repre-
sentatives of the press which we believe to 
be of marked mutual advantage. Every guest 
on this ship has already a clear conception 
of what our Navy is doing and what it stands 
for, and will be able to present our Navy's 
mission to the public in a more intelligent 
and broader way. We hope that this bene-
ficent educational process will continue.70 
The event was worthwhile for the Navy. It enabled 
the service to reach a receptive audience with a 
message71 and to demonstrate its points as well. The 
program appears to have been continued until 1936 when 
the problem of security forced a limitation on guests 
to include only wire service representatives who were 
also officers in the Naval Reserve.72 During this 
period, the program was enlarged to include prominent 
civilian guests as well as press representatives.73 





first time tor newa ot the fleet to be sent by wireless 
during battle maneuvers. 74 'l'he ottioer Who made the 
arrangements., Robert B. Camey,, was later to become 
Chief or Jfaval Operations. 
Organizational Development 
On March, 1924, Secretary ot the Navy Curtis D. 
Wilbur succeeded Denby.75 The change 1n administration 
appeared to have little etteot on the development ot 
the 1ntorm.at1on function throughout the naval service • 
.. /· A letter to all ships and stations 1n August, 1924, 
emphasized the importance ot ott1cers appointed to 
information duties being relieved by other otticera 
when detached to insure continuity of the inf'orm.ation 
input to the Information Section.16 Secretary Wilbur 
at this time was conducting press conferences 1n the 
~·- :Navy Department twice daily, at 10 a.m. and at 4 p.m •• 77 
An additional reminder was sent also to the Bureaus of 
the Department to stimulate the information input 
available for the Secretary's uae.78 
Assistance promised to outlying commands in the 
Secretary's letter ot Februar)", 1923, urging increased 
efforts in presa relat1ons79 came torth, first in 
1924, in a seven-lesson study course on news handling 
80 issued by the Bureau of Navigation, and, later, 
1n a compendium issued by the Information Section, 
Office of Naval Intelligence, in 1925,detailing the 
current status of United States and foreign navies 
in relation to each other and to authorized treaty 
strengths.81 
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In February, 1926, the Office of Naval Intelligence 
took preliminary steps toward organizing a special 
group of volunteer reserve intelligence officers. 
Intelligence officers in naval districts were requested 
to submit a list of qualified individuals, "preferably 
key people in the news and writing world, who in time 
of peace can be of value in keeping in touch with this 
office and, in time of national emergency, can be 
actively coordinated with the duties of Naval Intelli-
gence in this particular section as part of war plans. 1182 
Thus was begun the selection of a nucleus force for 
later augmentation of the information function. 83 The 
organization chart for the Information Section of 1926 
showed billets for one captain, as branch head, one 
commander, six lieutenant commanders and thirteen 
lieutenants.84 Only three officers manned the section 
and did the work,85 but there was obviously room to 
grow. 
The Tide of Events 
With the presidency of Calvin c. Coolidge, the 
attitude of the administration tended to center on 
93 
domestic prosperity and to withdraw from armament pro-
posals to keep the United States Navy at full strength 
allowed under the agreements of the Washington Con-
86 ference. With Japan and Great Britain building ships 
in the unlimited classes of cruisers and auxiliaries, 
a move to reach agreement on further limitations became 
especially strong in the United States.87 Consideration 
of another conference was a source of consternation to 
naval planners and navalphiles alike, for agreements 
in tonnage ratios were based on actual levels afloat, 
88 building or funded. In this category, a fleet in 
being or in the making, the united States was especially 
weak. Yet, there was no indication that the adminis-
tration would consider any but the most restrictive of 
building measures prior to entering another limitation 
agreement for fear of jeopardizing a spirit of inter-
national conciliation. 
Measures proposed by the General Board to bring 
the battleship fleet to treaty levels and to increase 
cruiser tonnage to a parity with Great Britain failed 
to receive the support of the administration and 
of the Congress.9o In February, 1927, when Coolidge 
proposed the Geneva Conference, the Navy was faced 
with the reality that it had not even been able to 














of eight cruisers authorized in the appropriations act 
of 1924. 91 The postwar mood of the American people 
simply did not support continued spending upon armaments 
when the possibility of international agreements might 
serve a better purpose. 92 The machinations of Japan 
in the Pacific did not seem to alter the mood, nor 
did the intransigence of Italy or France in proceeding 
upon their own courses and refusing to attend the 
conference.93 
From Within the Navy 
Noting the apathy of the general public for the 
subject of adequate armaments, a rash of articles 
appeared in the professional journals during the period 
1924-1930 -- each proposing new or better ways to 
influence, educate or indoctrinate the general public 
on the needs of the service and its importance to the 
national defense.94 At least some segment of professional 
opinion had taken cognizance of the problem. One writer 
commented: 
••• The Navy Department usually manages to 
hold up its end of (the government's) vast 
system of collecting and releasing news to the 
press, but in other sections of the country the 
Navy's publicity scheme is either non-existent 
or woefully inadequate. 
There are feelings within the Navy that the 
country has deserted it ••• The country has not 
deserted the Navy; the Navy has not made itself 
an integral part of the country. It has not 
succeeded in making itself part and parcel of 
-----------------------------~.,C'"=~~¢-'. 
the national life; it has not become real in 
the minds of millions of Americans • 
••• Such a failure can only be attributed to 
the lack of effective and sustained publicity, 
the lack of organization, facilities, and 
equipment for the gathering and dissemination 
of service new~5to the newspapers and public of the nation.~ 
In commenting on organization, the author paid 
tribute to the Army's information system and proposed 
that the Navy follow suit by establishing an effective 
95 
nation-wide information network. That author was Hanson 
Baldwin, later to become military editor of the New 
York Times. His comments indicated that the information 
function in the Navy had a far piece yet to go. 
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CHAPTER V 
Talk of Peace and Organization 
for War 
Chapter V 
The failure of the Conference for the Limitation 
of Naval Armaments which met in Geneva from June 20 to 
August 4, 1927, served as a transition point for national 
military strategy and for popular opinion. 1 As the 
Conference wore on, Americans became increasingly dis-
illusioned with the failure to reach an accord over 
the question of limitation of cruiser tonnage. 2 In fact, 
many Americans came to adopt the theory that the United 
States could better bring about an agreement by building 
a Navy great enough to force accord, or at least, by 
building as many cruisers as our defense needs requirect. 3 
Indeed, President Coolidge himself seemed to be 
influenced in that direction when in his annual message 
to Congress in December, 1927, he said, "Where there is 
no treaty limitation, the size of the Navy which America 
is to have will be solely for America to determine. 114 
The Department's recommendations for new construction in 
that same month reflected that thought and included 
twenty-five cruisers, five aircraft carriers, nine 
destroyers and thirty-two submarines, all to begin 
building within five years. 
Collaterally, a significant movement was beginning 
for an international accord in the outlawry of war.5 
On April 6, 1927, French Foreign Minister Briand had 
proposed that France and the United States enter into 
104 
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a bilateral agreement renouncing war as an instrument 
of national policy. The proposal captured the popular 
imagination and gathered momentum through the support 
of various peace groups and contingents within the press 
and Congress. In December, the United States amplified 
the proposal, suggesting the agreement be expanded to 
include the other powers.6 
The negotiations leading to the formulation of 
the pact were duly publicized in an effort to answer 
criticisms before they were raised.7 The Pact of Paris 
(more commonly called the Kellogg-Briand Agreement} 
was signed on August 27, 1928 by representatives of the 
United States and fourteen other powers. The treaty 
was eventually approved by almost all nations although 
Great Britain made certain reservations regarding the 
defense of her overseas empire. 8 
Though the Kellogg-Briand Pact had no power of 
enforcement and allowed "defensive war," public support 
for this instrument of peace was rekindled in the 
United States.9 From 1928-1931, Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg supplemented this peace machinery 
with a series of eighteen bilateral arbitration treaties 
with non-American nations. 10 
The Naval Appropriations Bill, meanwhile, emerged 
from the Naval Affairs Committee cut to fifteen cruisers 
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and one carrier. It passed the House after heated debate 
in March, 1928,but died when the Senate adjourned on 
May 29, without considering it-- a victim, it was 
believed, of the popular antagonism against military 
12 
spending. The bill awaited the next session of Congress 
and was passed by the Senate in February, 1929 in 
the same session considering, paradoxically, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact.13 In the last days of the Coolidge admini-
stration, the Navy had obtained a small portion of the 
ships thought by the Navy to be required by the inter-
national situation, but fleet levels remained far below 
authorized treaty strength. With the advent of the 
Hoover administration prospects foretold that they were 
14 quite likely to remain so. 
The Hoover Administration 
Herbert Hoover succeeded to the presidency deeply 
disturbed over Anglo-American relations, which had 
deteriorated -- largely over naval competition in 
cruiser construction. 15 The president lost no time in 
setting the diplomatic wheels in motion. In June, 1929, 
Ambassador Charles G. Lawes arrived in London and, two 
days later, began discussions with Prime Minister Ramsey 
MacDonald on many problems, including naval limitation. 
By July, MacDonald had reported to the House of Commons 
on the satisfactory results from the conferences and 
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recommended consideration of the deletion of five ships 
from the current construction program. 16 On the same 
day, Hoover announced suspension of planned construction 
on three cruisers.17 In October MacDonald arrived in 
the United States for an eleven-day stay and met with 
Hoover, where plans were laid to convene another Limi-
tation of Arms Conference in London in January, 1930.18 
At the Conference, attended by representatives of 
the tJnited States, Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Japan, work began to complete the job undertaken in 
Washington eight years earlier. The delegates addressed 
themselves to the cruiser problem and ratios in 
auxiliaries and submarines.19 After a great deal of 
maneuvering on technical issues, an agreement was 
reached in April. Though all powers signed the document, 
France and Italy subscribed to only relatively unimpor-
tant clauses. 20 
The Conference succeeded in fixing the upper 
limits in all categories of ships, thus tightening a 
gap left open in the Washington Treaty. British and 
American navies were granted parity in all ship types, 
while the Japanese, who retained the 10-10-6 ratio in 
capital ships, obtained a greater share in getting 




The results of the Conference, though disappointing 
to many peace advocates, left much room for expansion 
of the United States fleet to parity with Great Britain 
within the upper tonnage limitation. With the financial 
crisis which had been visited on the United States with 
the collapse of the stock market in October, 1929, 
however, such a building program was unlikely to be 
proposed by the Hoover administration. 22 
The Development of Information Policy 
Noting the lack of results of servicewide infor-
mation programs, not so much at the departmental level 
but throughout the lower echelons of command, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, in March, 1930, wrote 
the commandants of the geographically divided naval 
districts emphasizing again, the importance of good 
press relations. 23 l!hclosed with the letter was a 
guide to the conduct of effective press relations which 
provided, as a keynote, a statement of Navy policy 
enunciated by Secretary of the Navy Wilbur on October 6, 
1928~ 
••• to furnish the public with full information 
on the Navy not incompatible with military 
secrecy, including its activities at home and 
abroad, its educational features, and its con-
tributions to ~cience and industry ••• 
It included, as well, a corollary to that policy: 
-------------~----------------------. --~-~---~-
••• it follows that reasonable effort should 
be made to correct the impressions made by 
published misstatements or misrepresentation 
of facts (not opinions) concerning the Navy 
and naval activities. Unless steps are 
taken to do this the reading public will be 
deceived and much or little harm will result, 
according to the gravity of the errors pub-
lished and ~he extent to which they are 
circulated. 5 
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The basic letter concluded with a request that 
commandants forward an analysis of operations with the 
press within their respective commands, "in order that 
a study or methods and results may be made and published 
••• for the general guidance of the service. 1126 
Secretary of the Navy, Charles F. Adams, followed 
up on the Director or Naval Intelligence's letter by 
issuing, on November 17, 1930, a directive outlining 
. 
the duties of the Information Section.27 cancelling 
all previous information instructions, the instruction 
established formal procedures as well as outlined 
information policy: 
2. The Information Section, Office of Naval 
Intelligence, is the Navy Department's central 
agency for supplying to the public full inf or-
ma tion of the Navy not incompatible with 
military secrecy. 
3. This work is accomplished by means of 
press relations; by cooperation with radio 
broadcasting agencies, motion picture, photo-
graphic and news reel companies; and by 
complying with requests made for general 
information about the Navy. 
/ 
4. The Information Section is governed by the 
following approved principles, applicable 
throughout the Navy Department. 
(a) to avoid any discrimination in dissemi-
nation of news. 
(b) to issue no statements derogatory to, 
or critical of, other branches of the 
government. 
(c) Neither to enunciate nor to comment 
upon policies. 
5. The Secretary of the Navy determines policies, 
and when these are to be made public, they 
normally shall be announced at daily press con-
ferences which are arranged for by the Aide to 
the Secretary assisted by an officer from the 
Information Section. 
6. Questions involving the supply of naval 
information to the public that concern the 
press, photographic agencies, sound and news 
reel companies, moving picture companies and 
broadcasting companies, when received in any 
of the offices of the Navy Department will 
be referred to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
Information Section ••• That office will then 
consult with the responsible offices con-
cerned, do preliminary work that may be 
necessary in arranging for representatives 
of the above agencies to witness naval 
activities, notify all parties interested 
and handle the required correspondence, 
always acting in accordance with the policy 
of the Navy Department. 
7. All bureaus and offices in the Navy 
Department will cooperate with the Infor-
mation Section in the accomplishment of these 
duties, and each bureau and office concerned 
will designate an officer with necessary 
clerical assistance to supply the Information 
Section with such data as may be requested, 
with news items of general interest for 
press releases, and with suitable illus-
trations when available. 
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Included as an enclosure to the letter was the same 
guide to effective press relations which had been cir-
culated by the Director of Naval Intelligence. 
The following day, the Chief of Naval Operations 
forwarded the Secretary's letter throughout the naval 
operating commands, "for the information and guidance 
of the naval service."28 
A memorandum from the Director of the Information 
Section to the Director of Naval Intelligence indicated 
in December that a survey of all naval districts had 
revealed that the Navy Department system was in effect 
and that all districts had reported satisfactory relations 
with the press. 29 The survey was taken to assess the 
servicewide diffusion of information policies and came 
on the heels of Hanson Baldwin's criticisms. 
Special Events 
In January, 1929, the aircraft carriers Lexington 
and Saratoga participated for the first time in the 
attack phase ofafleet exercise, simulating an attack 
on the Panama Canal~O So impressive was the performance 
of their aircraft that the 1930 maneuvers were scheduled 
to employ again, for the first time, a tactical unit 
built around the carriers. 
As a part .of the 1930 maneuvers, the carriers 
conducted a special demonstration for interested members 
of Congress and for the press~1 A special press party 
was embarked in the Lexington to insure adequate and 
complete coverage. Due to space limitations, the 
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representatives of the media drew lots to make an 
arrangement for pooling their material.32 The seven-
teen members of the press party were: four from press 
associations, three representing still picture services, 
three from the silent news reels and seven for sound 
news reels. Multiple representation was included to 
allow complete coverage from several vantage points. 
some of the representatives spread between a photo-
graphic aircraft during aerial maneuvers, on board 
the Lexington, and on board the Aroostook which 
maneuvered to a position close aboard the carrier 
during the flight demonstrations. Additionally, a 
special representative of Western Union was embarked 
to take the press files back to Hampton Roads 
immediately upon completion of the demonstration. A 
special communication circuit was held in readiness 
for the transmission of press traffic should that be 
required. 33 
The news coverage of this event was but a prelude 
for what was to follow. On May 7, 1930, one hundred 
twenty-five planes from the carriers Saratoga, Lexington 
and Langley began a three-day exhibition tour, flying 
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from Hampton Roads to New York and then on to Providence, 
Rhode Island, Boston and Lowell, Massachusett~ and 
Hartford, Connecticut. On their return flight, the 
torpedo, bomber, fighter and scout planes flew over 
34 Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and Norfolk. 
Accompanying these flying reviews were representatives 
of the press, who had, again, made pool arrangements 
for coverage from a special aircraft. 35 The two 
demonstrations, those flown from the carrier and the 
touring flying reviews, were staged, interestingly 
enough, Just a few days following the signing of the 
London Naval Treaty on April 22, 1930. 
Further Demise 
The remainder of the Hoover administration brought 
no encouragement to the advocates of preparedness. In 
1931, with Japan but only 5,728 tons below treaty 
allowances and Great Britain 20,874 tons below, the 
United States deficiency amounted to 153,698 tons. 
Needed to attain treaty strength, according to the 
United States Navy League, were: four carriers, three 
large and seven small-gun cruisers, twenty-five sub-
36 
marines and over 100 destroyers. The administration's 
proposals for that year were: one aircraft carrier, 
two six-inch(small-gun) cruisers, four submarines and 




failed to get action as the Congress adjourned in May 
without entering the bill on its legislative calendar.37 
Neither the Congress nor the President, it would 
seem, had any inclination to maintain the fleet at or 
near treaty strength. In September, Hoover announced 
a drastic cut in the naval building program for 1931-32 
and its elimination in 1932-33 in the name of world 
harmony and domestic economy.37 The Navy's leadership, 
under Secretary Charles F. Adams and Admiral William v. 
Pratt, showed little inclination to challenge the 
chief executive's policies or directions.38 
In the Far Fast, in Manchuria in 1931 and in 
Shanghai in 1932, signs of future trouble for the 
United States had begun to appear. The hope of a just 
and true peace through international conciliation 
appeared to be progressively dimming. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Navy 
The inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt brought 
to the White House a man who knew a great deal about 
the Navy. He had served for seven years as Assistant 
Secretary to Josephus Daniels, spanning the period 
prior to and during World War I. The domestic economy 
which President Roosevelt inherited was far from 
recovery.39 At the outset, it looked as though domestic 
considerations would influence a continuance of Hoover's 
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disarmament policies. 40 
A plan for warship construction was, however, 
included in the President's program for increased public 
works. On June 16, Roosevelt signed Ex:ecutive Order 
6174 which allocated $283 million or Public Works 
Administration appropriations for the construction of 
thirty-two warships over a three-year period. 41 
Internal Preoccupation 
The situations and events leading to international 
conflict and world war are known widely and need not 
be explored in this study. Among them: the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of Shanghai 
in 1932, Adolph Hitler's succession to Chancellor of 
Germany in 1933, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935, German occupation of the Rhineland and the 
beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the Japanese 
invasion of China in 1937, the Munich agreements over 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the climactic events leading 
to war in lll.rope in 1939. 
The failure of conciliation undertaken by the 
League of Nations42 infected popular opinion in the 
United States with the desire to remain neutral and 
avoid involvements in both Pbrope and the Far PB.st. 
Reflective of these opinions were the legislative 








the progressive neutrality acts of 1935-7. 43 Pre-
occupation with internal affairs was a characteristic 
of the time -- not only in the united States but in 
other nations of the world as we11. 44 Divergent 
national courses were bound for collision. 45 
Armaments and Talk of Disarmament 
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Through the leadership of the President and Carl 
Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, 
mustering the support of the administration forces in 
the House, the Vinson-Trammel Act ·was passed in March, 
1934. The bill provided authorization for construction 
to bring the United States Bavy up to full treaty 
strength -- the first comprehensive measure for ship 
construction since World War I. Unfortunately, the 
authorization did not gain appropriations to implement 
it. 46 
Under a provision or the Washington Naval Conference, 
the second London Naval Conference met in late 1935 with 
littie hope of success. The Japanese, who demanded but 
did not receive full parity in ship tonnage, withdrew 
from the discussions. Although an agreement was 
reached and a treaty signed in March, 1936, it was an 
instrument watered with escape clauses which held 
little meaning in light of the nonadherence of both 
Italy and Japan. 47 
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President Roosevelt concluded that it was unwise 
to fall behind in a rapidly rearming world and, in 
January, 1938, proposed to Congress a $1 billion naval 
appropriation. Known as the Second Vinson Act, th.e 
bill authorizing an increase in total tonnage of under-
age naval vessels amounting to forty thousand tons for 
aircraft carriers and authorizing three thousand air-
craft, was passed in May.48 Rearmament was under way. 
Development of the Public Affairs Function 
From a standpoint of public interest in and concern 
for the national security and military and naval policy, 
the early and m1d-1930 1s provided little opportunity for 
development of the public affairs function. Refinement 
and codification of public relations policies and pro-
cedures, however, continued. 
In 1932, the Navy Department issued a comprehensive 
set of instructions governing Navy cooperation with 
producers in the production of motion picture "plays. 1149 
The following March, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. 
Swanson50 issued a directive to all ships and stations 
detailing specific information which could be released 
concerning Navy ships under the Washington and London 
treaties and specifically restricting the release of 
information of a technical nature.51 
In 1935, the Department issued a General Order 
emphasizing the care which should be taken by officers 
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writing on professional subjects. The order noted 
that the Department would maintain no censorship on 
discussions or articles but cautioned, "unrestricted 
utterance or publication of fact and opinion may divulge 
information which it is not advisable to make public, 
and may constitute an offense against military dis-
cipline ••• " While a veiled threat, it was a notable 
improvement over the repressive General Order 139 
issued by Secretary Meyer in 1911. 
In August, Secretary Swanson reemphasized the 
manner in which he intended information to be made 
public in a memorandum to all bureaus and offices of 
the Navy Department:53 
/ 
The Public Relations Branch54 of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence has been asked by news-
papermen from time to time to corroborate 
items of indisputable Navy Department origin 
that have appeared in the press but which have 
not been cleared through its press section. 
Instances have occurred where a reporter 
was refused information by the Public Relations 
Branch on the advice of the bureau or office 
concerned and subsequently an opposition 
paper obtained the information by establishing 
contact directly with an officer or employee 
of the bureau or office. 
Such departures from the regular procedure, 
while seldom serious in themselves, tend to 
compromise the Navy Department's machinery 
for the simultaneous and impartial distri-
bution of public information concerning the 
Navy Department and the naval service. 
In order to preserve a strict impartiality 
and:"uniform treatment toward all correspondents, 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, to 
obviate confusion, to relieve all bureaus and 
offices of the annoyance of importunate 
queries and to insure the simultaneous 
release of officially visaed information to 
the public, all heads of bureaus and offices 
will take steps to insure that information 
suitable for publication is normally cleared 
through the Public Relations Branch (Press 
Section) of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
To this end, officers of the several 
bureaus and activities of the Navy Department 
designated as liaison officers with the Navy 
Department Public Relations Branch will 
maintain close contact with the Press Section 
and furnish such items as are suitable for 
publication. Where circumstances make a 
departure from this procedure advisable the 
responsible official who releases infor-
mation to a reporter or special writer 
should communicate to the Public Relations 
Branch the substance of his remarks. 
/s/ Claude A. Swanson 
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Again in November, 1938, Secretary Swanson found 
it necessary to reemphasize the instructions55 because, 
"the ••• (instructions are) not in all cases being 
observed. It is directed that ••• (they) be brought to 
the attention of and strictly complied with by officers 
and civil employees of bureaus and offices of the Navy 
Department." The occasion for this emphasis, according 
to B. L. Austin, then a Lieutenant Commander in charge 
of the Press Section, was the multiplicity of n~ws 
leaks throughout the Department.56 Various stringers 
for the news media world.ng in the bureaus and offices 
were circumventing the news release policy. Admiral 
William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, insisted 
that the leaks be plugged and the central source of 
news become, and remain, the Press Section. 57 
The work accomplished by the Public Relations 
Branch is well summarized by the following exerpts 
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from its annual report, July 1, 1938, to June 30, 1939: 58 
Close liaison is continually maintained 
by the Public Relations officer with the 
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval 
Operations in order to keep his (sic) office 
properly informed on all phases Of policy • 
••• During the past fiscal year 900 formal 
releases of important news were made to the 
press. This compares with 550 such releases 
for last year (1938). These releases vary 
in length from l to 49 pages each. One 
hundred and fifty copies of each release 
are made available to the press at the 
Navy Department Press Room and at the 
National Press Club, and 30 copies are 
distributed for information within the Navy 
Department. The number of informal releases 
of information of interest to special groups 
is indeterminate, but is estimated to have 
increased during the year in about the same 
ratio as the formal releases. The Public 
Relations officer and the Press officer 
are available night and day, seven days a 
week, to answer queries of the press which 
have noticeably increased in number with 
the mounting tension in international 
affairs and consequent increase of public 
interest in national defense ••• 
The Public Relations officer and the Press 
officer attend all White House press conferences 
and inform the interested senior officers and 
the Secretary of any discussions of service 
interest. We also watch the ticker tape, 
newspapers and magazines and inform respon-
sible senior officers promptly of pertinent 
bulletins and articles ••• 
••• Biographies have been prepared and 
filed of all senior officers who have figured 
in press releases or for wh.irch specific 
requests have been received ••• 
••• Speeches and articles by naval officers 
containing data on current naval topics are 
I 
mimeographed and distributed to the public 
upon request ••• material and assistance 
furnished officers in preparation for 
speeches ••• arrangements are made for 
speakers before patriotic societies and 
similar organizations ••• 1ncluding radio 
broadcasts ••• 
••• Arrangements are made tor cooperation 
with broadcasting companies, including all 
major networks, in presentation of programs 
of factual naval interest • 
••• Arrangements are made for accredited 
press representatives and photographers to 
take passage in naval vessels to cover 
specific naval activities when requested 
and deemed to be of paramount interest. 
The coverage of Cruiser Division Seven's 
South American good will cruise is one ••• 
illustration • 
••• cooperation with all major newsreel 
companies in arranging for filming current 
naval activities of public interest • 
••• During the past year this office has 
answered approximately 6,000 letters in 
reply to queries for factual information 
from colleges, schools, individuals, 
societies, libraries, newspapers, magazines, 
writers, etc. Many of these requests require 
considerable research work ••• number of mimeo-
graph stencils out - 2,092. Number of sheets 
of mimeograph paper used - 495,600 • 
••• Photographs have been supplied to news-
papers, magazines, organizations, and, in 
some cases, feature writers, when requested 
and when impracticable to obtain them from 
other sources • 
••• This office arranges for still and 
motion picture companies to photograph 
naval subjects. U.S. Navy Photographer's 
identification cards were issued to ninety 
accredited photographers operating in the 
Severn and Potomac areas this year • 
••• cooperation with motion pictures -
. the Public Relations officer is a member 
of the Navy Department Motion Picture Board. 
He assists in reviewing and censoring of 
motion picture scenarios in which naval 







seventeen motion picture scenarios submitted 
to the Motion Picture Board, ••• five have been 
approved ••• two completed ••• and three are ••• 
in production • 
••• In addition to his usual activities, the 
officer in charge of this branch is Secretary 
of the Navy Department Navy Day Committee. 
Ground work for the celebration of Navy Day, 
October 27, is usually started in June. This 
office cooperates with the Navy League, the 
Naval Reserve and patriotic organizations in 
promoting the success of Navy Day. Seventeen 
articles and speeches, bearing on the subject 
of the Navy were distributed to the naval 
service as basic material for press and 
speeches on Navy Day ••• 
••• During the President's cruise in the 
Houston, August 1938, this office-was desig-
nated by the White House to handl~9news releases concerning the cruise ••• ' 
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The staff required to produce this work was eight: 
Commander Leland P. Lovette, Officer-in-Charge; 
Lieutenant Commander B. L. Austin, Assistant for Press 
Relations; Lieutenant w. G. Beecher, Jr., Assistant 
for Photography; two civilian assistants, Miss Helen 
Philibert for the Press Room and Miss Alice Costello, 
for the Pu~lic Relations Branch, plus two stenographers 
and a Marine orderly.60 
Two stories, mentioned only in the annual report 
as outstanding events, yield~d further insight into 
I 
the operations of the Public Relations Branch -- the 
fleet visit to New York in May, 1939, and the loss 
of the submarine Squalus in that same month. 
123 
During May, 6-16, a special contingent of the 
Atlantic Fleet arrived in New York for the opening of 
the World's Fair. 61 During its stay, over a half 
million visitors went aboard fleet units. Special 
groups of visitors, among them 100 publishers from the 
Newspaper F.ditors and Publishers Association then 
holding a convention in New York, over three hundred 
working press representatives visiting individually and 
in groups and five hundred Children of the American 
Revolution. Arrangements were coordinated by Austin 
and Miss Philibert from Washington and Lieutenant 
H. w. Gordon and two yeomen from the New York pub-
licity. office. Letters of tribute and appreciation 
for the outstanding arrangements were received from 
many guests: Kenneth Hogate, president of the Wall 
Street Journal; F.dward Bartlett, city editor of the 
New York Sun and many others including F.dward L. 
Bernays and T. J. Ross, prominent public relations 
counselors. New York Times military editor, Hanson 
Baldwin, commented, " ••• I think you did a swell job 
up here under considerable difficulties and that 
the Navy Department deserves commendation for sending 
you ••• it was a real help to us of the press and 
establishes a precedent which should be followed, 
in my opinion, in all such future fleet visits to 
New York ••• n62 
---------------------------------~~--"fl'-
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On May 23, 1939, the submarine Squalus was lost 
on a practice dive off Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Fifty-
nine of her crew were saved in rescue operations; twenty-
six perished. On a previous submarine accident with 
the S-4, members of the press had received no cooperation 
from the Navy, and had hired a tug to get to the scene 
where they were greeted with fire hoses turning them 
away from coverage of the salvage operations. Deter-
mined to provide full information in the Squalus dis-
aster, Austin went directly to Admiral Leahy and received 
full authority to arrange complete press coverage. A 
special telegraph circuit was installed in the press 
room in the Navy Department to facilitate direct 
communications with the recovery forces and special 
fleet units shuttled press representatives to and from 
the scene. 63 The sympathetic coverage obtained was 
brought about by a significant departure from policies 
at similar disasters in the past.64 
The last of the pre-war training instructions 
under Naval Intelligence, a 300-page manual consisting 
of monographs dealing with various aspects of public 
' relations organization and practice, was issued in the 
summer 1939. 65 On the first of September, war began 
in m..trope when Germany invaded Poland. 
Following declaration of war by Great Britain 
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and France upon Germany on September 3, the United States 
proclaimed its neutrality on the 5th. On the next day 
a United States naval patrol was established in the 
Atlantic and caribbean to observe the movements of 
belligerent ships. On September 8, President Roosevelt 
declared a limited national emergency, ordering an 
increase in the strength of all military forces -- one 
of many measures which followed in rapid order attempting 
to put the United States on a war footing. 
In January, 1940, Charles Edison assumed the 
duties of Secretary of the N,avy, a post vacated by the 
death on July 7, 1939, of Claude Swanson. Edison, in 
turn, was succeeded by Frank Knox on July 11, 1940, 
after the former had resigned in June. 
The Mobilization of Public Relations66 
In July, 1940, the Public Relations Branch of 
the DJ.vision of Naval Intelligence was staffed by 
thirteen personnel: the officer-in-charge; three 
officers and an experienced civilian assistant in the 
press section; one officer and an assistant who handled 
general information requests, pictorial and radio duties; 
plus four clerical personnel and two Marine orderlies. 
Commander H. R. Thurber became Officer-in-Charge 
on July 16. His first orders were to "build up the 
office for an emergency. 067 Records of Naval Reserves 
slated for war-time duty in public relations were 
reviewed and tentative selections were made of 
individuals who might head the individual sections of 
an expanded office. War plans, written in 1924 and 
revised through 1939, were reviewed and modified as 
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necessary. Although there was no legal requirement for 
reserve officers to enter onto active duty in 1940,68 
selected individuals were interviewed and asked to come 
on active service if their personal situations would 
permit. 
Plans for the expansion envisioned a director, 
an assistant director, and operational sections to 
include: administration, plans, press, radio, pic-
torial, scripts, civic liaison and naval districts, and 
a reference section. 
In 1940, three officers reported as section heads: 
Lieutenant (Junior Grade), Victor F. Blakeslee, USN, 
(Retired), in August, to head the scripts section which 
was charged with preparation of speeches for high-
ranking civilian officials and officers of the Navy 
Department and, as well, with assistance to writers 
and publishers; Lieutenant Commander w. M. Galvin, 
U.S. Naval Reserve, in September, former Secretary of 
the Navy League, to ~ead the plans section; and 
Lieutenant Commander E. John Long, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly on the executive staff of National Geographic 
magazine, in December, to take control of the pictorial 
-- ~~. 
127 
section which was, at that time, issuing approximately 
seven thousand photographs per year. 
In February, 1941, two more officers assumed duties 
as section chiefs: Lieutenant Commander James G. 
Stahlman, U.S. Naval Reserve who had volunteered for 
the duty, formerly editor and publisher of the Nashville 
(Tennessee)Banner, to assume control of the civic liaison 
and naval districts section; and Lieutenant Commander 
Norvelle w. Sharpe, U.S. Naval Reserve, former indepen-
dent radio consultant, to head the radio section. 
Lieutenant Commander, w. s. Wharton, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly of the editorial staff of the Oregon Journa~ 
reported a short time later and became the head of the 
press section in September, relieving Lieutenant 
Commander R. w. Berry, U.S. Navy, who had acted, as well, 
as the branch's Assistant Director. 
One of the primary jobs in reorganization was 
undertaken by Stahlman who made a tour of the naval 
districts to evaluate the effectiveness and needs of 
the servicewide information organization. 
Positive Steps 
In March, 1941, the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations issued a directive throughout the naval 
service outlining the proper function of public relations, 
declaring it a function of command and emphasizing, 
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" ••• it is not the function of Navy officers to endeavor 
to police or otherwise monitor publications, radio 
stations, or other media of information. It is the 
function of Navy officers to keep the public informed 
of the activities of the Navy, as compatible with 
military security. 1169 
Two days later, the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations issued a directive to the commandants of all 
naval districts which, effectively, insured the develop-
ment of a public relations organization throughout the 
shore establishment:70 
••• it is the function of naval command to give 
prompt and careful attention to the legitimate 
requirements of public dissemination agencies. 
In the Navy Department, this is accomplished 
through the Public Relations Branch which is 
a subdivision of Naval Intelligence. In each 
naval district, this shall be accomplished 
through a Public Relations Branch, ade-
quately manned and equipped. 
The commandant of each naval district will 
survey the public relations requirements of 
his district ••• cognizance should be taken of 
the advisability of placing or designating 
a public relations officer in each state, 
or in each large publishing center, or in 
each zone where there is an important naval 
activity. 
Requests for additional personnel and 
equipment for <;listrict public relations will 
be submitted not later than April 10, 1941. 
The directive included a sixteen-page guide outlining 
the basis of a public relations program by which the 
commandants could assess their needs. 
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Establishment of the Office of Public Relations 
In April, Secretary Frank Knox formally removed the 
public affairs function in the Navy from within the 
Office of Naval Intelligence and placed it directly 
under his own control:71 
1. The Office of Public Relations is estab-
lished as of 1 May 1941 as an independent 
office directly under the Secretary of the 
Navy, and it will have the same functions 
and responsibilities as those of the present 
Public Relations Branch of the Division of 
Naval Intelligence. The head of the office 
will carry the title of Director of Public 
Relations. 
2. The personnel, furnishings, and equipment 
of the present Public Relations Branch of 
the Division of Naval Intelligence will be 
transferred to the newly created office of 
public relations. 
3. All correspondence of the new office 
will form a part of the Secretary's files 
and will bear the office origim1ting symbol 
OOR. Correspondence antedating_ 1 May 1941 
will remain a part of the-files of the 
Division of Naval Intelligence. 
Thus had the function returned to the Office of the 
Secretary, where first it was formally established. 
On May 1, 1941, the Office of Public Relations 
began operations. Acting as its head until the May 
27 arrival of Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn was Commander 
H. R. Thurber. On that date, the personnel of the 
Office of Public Relations numbered fifty-five. Another 
thirty-eight were on the way. 




Lieutenant Commander Waldo F. Drake, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly on the staff of the Los Angeles Times, ordered 
to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet as Fleet Public Relations Officer and Lieutenant 
Commander S. B. Wright, U.S. Naval Reserve, formerly 
of Paramount News, as Fleet Public Relations Officer 
for the Atlantic Fleet. 
On May 9, following the creation of the Office of 
Public Relations under the Secretary, the Chief of 
Naval Operations directed naval district commandants 
to transfer their public relations offices from the 
cognizance of Naval Intelligence to a separate status 
directly under the commandant's control.72 The frame-
work for the new organization, by now, was complete. 
The public affairs function which had begun 
informally at the inception of the Navy, followed a 
tempestuous path. It now faced its greatest challenge. 
In his address to the first assemblage of public relations 
officers in July, 1941, Secretary Knox sounded the 
keynote for future public affairs operations: 
••• May I try to impress upon you ••• how vitally 
important it is that we do get ••• (naval affairs) 
into current discussion and reading, because, 
after all, we are not going to have much 
trouble whatever in getting the necessary 
appropriations for the enlargement of our 
naval strength, because right now we have 
a popular fear to support us. The time will 
come when those fears will subside, but yet 
' 
1 
it will be just exactly as acutely necessary 
for our future safety and security that the 
sea-power and air-power that we are now 
building up shall be retained against a 
future danger as it is that we shall build 
it up in the first place, and if we are 
going to have that kind of popular support 
for an adequate Navy in the future -- when 
our present alarm shall have subsided and 
our fears gone by -- then we must take 
advantage of this time when the people 
are interested in the Navy to make them 
so thoroughly Navy-minded that when the 
time comes for pruning expenditures 
and cutting down expenses there shall 
- al ways be present in the minds of the 
people as an automatic reflex that if 
we want to be safe, we llif~e got to be 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter VI 
A retrospective view of the development of the 
public affairs function in the United States Navy must 
consider, as well, the political and social contexts 
which fostered its evolution. 
In its earliest practice, in the formation of the 
United States Navy, such public affairs functions as 
there were were directed at marshaling political support 
for legislative action. The limited success of that 
campaign, however, primarily was attributable to 
external factors -- the actions of the Barbary corsairs 
and the French privateers -- which dramatized the need 
for an adequate seagoing force. 
The War of 1812 demonstrated to Americans the 
inadequacy of a military and naval strategy based on 
defensive considerations -- reliance upon militia and 
upon concepts of the Navy as a passive coastal defense 
force. The strategic lessons which should have been 
apparent from that war went unlearned and continued to 
have effect upon the public affairs function throughout 
the following century. 
The Civil War, by its nature, brought to the fore 
a requirement for information of military and naval 
operations to be disseminated directly to the citizenry 
through the media of mass communications. 
There were, as well, other factors which hastened 
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the development of the public affairs function in this 
period: the technological progress made in the tele-
graph which could speed information across the 
continent, broadening the information consumer base 
and, thereby, the requirement for more information; 
interservice competition for both funds and manpower 
which sought support through popular appeals; and the 
requirements of military security which presaged the 
need of a formal organization which could operate in 
the information environment without divulging infor-
mation of military value to an enemy. 
It was in the Civil War that the essentiality of 
an informed public was demonstrated graphically to 
naval strategists when a widespread fear along the 
eastern seaboard clamored for a departure from sound 
strategy in favor of a heterogen.eous posture of frag-
mented forces -- the first firm inkling that public 
opinion in operation, especially an alarmed opinion, 
had profound implications for naval strategy. 
In the wake of the Civil War came the natural 
revulsion to military preparedness. Not so much a 
characteristically American syndrome, as so often it 
has been described, but, rather, a more characteris-
tically human desire to rebuild a nation and reestablish 
political order. 
The Civil War had brought attendant progress in 
technological development -- progress which had deep 
meaning for naval strategy. The use of armor plate, 
the potential of steam propulsion, the capabilities 
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of high-velocity naval rifles and exploding shells --
all demanded of the Navy an active transitional program 
as well as a doctrinal revolution. To facilitate these 
changes required, in the period between the Civil War 
and the Spanish-American War, the understanding and 
the support of the public. These were the forces 
which operated to sustain the public affairs function 
in the Navy. 
Cooperation by the federal agencies in exhibitions, 
beginning.. with the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition 
in 1876 and continuing through to the Panama-Pacific 
Exhibition in San Francisco in 1914-16, reflected, in 
President Grant's direction for cooperation,a concern, 
" ••• to illustrate the functions ••• of the government 
in time of peace and its resources as a war power, 
and thereby ••• demonstrate the nature of our insti-
tutions and their adaptations to the wants of the people ••• " 
-- a conscious attempt to interpret the government to 
the people. 
The writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 1890 1s 
heralded a revolution in naval strategy. Though his 
theories were widely acclaimed by naval strategists, 
ti' d 
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accepted by political theorists and pragmatists alike, 
quoted and expounded upon both in and out of the halls 
of Congress, their diffusion to the American public at 
large taken for granted, the popular hysteria which 
swept the eastern seaboard of the United States at 
the outset of the Spanish-American War urging a complete 
departure from the dictates of sound naval strategy 
demonstrated clearly the fallibility of information 
dissemination. The concept of command of the sea was 
challenged seriously by the popular demand for a 
strategy of coastal defense. 
News coverage of the Spanish-American War was 
unique in the annals of reporting. Virtually uninhibited 
travel by reporters and nearly unlimited access to 
operations provided detailed, if not always accurate, 
accounts throughout the military campaign. Again, 
considerations of military security were raised by the 
intelligence community in noting Spain's use of these 
press accounts. This concern, coupled with the success 
of the Japanese in keeping hidden the movements of their 
fleet prior to the Battle of Tsushima (May, 1905) in 
the Russo-Japanese War, led the Navy's General Board, 
in Decembe~ to recommend the creation of a Navy 
Information Bureau to exercise control over information 
made public in time of national peril. 
The administration of President Theodore Roosevelt 
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advanced the mergence of foreign and military policy 
with a consideration for the effects of public opinion 
upon that policy. A natural outgrowth from this 
philosophy was the Navy General Board's enunciation, 
in 1913, of the need for naval policy to be made public. 
Roosevelt's administration was marked, too, by a 
popular appeal for continuous and orderly development 
of military forces as a foundation of national military 
power, a requisite with the emergence of the United 
States as a world power. The presidential leadership 
of public opinion took many forms. In naval affairs, 
the most dramatic moves to popularize the Navy were the 
fleet reviews and the round-the-world cruise of the 
battleship fleet. 
In this same era was established an independent 
civilian body whose purpose was to strengthen the U.S. 
Navy through direct appeals to t'he people of the nation 
-- the Navy League of the United States. Though the 
Navy's role in the ~reation and development of the 
League remains obscure, active Navy cooperation with 
League events doubtless had salutary effects. 
The building program of President Roosevelt 
brought yet another naval need into focus -- that of 
increasing numbers of personnel. The attendant require-
ment for sustained publicity campaigns on behalf of 
.d 
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recruiting encouraged the Navy to establish recruiting 
publicity bureaus in the major news centers of the 
United States. Once established, these operations lent 
themselves admirably to Navy information programs. 
In the Taft administration, the lack of a progressive 
naval policy saw increased appropriations become the 
target of spoils while necessary overseas base develop-
ment in support of far-flung responsibilities went 
wanting -- providing yet another example of the need 
for a definitive policy backed by public understanding 
and support. 
The administration of President Wilson was not 
without political objectives. The progress of inter-
national events, however, were to frustrate those 
objectives and precipitate the world into devastating 
war. To the extent that Wilson's objectives departed 
from international political reality as seen by military 
and naval strategists, there was bound to arise a 
climate of discontent, discouragement and frustration. 
Within this climate was fostered a greater appreciation 
on the part of the Navy for the value and importance of 
public understanding of military and naval policies. 
With the United States• entry into the war came 
the most ambitious program of information and education 
yet attempted -- the formation of the Committee on 
rd 
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Public Information. The Navy's part in this program 
was carried by the Navy News Bureau, created especially 
for the purpose of informing the nation about the 
details of the naval war effcrts. The formalization of 
that news organization in 1917, established a pattern 
of operation responsive to the informational needs of 
the nation. The realization that the policies which 
dictated this operation represented solely those of 
the administration caused further evaluation of the 
utility of such a function during congressional 
investigations of the Navy Department in 1920. 
Following World War I, the united States found 
itself unable to withdraw from international affairs. 
Though it remained aloof from membership in the League 
of Nations, the country still concerned itself with 
the reestablishment of world order. Popular interest 
provided the support for peace movements which mani-
fested themselves, in 1922, in the naval Limitation 
of Arms Conference in Washington. The resultant threat 
to the maintenance of naval forces felt by naval strate-
gists to be necessary to continued world peace, coupled 
with the collateral threat posed by the developing tech-
nological advances of air power, led naval planners, 
in 1922, to establish within the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence an information function designed to combat anti-






it was the means of appeal for popular support. 
In an effort to propagate a greater understanding 
of the Navy's role in national security affairs, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
proposed, in 1921 and again in 1923, that a special 
course of instruction for selected members of the press 
be instituted at the Naval War College. Though restric-
tion in available funds precluded beginning that 
project, a plan was initiated by Secretary of the Navy 
Denby to embark editors and publishers in fleet units 
during portions of the annual fleet training exercises. 
The first "press cruise" took place in the winter, 
1923-24, and the program continued annually thereafter 
until 1936. 
Consolidation of the information function within 
the Navy Department began in 1922. While Secretary 
/, 
Denby carried on the precedent of conducting the daily 
press conferences himself, he directed the bureaus and 
offices of the Navy Department to assist the Infor-
mation Section of Naval Intelligence by appointing an 
officer who would have cognizance over informational 
affairs. He also required that timely information be 
submitted to the Department as it occurred. 
To spread the information network throughout the 
naval service, Denby, in 1923, emphasized the value of 
rd 
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good press relations and directed all naval district 
commandants to establish contact with press represen-
tatives in their respective areas. Assistance was 
provided by the Director of Naval Intelligence in the 
form of guides to press relations, study courses in 
news handling and materials suitable for public release 
on the United States and world navies. 
In 1926, the first steps were taken to create a 
Naval Reserve nucleus qualified for special duties in 
public relations in the event of mobilization for war. 
Planning for this eventuality continued until imple-
mentation in 1940 when carefully selected and specially 
qualified individuals were asked to come on active duty 
in the Public Relations Branch of Naval Intelligence, a 
year prior to the activation of the Naval Reserve. 
The popular opinion which had firs~ supported 
President Wilson in his quest for conciliatory settlements 
of world disputes, supported, as well, his policies to 
enter the war to make "the world safe for democracy." 
In the post-war period, this same opinion turned a deaf 
ear to preparedness advocates and supported the limitation 
of arms philosophies of President Harding. Finally, in 
the administration of President Coolidge, that opinion 
turned to concern for internal prosperity and development. 
With peace secured by international agreement, it seemed 
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to the largest segment of American people that there was 
little to be concerned over in the state of readiness of 
their armed forces. Though the Geneva Conference of 1927 
ended in failure, preoccupation with internal development 
remained only slightly broken and was soon reinforced 
by the Kellogg-Briand peace pact of 1928. 
The pacifist policies of President Hoover further 
kindled the country's hopes for peace and promised 
to a nation whose economy was deeply depressed, some 
respite from the burden of defense expenditures. 
The agreements of the London Naval Limitation of 
Arms Conference, in 1930, brought still further hope 
for the avoidance of a naval race. At the end of the 
Conference, the United States was still far under the 
ship tonnages allowed by the agreements and, with the 
economic situation of the nation in difficulty and 
considering the political objectives of President Hoover, 
it was quite likely to remain so. 
Meanwhile, the Office of Naval Intelligence, acting 
through the Secretary of the Navy, continued to refine 
its information procedures and attempted to further 
sophisticate its operations throughout the service. 
Special events such as the demonstration of naval air-
craft from the deck of the aircraft carrier Lexington 
and the touring flight demonstration over the major 
cities of the northeastern seaboard were staged in 
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May, less than a month following the agreement in London. 
While there is nothing written officially which would 
link the events, it is unlikely that the show was without 
purpose. Although the London Conference had placed a 
limit upon aircraft carrier tonnages, it had not been 
able to reach any agreement on limitation of aircraft. 
From the outset, it appeared that the administration 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt would be forced to concern 
itself with internal development in order to recover 
from the depression. The tide of international events, 
however, forced a modification of that thinking as first 
the Japanese, then the Italians and, finally, the 
Germans and Russians embarked upon courses of conquest. 
The failure of the second London Naval Limitation 
of Arms Conference in 1935-36 set the stage for world 
rearmament. In January, 1938, President Roosevelt asked 
Congress for a $1 billion naval appropriations bill. 
The "two-ocean Navy't measure was passed in May over the 
voices of the pacifists and the United States, belated 
as usual, found herself with both feet planted in the 
greatest naval race in history. 
The mobilization of public relation activities 
began in 1940 and continued through to the United States' 
entry into the war. Utilizing the Naval Reservists who 
l~ 
had been specially selected and trained, or who were 
otherwise qualified by the nature of their civilian 
occupations, the Public Relations Branch of Naval 
Intelligence expanded in less than a year from thirteen 
personnel to fifty-five by the end of May, 1941. 
Additional plans had been implemented to create, within 
the naval districts as well, the nucleus force of quali-
fied Reservists. Public Relation officers had been 
placed, also, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets 
commands. 
On May 1, 1941, the public affairs function in the 
Navy became, once again, an independent function respon-
sible directly to the Secretary of the Navy. Later, 
through the efforts of Admiral Ernest J. King, the 
office became responsible also to the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 
Conclusions 
Within the period of this survey, the nature and 
role of the Armed Forces of the United States have 
changed: adapted to the shifting requirements of both 
the society these forces serve· and to the political 
and social institutions they are created to defend. 
Throughout this development has run the thread 
of political consistency., Military power, or the lack 
of it, is political -- in being as well as in use. 
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The question of whether to raise and maintain 
standing armies and navies has not been long a major 
issue for the people of the United States, but, rather, 
the degree at which they should be maintained, and at 
what cost to a democratic society -- that is the question. 
The answers, such as they are found, form the fabric 
of our national policy. 
From its beginnings, the Navy has sought to gain 
support for the maintenance of both its efficiency 
and its combat capability. That role is implicit in 
the political leadership of the service, in the office 
of the Secretary of the Navy. 
It was within the office of the Secretary, then, 
that the public affairs function had its natural 
beginnings. Nor is it surprising to find that the 
function reached its peaks of refinement under three 
secretaries who had been newspaper publishers: Gideon 
Welles, Josephus Daniels and Frank Knox, and in periods 
of its greatest need: the Civil War, World War I and 
World War II. 
or cardinal consequence in advancing the develop-
ment of the function were the extraordinary requirements 
of naval forces for orderly development -- war was too 
late. The complex demands of technological progress --
i 
d .g ~ 
of building ships and training crews to man them --
required both orderly and constant attention. The 
problem became how to demonstrate the need, how to 
enunciate the national policy in terms meaningful .to 
the body politic, and how to translate meaning into 
dollars and cents support. 
The needs of the service evolved from the needs 
of the nation. The requirements of national security 
policy were translated into terms of funds, men and 
ships by which that policy could be supported. The 
multifarious nature of policy determinants involved 
complex considerations of both national and inter-
national interests. Catalysts, events, internal and 
external rivalries, effects of technology, wants and 
fears -- operated in both positive and negative ways 
to hasten or retard policy development. This was the 
environment in which the public affairs function had 
to operate. 
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From its beginning attempts to influence legis-
lators, the public affairs function in the United States 
Navy proceeded to the time of the Civil War when it 
shifted its approach to the more mature managerial 
concept of responsibility to the broad base of political 
support the people themselves. This point marks 
the beginning of the public affairs function in its 
t'" 
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operational sense -- the "turning mark" where the helm 
was shifted and the course changed. 
Throughout its short history, the public affairs 
function and its development had been characterized 
by reaction rather than by initiative. Eich of the 
milestones passed came as a result of political or 
practical problems faced by the Navy. Perhaps this 
was because the evolution of the function developed 
along a political model: never had the function known 
rational progression. Programs were designed to 
overcome problems of the present; seldom anticipating 
future evolution. Interpretation of the Navy to the 
public was the goal -- interpretation of the public to 
the Navy never envisioned. 
Partly this was due to the absolute nature of 
military operations. Senior officers, knowing they must 
succeed or fail, survive or perish with available forces 
on hand in any crisis, found little interest in public 
hopes for disarmament which, they felt, were unjustified 
by the international situation. Conflict in interest 
stood as a b'ar to mutual understanding. Men who had bled 
knew that bleeding was less when training and capabilities 
were greated; that less of the nation's treasure was spent 
when spent continuously on orderly development rather than 
in huge crash programs. The concepts were difficult to 
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convey to a public who saw a chance for a detente, a 
hope for disarmament and the opportunity to devote their 
energies to peaceful pursuits. The question of balance 
and the quest for understanding fostered the growth of 
the public affairs function. 
Competition certainly played its part. Competition 
for funds; strong interservice rivalries for manpower, 
monies, and functional assignment; competition against 
peace groups and advocates of disarmament and with other 
segments of society striving for public attention and 
support. 
The nature of the society demanded that the public 
have knowledge enough to provide support in the degree 
required. But, how much knowledge could be imparted 
in a free society without endangering,fighting ability 
by informing an enemy? The question of military security 
and censorship versus freedom of information, too, spurred 
the development of the public affairs function. 
Yet the demands for information to the public had 
great significance to the vitality of naval policy. In 
its first public pronouncement, the Navy General Board 
placed on record its recommendations to the Secretary 
of the Navy on naval policy. Included as an appendix 
to the Secretary's annual report in 1913, it addressed 
the public affairs function: 
*:'td 
••• In the opinion of the General Board any 
rational and natural development of the Navy 
looking to the continuance of peace and the 
maintenance of our national policies demands 
the adoption of, and the consistent adherence 
to, a·governmental naval policy founded on our 
needs and aims. To give life to such a policy 
requires the support of the people and the 
Congress; and this support can only be obtained 
by giving the widest publicity to the policy 
itself and to the reasons and arguments in 
its support, and taking the people and the 
Congress into the full confidence of the 
Government, inviting intelligent criticism 
as well as support. The General Board believes 
that only a lack of understanding ••• by the 
people at large prevents the adoption of a 
consistent naval policy; and recommends to the 
department a system of extended publicity 
in all matters relating to naval policy, 
acting through patriotic organizations, the 
press, or by whatever means a knowledge of 
the naval needs of the Nation may be brought 
home to the people of the country ••• 
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Behind that statement lay the most perplexing 
problem confronting the public affairs function: The 
basic consideration of responsibility. Did naval 
policy rest with the Commander-in-Chief, and, thereby, 
naval public relations policy with it? Or did the 
public affairs function, as the national security 
function, have a greater responsibility directly to 
the people? In questions where the best professional 
judgment varied with that of the Chief Executive, who 
should know of it? Who controlled the policy governing 
public affairs? Why was control necessary? To what 
purpose was it exercised? 
rd 
155 
In 1941, the public affairs function in the Navy 
found itself soon to be responsible to two authorities: 
---the political suthori ty embodied in the Secretary of 
the Navy, and the military authority vested in the Chief 
of Naval Operations. Theorists who saw in the function 
a discharge of basic responsibilities to the people of 
the nation in keeping them fully informed could afford 
to disabuse themselves of that nation. The public 
affairs function had grown from the Navy's requirement 
to win a broad base of support for its policies. 
Looking ahead to the post-war reorganization of 
the defense establishment and the creation of the 
Department of Defense in 1948, would serve to highlight 
the problem. When military objectives were in consonance 
with political policies, there were few problems for 
public affairs. When the two courses diverged, however, 
the concert became cacophony. The problem, in this later 
period, was transferred up yet another notch in the 
bureaucracy. With this important exception: the military 
organization under the Department of Defense had lost its 
voice. 
The organization, in 1941, of the Office of Public 
Relations was the product of the many forces which had 
preceded it; had demanded it. It was not enough to 
realize that, for the Navy, the helm had been put "a'lee, 11 
but, further, to consider what course the ship would 
steer and whose hand was on the helm. 
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APPENDIX A 
Excerpts from Commander H. R. Thurber Memo 
to the Director of Naval History; "Navy 
Public Relations, July 1940 - May 1941." 
••• From July 16, 1940, to 1 May 1941, I was officer 
in charge of the Public Relations Branch in the Navy 
Department, and was under the Director of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. From·l May to 27 May 1941, I was 
attached, as acting director, to the Office of Public 
Relations, Navy Department, public relations having 
been transferred as of 1 May from cognizance of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy ••• 
••• When I reported for duty as officer in charge, 
the Public Relations Branch, Navy Department, was manned 
by 2 other USN officers who had recently reported, 2 USNR 
officers, 2 experienced civilian assistants, 4 civilian 
clerical personnel and 2 enlisted Marines. The branch 
handled press relations, radio, photographic and other 
phases of public relations in 3 rooms located between 
the 8th and 9th wings on the front corridor of the 2nd 
floor of the Navy Department. The former press section 
officer remained on board until turnover was completed. 
Personnel attached were capable, and the branch was 
operating on principles which had been established over 
a period of years. lUblic relations offices in the 
Naval Districts were, in total, below peacetime operating 
strength. 
The directive issued to me was "to build the office 
up for an emergency". War plans for.such a contingency 
existed, having been written in 1924 and revised through 
lr939. Those plans were analyzed, and, after some changes, 
action was taken on the task assigned. 
The first step was that of obtaining additional 
numbers of experienced personnel. Records of Naval 
Reserves slated for war-time duty in Navy Public 
Relations were reviewed and tentative selections made 
of those who would head the various sections of a war-
time Office. There was no legal requirement for these 
Reserve officers to enter service in 1940; however, 
selected candidates were interviewed and asked to enter 
active service provided their personal situation would 
permit. This procedure was effective, although the 
time element often appeared protracted as activities 






With additional personnel, and a general speed-
up of public relations because of the international 
situation, it was necessary to obtain larger operating 
space and in a location that was more accessible to 
members of the press, radio and photographic services. 
The entire NaV¥ Department was beginning to expand, but 
space (7 rooms) was acquired in August 1940, on the 
first floor, front corridor, next the center (main) 
entrance to the Navy Department. 
Problems of actual public relations were carried 
forward toward solution, and are discussed under indi-
vidual headings, in the order: OPR organization, press, 
radio, pictorial, scripts, civic liaison and naval 
districts, reference section, voluntary censorship, 
special projects, comments. 
During the period the foregoing were taken in hand, 
the international situation affecting Navy public 
relations developed rapidly. The Acting Secretary of 
the Navy signed in September 1940, contracts for the 
tt$4,000,000,000 Navyn (200 combatant ships, 2400 air-
planes, expansion of the naval shore establishment); 
fifty over-age U.S. destroyers were given to the British 
in exchange for the right to lease British naval and 
air bases in the Western Atlantic; the Selective 
Service and Training Act was enacted; the export of 
iron and steel scrap to Japan was prohibited; and 
Germany, Italy and Japan signed a treaty of alliance 
which contained a threat against the United States. In 
January 1941, the President addressed Congress on "the 
four freedoms", and his budget message requested an 
additional eleven billion dollars for the natior:al defense 
program. Repairs to British men-of-war, damaged in the 
sea war, were undertaken in u.s. naval shipyards. In 
March 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease bill, and 
the President stated the great task of the day was to 
"move projects from the assembly lines of our factories 
to the battle lines of democracy - Now! On May 27, 
1941, an unlimited national emergency was declared. 
OPR ORGANIZATION. 
In July 1940, the Navy Department's Public Relations 
Branch (referred to hereafter as OPR) had an officer in 
charge (Commander, USN) three officers and an experienced 
civilian assistant in the press section, and one officer, 
with an experienced civilian assistant, who handled 
general information requests, pictorial, radio and such 
other duties as were assigned. 
War plans for OPR called for a Rear Admiral as 
director, a deputy director, a press section, radio 
section, photographic (stills) section, Motion picture 
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section, and general information section. Provisions 
were made for liaison with Navy public relations branches 
in the Naval Districts and with Navy public relations 
representatives afloat. 
The mission of OPR, as evolved from u.s. Navy Policy, 
was to make available_ to the public through press, radio, 
pictorial, and other media, all information concerning 
the Navy that was compatible with military security, in 
order to keep the people of this country informed of 
the activities and conditions of the Navy. Decision 
was made in July 1940 that in order to carry out this 
mission, OPR 1s motto should be •service, consistent 
with security ... Because of the.international situation 
and the country's current response to threats against 
our national security, it was determined that attempts 
to "sell the Navy" to the country were irrelevant and 
should be firmly and scrupulously avoided ••• 
To further the accomplishment of OPR1s mission, 
personnel acquired were assigned to carry out functions 
for which they were judged best-fitted, with the follo-

















Pictorial Section • 
Scripts Section. 
Civic Liaison and Naval Districts Section. 
Reference Section. 
By the middle of May 1941, the foregoing organi-
zation was operative, although sections were not com-
pletely staffed. 
During the growth of OPR in the period under review, 
the undersigned acted as "Director", with the assigned 
responsibility of enunciating and effectuating approved 
public relations policies of the Navy. Lieutenant 
Commander (now captain) R. w. Berry, USN, acted as 
"Assistant Director", as well as officer-in-charge of 
the Press Relations.Section until September 1941 when 
the latter duty was assigned Lieutenant Commander (now 
Captain) w. H. Wharton, USNR, formerly of the editorial 
staff of the ORBlON JOURNAL and who had reported in for 
duty in the spr!ng of 1941. 
Administrative. Lieutenant (now captain) H. W. 
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Gordon, Jr., USN was in charge of the "Administrative 
Section" throughout, and had numerous additional duties 
until relieved of them by incoming personnel. The 
Administrative Section had cognizance of accrediting 
press, radio, magazine and photographic representatives 
to the Fleets; of the business management of OPR -
personnel, budget, equipment, space, orders, travel; 
of mail distribution and files; and of the reference 
library, which eventually became a separate section. 
Correspondence handled through the Administrative 
Section during the period under comment totalled 
26,533 letters, representing answers to queries for 
factual information from the press, colleges, schools 
societies, publishers and individuals, and correspondence 
initiated by OPR. 
In anticipation of the 11war 11 influx of correspon-
dents, writers, radio broadcasters, and photographers 
into the Fleets, and the attendant administrative and 
policy details, arrangements were made in April 1941 
with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to. 
have Lieutenant Commander Waldo F. Drake, USN of the 
LOS ANGLES TIMES, ordered to PacFlt staff as Fleet 
PUbllc Relations Officer, and with the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, to have Lieutenant Commander 
(now Commander)Stuyvesant B. Wright, USNR, formerly of 
PARAMOUNT N&IS, ordered to his staff as Fleet Public 
Relations officer. 
In addition to assistance in the forming of three 
Fleet units for combat photography, and of the combat 
artist group the Administrative Section worked with 
U.S. Marine Corps Representatives in formulating plans 
for Marine combat correspondents. 
Plans. Lieutenant Commander (now captain) W. M. 
Galvin, USNR, former Secretary of the Navy League_ of 
the United States, was placed in charge of the "Plans 
Section"l on his entry into active service in September 
1940, with the responsibility of evaluating and making 
recommendations on Navy public relations problems. 
Specific tasks initially assigned were: (1) future 
organization of Navy public relations ashore and afloat 
for efficient war service; (2) war liaison of Navy 
. public relations with other current and ~respective 
government public relations activities; l3) constant 
review and analysis of public reactions to the Navy's 
activities with a view toward improvement in the Navy's 
public relations. Task (1) was completed in late 
1originally, uAnalysis Section"; later "Research 
Section. n 
I' 
October 1940; task (2) in January 1941; task (3) was 
immediately operative and was subsequently expanded 
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in February 1941. Lieutenant Commander Qfllvin 1s section 
was increased to five officers by May 1941, and during 
the interim contributed numerous plans whose implemen-
tation will be included hereafter in the outline of 
activities of other sections. 
PRESS 
The Press Relations Section (hereafter referred to 
as the Press Section) expanded in this period from 3 
officers and 1 experienced civilian assistant, to 9 
officers and 2 experienced civilian assistants. 
Press Section cognizance was as follows: 
a. Preparation and distribution of press 
releases. 
b. Answering requests from the press, and 
from individuals with respect to Navy news. 
c. Maintaining close liaison with the press; 
with presS-conferences of the President, the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Secretary of War; and with the Navy 
Department bureaus and offices. 
Pretaration and distribution of press releases. 
Preparat on of releases was carried out under the super-
vision of the officer in charge of the Press Section, in 
consultation with the "Director" whenever matters of 
policy were involved •. During the period covered by 
this summary, 1644 formal releases were made to the 
press, varying from 1 to 88 pages. (During the pre-
ceding fiscal year, 1216 such releases were made; 
during the year before that, 900). The number of 
informal releases of information is indeterminate, but 
it is estimated to have increased during the period 
covered in about the same ratio as the formal releases. 
Distribution of each formal release was made within the 
Navy Department press room and at the National Press 
Club. No mailing list was maintained. 
Answering Requests. In accordance with tradition, 
the officer in charge of the Press Section was "on call" 
for 24 hours each day. As additional personnel.reported 
and were given a familiarization course, a system of 
"watch officers" was inaugurated in order to provide 
answers to queries which were increasing materially as 
international tension mounted. In November 1940, a 16-
hour Press Section watch was set; and in May 1941, a 
24-h~ur watch was activiated. 
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Liaison. The move of OPR to new quarters in August 
1940 permitted of increased facilities for representatives 
of the press assocations and large daily newspapers 
having Washington bureaus. This closer liaison provided 
for more accurate reporting of Navy news, and for 
correcting misstatements or inaccurate statements con-
cerning the Navy. 
The 11 D1rector", OPR, maintained clo:se liaison with 
the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief \or •Naval Operations, 
and delegated this responsibility when necessary. The 
officer in charge of the Press Section arranged for 
regular conferences of the Secretary of the Navy with 
the press, briefed the Secretary in advance, and arranged 
for record and distribution of his remarks. The officer 
in charge of the Press Section attended press conferences 
of th~ President, and a Press Section representative 
attended press conferences of the Secretary of War. 
Commencing in August 1940, the undersigned directed 
that closer contacts be established with the bureaus and 
offices of the Navy Department. The Press Section was 
able, as personnel increased, to carry out this direc-
tive by creating "teams" to develop newsworthy details 
hitherto dormant •. 
Navy Radio News. In December 1940, the Press 
Secti9n commenced Issuing Navy Radio News to the Fleet 
and outlying stations. The United Press had been 
supplying a news digest to the Navy Department (Com-
munication Watch Officer) for dissemination to the Fleet, 
but in October 1940, expressed a desire to terminate 
this service at the Navy's earliest convenience. 
Negotiations conducted by the undersigned resulted in 
having this digest continued in modif'ied form, and 
supplied to the "first watch' officer in the Press 
Section. Here it was further edited and augmented 
with news of particular Navy interest, for radio trans-
mission to the Navy. This improved service met a long-
felt desire for last-minute news to the Fleet and out-
lying stations. 
RADIO 
The Radio Section of OPR was not formalized until 
February 1941. Lieutenant CQmmander N. w. Sharpe, USNR, 
{former independent radio consultant) who had been per-
forming the functions of officer in charge of the Navy's 
radio public relations while still attached to the 
Press Section, was named as head of the Radio Section in 
a new OPR organizational paper, and was assigned an 
assistant. (In June, two additional assistants reported 
to this Section.) 
4, 
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The Radio Section had cognizance of arrangements 
for Navy participation in national broadcast programs, 
of answering queries from radio news broadcasters, of 
assistance in script preparation for addresses by naval 
personnel, and of liaison with commercial broadcasts. 
Arrangements for·the Navy's participation in 
national broadcast programs included those necessary 
for 16 addresses by the Secretary of the Navy, 2 by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 5 by the Chief of 
Naval Operations, and 23 by various high-ranking 
officers; for 19 national news events, such as the 
ceremonies attendant upon launching of major naval 
vessels; for Navy Day programs; for Christmas Day 
programs; for 38 nationwide recruiting programs; and 
for consideration of numerous, varied requests from 
national broadcasting companies. 
National radio news broadcasters received much of 
their assistance from the Press Section but there were 
numerous calls on the Radio Section for additional, 
11 background" material. 
While script preparation was not visualized as a 
permanent function of the Radio Section, nevertheless 
much of this was carried out as a service, particularly 
in the 1940-41 recruiting programs, in which OPR 
assistance was requested by the Navy Department's Director 
of Recruiting. Script preparation included 11 addresses 
on recruiting for particular phases of the Navy 1s needs, 
and 293 recruiting ntag-linesn for nationally-known 
entertainment leaders and national news commentators, 
all of whom requested this as a privilege. 
Liaison with commercial entertainment broadcast 
{adve~tising) programs was a problem which was met by 
a directive, drafted by the officer in charge of radio 
relations, and signed by the Chief ot' Naval Operations 
in December 1940. This permitted commercial enter-
tainment broadcasts afloat and ashore, provided the 
Navy were not directly identified with the product 
advertised, and further, that each broadcast would 
include a statement to the effect that the program 
had been staged for the entertainment of naval per-
sonnel concerned and did not constitute an endorsement 
by the Navy of the product advertised. 
During this period, preliminary arrangements were 
started {in January 1941) on the request of a national 
broadcasting company, for short-wave radio broadcasts 
of entertainment and morale value to the Navy overseas. 











security and conununications problems for these broad-
casts were solved and the project was in readiness for 
future, war use. 
The Radio Section entered into the Navy's educa-
tional campaign on voluntary censorship, and by parti-
cipation in three major panel discussions assisted in 
arriving at a satisfactory understanding between the 
Navy Department and the broadcasting companies of 
the security problems involved. 
As a result of its monitoring of broadcasts, the 
Radio Section reconunended in May 1941, that Japanese 
language broadcasts from Hawaii be eliminated. This 
recommendation was translated into a draft letter, 
subsequently sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the Conunandant Fourteenth Naval District. 
PICTORIAL 
The Pictorial Section of OPR was established in 
December 1940 under Lieutenant Oonunander (now Captain) 
E. John Long, USNR, formerly on the executive staff of 
the NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE ••• Cognizance of this 
new section was assigned as follows: still photographs 
news, features and advertising; motion pictures - news, 
feature shorts and productions; artists - arrangements 
and display; posters. These responsibilities pre-
viously had been assigned various members of OPR staff, 
who continued to assist Lieutenant Conunander Long until 
additional personnel reported for duty. By May 1941, 
there were three officer assistants, an experienced 
civilian assistant and two clerical personnel in this 
Section. 
Still Shoto,raphs. Prior to December 1940, the 
growing num er o requests for Navy "still" photographic 
material had placed a heavy load on an understaffed OPR2. 
Problems of procurement, laboratory processing, editing, 
clearing for security, and ready availability had been 
analyzed, but progress in solving these was slow. In 
December 1940, the Navy was issuing, on request, about 
7,000 still photographs a year. Conunencing in January 
1941, as a result of more expeditious clearance arrange-
ments with the Department's security agency, official 
2As an example of the work involved in meeting 
requests for pictorial cooperation, over 1500 photos, 
together with script cafitions and layouts were reviewed, 
for the "Navy Day Issue' (October 1940) of LIFE Magazine, 
which had resulted from.negotiations between LIFE 
editors and the undersigned in early August. 
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Navy photographs were displayed in the Press section in 
connection with news releases, and more rapid cooperation 
was made possible in supplying photographs requested by 
pictorial magazines and newspaper rotogravure sections. 
Twenty-two pictorial Navy features of large scope were 
requested by leading magazines, and over four hundred 
Navy photographs were used in rotogravure sections during 
the period of this report. In the advertising field, 
numerous requests from 21 national advertising agencies 
were met by assistance in reviewing layouts, copy, 
photographs, and furnishing material and photographs 
for nationwide advertisements having the Navy as the 
main background. In May 1941, by improving the quality 
and variety of naval photographs and the production line, 
the Pictorial Section was issuing approximately 1,000 
still photographs a day. 
Motion Pictures. Arrangements were made with 
motion picture news reel companies during the period 
under review for coverage, on their request, and for 
security clearance, of 46 Navy news events of national 
interest. Cooperation was extended five major motion 
picture companies for feature shorts of 22 Navy subjects 
which were requested and were subsequently cleared by the 
Department's security agency. Arrangements were made 
with news reel companies for film and editing in the 
make-up of a new and up-to-date recruiting film, entitled 
"The Battle". OPR cooperated in the review and scripts 
of 13 major motion picture productions, of which 10 
were cleared, as suitable, and 3 rejected. Close 
relationships were maintained with the "Hays Organi-
zation", which resulted (March 1941 ), in holding up · 
shipments to the Japanese government of news reels 
showing U.S. Navy activities; in the forming of Naval 
Reserve units of camera men and technicians for research, 
and of three Fleet units for combat photography; in 
assistance to naval recruiting; and in supplying naval 
subjects for motion pictures to be distributed in Latin 
America for furthering the "good-neighbor" policy. 
Artists. Prior to establishment of the Pictorial 
Section, foundations were laid by the undersigned for an 
art project as a phase of the Navy's public relations ••• 
A number of artists, etchers, and illustrators were 
interviewed, and arrangements inaugurated to start the 
shore phase. Mr. Vernon Howe Bailey, an eminent etcher 
and water color artist, was obtained through financial 
contract with the Bureau of Ships, and was started in 
the spring of 1941 on a comprehensive record of ship-
building which subsequently had been partially displayed 
in art exhibits throughout the country, and reproduced 
in magazines and in rotogravure sections of metropolitan 
newspapers. In March 1941, Mr •. Griffith Baily Coale, 
president of the National Society of Mural Painters, 
was selected as the prospective officer in charge of 
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a group of naval artists. Commander Coale 1 s work as a 
combat artist and a writer, his cooperation in obtaining 
other outstanding naval combat artists, and his enthusi-
astic leadership in this field are too well-known to be 
repeated in this commentary. Eventually, under Lieutenant 
Commander Long's later guidance, an experienced "curator" 
served during the War to correlate the many phases of 
this activity. This art project will have a lasting 
value in the Navy's public relations. 
Posters. In pursuance of requests from litho-
graphing firms and from the (President's) Office of 
Facts and Figures, the Pictorial Section cooperated in 
supplying Navy material for Navy recruiting posters, for 
"spy" posters being prepared by the Society of Illus-
trators, and for the THINKAMERICAN series of posters. 
Correlation of photographic activities. As a 
result of the increased demand for Navy still photo-
graphs and motion pictures during the emergency period, 
the photographic facilities available to OPR became 
seriously overtaxed by the spring of 1941. A study of 
laboratory facilities available led to the submission of 
a memorandum by OPR, embodying specific suggestions for 
revision and improvement of the entire framework of Navy 
photography. As a result of this memorandum, the Secre-
tary of the Navy convened a Photographic Board. The 
report of this board, on which OPR was represented by 
Lieutenant Commander Long, set forth principles that 
guided official Navy photography throughout World War II. 
Following the submission of a memorandum from OPR 
in the spring of 1941, a board was convened to revise 
General Order Number 96, which governed the taking and 
publication of photographs of naval subjects for pub-
lication, General Order No. 179 resulted, and gave a 
workable solution for this subject during World War II. 
SCRIPTS. 
The Scripts Section was formed in August 1940 under 
Lieutenant (jg) (now Captain) Victor F. Blakeslee, USN 
(Ret.), a capable writer, and was assigned cognizance 
of: 
a. Preparation of addresses for the Secretary of 
the Navy, the Under-secretary of the Navy, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, and for high-ranking naval officers. 
b. Preparation of "ceremonial" statements for 
the Secretary of the Navy;. 
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c. Assistance to writers and publishers in pre-
paration of books, magazine articles and pamphlets. 
Scripts preparation and assistance for addresses 
totalled 31 during the period under review, the addresses 
varying in length from fifteen to forty-five minutes' 
delivery time. 
"ceremonial statements" prepared by the Scripts 
Section numbered 92, and included such subjects as 
Alnav~ for the centenary observance of Admiral Mahan 1 s 
birth , for Navy Day, for Thanksgiving, tor Christmas, 
for Army Day, for the founding of the Marine Corps; 
congratulatorY messages to national patriotic organi-
zations; Chief of Naval Operations" messages to the 
commanding officers of naval ships.being newly commis-
sioned. 
Assistance to writers and publishers imposed an 
increasing challenge to the resourcefulness of the 
Scripts Section. In the book field, the manuscripts of 
24 authors were reviewed, and suggestions for additional 
material or changes were accepted by the authors. In 
the magazine field, aid was given to LIFE for eight 
major articles on the Navy; to FOR'1't1Rlf'1"or three Navy 
studies; to the SATURDAY ~NG POaT for four exposi-
tory articles on the Navy~ the N'XTIONAL GBJGRAPHIC 
MAGAZINE for four illustrated Navy articles; to 
COLLIER'S, COSMOPOLITAN, AMERICAN, LOOK, POPULAR SCIFNCE 
MOH'.Mtt#Y, ARCHiTEdftJRAL FORUM, MACH!Rl'Rf, Ms wm, 
AidklcAN FOREIGN skHVICE JOURNAL, ARMY ORDNANCE ASSOCI-
ATION :oURNAL, for feature Navy articles In their field; 
to Nelson Rockefeller (Coordinator for Commercial and 
Cultural Relations Between the American Republics) in 
illustrated magazine publications for circulation in Latin 
America. 
3In connection with the Mahan centenary, OPR pre-
pared a suitable ceremonial message for press release 
by the President, made arrangements for a wreath-laying 
ritual at Mahan 1s grave, and aided the Naval War College 
in observance of the day. 
40ne of these, "Ships, Men - and Bases" by the 
Secretary of the Navy (with Fletcher Pratt) was reprinted 
free-of-charge by the POST publishers in pamphlet (color 
illustrated) form, and 20,000 copies distributed "for the 
Navy Department in the interest of National Defense". 
"' ___ .__ ________ ~--------------------2-~ 
Pamphlet assistance included preparation for the 
Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee of an 
illustrated booklet (Senate Document No. 53) on"The 
United States Navy", for congressional distribution; 
prev.aration for the American Council on Public Affairs 
of 'The United States Navy in National Defense" by 
Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, for a nationwide 
sale; review of four major pamphlet studies on the 
national defense by the Foreign Policy Association; 
review of material submitted by the Navy League of the 
United States. 
CIVIC LIAISON AND NAVAL DISTRICTS SECTION. 
This Section was not formalized until late in February 
1941, and was then placed in charge of Lieutenant Commander 
(now Captain) James G. Stahlman, USNR, owner and pub-
lisher of the NASHVILLE BANNER, who had volunteered to 
the Secretary o? the Navy in January for Navy public 
relations duty. Prior to the establishment of this 
Section, its functions were carried on by the Adminis-
trative Section. 
Cognizance of the Civic Liaison and Naval Districts 
Section? included liaison with Public Relations Officers 
in the Naval Districts, and~cooperation with welfare, 
patriotic, civic, fraternal, educational, entertainment 
{USO) and other civilian organizations (decentralizing 
to Districts whenever feasible} • 
••• In February, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Stahlman 
was sent on a tour of the Districts to investigate prob-
lems of the public relations officers. As a result of 
this tour, closer liaison procedure was established and 
a directive was signed by the Chief of Naval Operations 
for further increases in Districts• public relations 
personnel. A "Guide to Navy Public Relations", initia-
ted by the undersigned, was prepared by the Section, and 
issued in March, 1941, to6the Naval Districts7by the Chief of Naval Operations • A further letter was pre-
pared by the Section, at the direction of the under-
signed, and issued to the naval service by the Chief of 
Naval Operations in March 1941, for guidance in connection 
with the Navy's campaign for voluntary censorship. Plans 
were formulated in May for a conference of public rela-
tions officers from the Naval Districts in Washington in 
the summer of 1941. 
5Later changed to the Naval District Section. 
6cNC Serial 380616 of March 19, 1941. 





Civic Liaison. Requests of national civic groups8 
on OPR for speakers, Navy exhibits and naval parti-
cipation in celebrations were originally handled by the 
Administrative Section, decentralized wherever possible 
to the Public Relations Officers of the Naval Districts. 
This function was gradually taken over by the Civic 
Liaison and Naval Districts Section, and turther decen-
tralized to the Districts. 
REFERmfCE SECTION. 
The Reference Section was established February 1, 
1941, under the supervision of Miss Helene Philibert, 
with experience of over twenty years in the Navy 
Department's Press Section. Miss Estelle Philibert, 
a capable statistician, was enrolled as assistant. 
Inspection was made of the systems in the New York 
Public Library (government publication section), and 
the libraries and "morgues" of the Associated Press and 
the New York Herald Tribune. 
In late February, organization was started of ref-
erence material hitherto accumulated by the Press and 
other Sections. Binding, arranging, and indexing of 
press releases (from July 1919 to date), assembly and 
indexing of Congressional hearings and bills on the 
Navy, indexing digests of Navy contracts, consoli-
dation and indexing of biographical material, binding 
and arrangement of histories of all u.s. Navy ships and 
air squadrons, and assembly of authoritative Navy his-
torical reference material continued with commendable 
speed and efficiency. By May 1941, the Reference Section 
not only had been able to meet the numerous demands of 
other OPR sections, but also had assisted materially in 
supplying a remarkable volume of source material 
requested by other bureaus and offices of the Navy 
Department. 
VOLUNTARY CENSORSHIP. 
The international situation affecting Navy public 
relations developed ••• (sentence obscured) ••• m1litary 
value to the Axis powers was unrestricted, except for 
that issued by the Navy Department. I discussed this 
problem with the Director of Naval Intelligence and 
recommended that a letter be sent by Secretary Knox to 
8 The Navy League of the United States was lacking in 
active leadership and finances in 1940, but commencing 
early in 1941, under the presidency of the Honorable 
Sheldon Clark, assumed a positive role in supporting a 
national information program on the Havy. 
,, 
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all U.S. press, magazine, radio and photographic agencies 
requesting their voluntary cooperation in the avoidance 
of publicity - unless announced or authorized by the 
Navy Department - on certain subjects. This recommen-
dation was based on the following factors: 
a. Agreement in Joint Army and Navy Board 
reports dating back to 1937, that censorship of these 
agencies in time of war should be limited at least 
initially, to voluntary, self-imposed censorship. 
b. The probability that the U.S. would be 
totally embroiled in World War II, and allied with the 
British. 
c. The fact that in World War I,, a "list" or 
code for-specific guidance in voluntary censorship had 
not been available until seven weeks after hostilities 
began. 
d. The thought that an educational period in 
voluntary censorship would be mutually beneficial to 
the agencies concerned and the Navy. 
As a result of this recommendation and further dis-
cussions of a draft prepared by the undersigned,, 
Secretary Knox sent the following confidential letter to 
over 3,,200 agencies: 
"December 31,, 1940 
"Dear 
"As the present emergency has become more 
critical, many news, magazine, radio and photo-
graphic agencies have requested me to advise 
them as to the manner in which they can make 
their services more helpful to the Navy. This 
cooperative attitude is much appreciated. 
"Speaking not only as Secretary of the Navy 
but also as a former newspaper publisher, I 
believe that if further assistance is requested 
of publishing agencies in the interests of national 
defense, it will be gladly extended. 
At the moment, the Navy finds itself seriously 
hampered in the proper conduct of its preparations 
for the present emergency because of dissemination 
to the public - and thereby to unfriendly powers -
of certain details concerning these preparations. 
"Your cooperation, therefore, is requested after 
January 15, 1941 in avoidance of publicity --
unless announced or authorized by the Navy Depart-
ment -- on the following subjects: 
11 (1) Actual or intended movements of vessels 
or aircraft of the U.S. Navy, of units 
of naval enlisted personnel or divisions 
of mobilized reserves, or troop move-
ments of the U.S. Marine Corps: 
11 (2) (Mention of) "Secret" technical U.S. 
naval weapons.or development thereof: 
11 (3) New U.S. Navy ships or aircraft; 
"{4) U.S. Navy construction projects ashore. 
"In making this request, I wish to assure you 
that the Navy Department will continue to release 
information concerning the foregoing subjects to 
an extent that is consonant with public interest 
and with the effectiveness of the Navy's pre-
parations. 
"A similar confidential letter is being sent 
simultaneously to all the listed American press, 
magazine, radio and photographic agencies. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ FRANK KNOX. 
Secretary of the Navy" 
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Replies to this letter were practically 100 per cent 
in acceptance. There were natural questions arising from 
such a proposal:e.g. - Would there be similar "lists" 
from other government departments? Would there be some 
Navy agency available for rapid decisions on clearance 
for news material of questionable security? Would the 
Navy's "list" be changed, or eventually made more specific? 
The National.Press Club, in Washington, undertook to 
approach these problems by arranging an "off-the-record" 
forum on press censorship, 14 March 1941, to which Mr. . 
Lowell Mellett (President's Office of Facts and Figures), 
Major General Robert c. Richardson, Jr. {Director of 
Public Relations, War Department) and the undersigned 
were invited in order to answer questions proposed by 
leading journalists and publishers. Transcriptions of 
this (and a second) forum were sent by the National 
Press Club to all publishing media in the U.S. for infor-
mation, but not for publication. 
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On 17 March, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
in furtherance of the voluntary cens§rship campaign, 
issued a letter to the Naval Service amplifying the 
intent of voluntary censorship, attaching a digest of 
existing security regulations, and applying inter-
pretations in clarification of the Navy's public relations 
policy: "To keep the public informed of the activities 
of the Navy, as compatible with military security." 
The undersigned subsequently was designated to 
follow up on this campaign: at the second Forum of the 
National Press Club, 10 April 1941, in an address before 
the annual convention of the American Society of News-
paper F.ditors, Washington, D.C. 18 April 1941; in a 
national radio forum with three prominent New York edi-
tors on CBS "People's Platform", New York City, 19 April 
1941; in an address at the annual convention of the 
National Association of Broadcasters, St. Louis, Mo., 
13 May 1941; in a panel discussion (again with Mr. 
Mellett and Major Gen. Richardson) for Mid-Western 
editors at the University of Missouri, 14 May 1941; and 
by addresses at numerous other, less formal meetings. 
The foregoing steps, supplemented by considerable 
correspondence and by discussions in U.S. trade journals 
of the publishing world, did not entirely solve the many 
problems of voluntary censorship. There were lapses and 
errors in judgement, not all of which were on the part 
of the press or due to the voluntary system. However in the 
May 3, 1941 issue of EDITOR & PUBLISHER, the leading 
article, which was on Voluntary Censorship, noted that: 
"In both the Navy and War Departments, news-
papermen assigned to coverage say access is not 
as free today as it was a few months ago; yet 
it is agreed that the news product is greater -
more releases are issued daily and press confer-
ences are conducted with greater regularity than 
in the past ••• commander Thurber describes it as 
•more constructive coverage, with emphasis on 
news which does not run head-on into the cate-
gories suggested by Secretary Knox• ••• Cited as 
evidence that voluntary censorship is workable 
both branches of the service report an almost 
universal practice of submitting questionable 
news for clearance before publication." 
And in the SATURDAY EVENING POST of 26 September, 1942, 
the following qonclusion was reached in an article on 
"Now Your News' is Censored": 
9CNo Serial 247216, prepared by OPR. 
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"Pearl Harbor had caught neither the military 
nor the American press with its guard down, so far 
as censorship was concerned. For more than ten 
months before that fateful Sunday a full-dress re-
hersal of censorship had been carried on. Although 
bearing the title of •voluntary co-operation•, it 
actually amounted to a wartime censorship on naval 
matters ••• It managed to conceal an extremely impor-
tant movement of the fleet at one stage; it put 
our building program into the mystery category; 
and it allowed the establishment of outposts at 
remote spots that have never been revealed to this 
day ••• 
11Whatever its merit or fallacy, Knox 1s 1volun-
tary co-operation' did help train the. American 
newspaper editor to police himself and his works, 
and to recognize the difference between news that 
would give 1aid and comfort to the enemy• and news 
that wouldn't. When (Byron} Price took over the 
reins of censorship in December, not only did the 
newspapers and radio have the benefit of this 
experience but they had been voluntarily operating 
for the two weeks after Pearl Harbor under a mili-
tary censorship put into effect by the Army and 
Navy." 
SPECIAL PROJECTS. 
Navy Day, 1940. 
The officer in charge of the Administrative Section 
of OPR branch was secretary of the Navy Department Navy 
Day Committee. Ground work for the celebration was 
started in July, in compliance with detailed requests 
from the Navy League, the Naval Reserve and patriotic 
organizations. 
The slogan for Navy Day, 1940 was "KEEP THE NAVY 
STRONG". Eleven articles and speeches on the subject 
of the "Two-Ocean Fleet", and similar appropriate 
material were distributed to the Naval Service as basic 
material for press and speeches on Navy Day ••• 
••• cooperation was extended in securing speakers 
at Navy Day events under the auspices of Naval Reserve 
organizations, American Legion, Military Order World 
War and other patriotic organizations, as well as city 
and state committees. The Maryland Navy Day committee 
and the Propeller Club of Baltimore sponsored the Navy 
Day banquet at which Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval 
Operations was principal speaker. Other programs of 
interest were held in the principal large cities. 
.. 
One of the events of Navy Day which created wide 
interest was the unveiling or a bronze plaque in honor 
of William Chauvenet, co-founder of the Naval Academy 
at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. 
Industrial Mobilization. Acting upon a suggestion 
from the late Lieutenant Commander Leslie P. Jacobs, 
USNR, who entered OPR service in March 1941, letters 
were prepared for signature of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and sent in April 1941 to the Commandants of 
Naval Districts in the United States, directing that 
arrangements be made for addresses by notable Navy per-
sonnel at private industrial plants holding Navy con-
tracts. Lieutenant Commander Jacobs also suggested the 
awarding of "E",s for excellence of production, an idea 
which was formalized later under the Industrial Incen-
tive Division, of OOR. 
Liaison with Bureau of Public Relations, War 
Detartment. Close liaison was maintained with the public 
re ations personnel assigned the War Department. With 
the reporting in February 1941, of Major General Robert 
c. Richardson, Jr., as Director of Public Relations, War 
Department, interchange of ideas increased. The person-
ality and-·ability of that officer added greatly to the 
voluntary censorship campaign initiated by the Navy, and 
rapidly furthered by the Army. In the establishment of 
this pleasant liaison, there were many benefits that 
became evident when service public relations came under 
the test of war conditions. 
Security. The growth of Navy public relations 
during the period under review added to the volume of 
work placed on the Security Branch, Office of Naval 
Intelligence, which was responsible, among other duties, 
for security clearance of all OPR projects. This branch 
was conveniently located adjacent to OPR and was in charge 
of Commander (now Captain) J. s. Phillips, USN, with' 
Lieutenant Commander (now captain} E.S. Barnhardt, USN 
(Ret), as his deputy. Cooperation of these officers in 
timely clearance was outstanding, and their suggestions 
for time-saving methods were invaluable as the work-
load on OPR increased. 
COMM»frS. 
Certain organizational and admi~strative problems 
for future planning of Navy public relations are evident 
from the preceding summary. Three are noted briefly. 
a. Training. A school, or course, is recommended 
for public relations personnel, the curriculum to include 
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instruction in selected aspects of the art of public 
relations, the Navy's organization, the Navy's policy, 
and naval strategy and tactics. Arrangements for atten-
dance of Naval Reserve personnel who are scheduled for 
public relations duty at the "naval phases" of such a 
school, and for sending this personnel on Fleet maneuvers, 
is recommended. 
b. Public Media. An OPR program for forum dis-
cussions-on Navy public relations problems with rep-
resentatives of the public media is recommended, subjects 
for discussion to include those necessary for famili-
arization of representatives of the press, radio, photo-
graphic magazine and other public media with the Navy's 
organization and policy, with the current operating Navy, 
and with naval strategy and tactics. 
c. Security. The mission of Navy public relations-
to keep the public informed of the activities of the Navy, 
as compatible with military security - raises many thorny 
problems of security in peacetime, and (under voluntary 
censorship) in wartime. A "code" is suggested for 
guidance not only of the Navy, but also of the public 
media - this 11 code11 to be issued to the Navy, and to be 
included in forum discussions noted in b, preceding. 
Emphasis on wartime security is requisite. An approach 
to this latter problem is suggested in order to increase 
understanding and responsibility; namely, to study avail-
able enemy estimates of U.S. losses each action of World 
War II, with a view to arriving at an approximate 11 code 11 
of what can and can't be released from a standpoint of 
security, this "code" and the study from which it resulted 
to be supplied the Navy and the public media as noted 
above. 
In concluding this summary, the undersigned again 
desires to pay tribute to his hard-working, effective 
associates who produced, and who gave Navy public rela-
tions a good name in and outside the service during the 
period under review, and in addition established a sound 
nucleus for the subsequent, wartime expansion of personnel. 
H. R. THURBER. 
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"It is known among the military, but less 
widely among the general public, that the object 
~ 
of war is determined by policy; that policy in 
turn is determined by statesmen, and that these 
statesmen are strongly influenced by public opinion. 
But it has not been generally appreciated that for 
this reason public opinion may give to strategy 
its initial direction and may color and even 
decisively influence the outcome of a war. 11 
••• J. M. Scammell 
Preface 
Little admitted, seldom supported, and rarely 
recognized for what it was, the United States Navy's 
adoption of a formal public affairs function followed 
a stormy evolution. Participation in international 
expositions, publicity campaigns on behalf of re-
cruiting, cooperation with the Navy League of the 
United States -- all played a part of in its develop-
ment. Despite popular misconception, the public 
affairs function did not grow, nor was it fostered, 
in a vacuum. It evolved because of the social and 
political forces which demanded a responsive and res-
ponsible voice in government. 
In any assessment of a nation is power, it is 
essential to begin with the temper, the will of her 
people. Military and naval forces form but an ex-
tension of that will, which, in operation, constitutes 
national purpose and dictates national policy. 
Factors which influence that will, then, are of 
great importance in determinations of national power. 
In this nether land of the indefinable, it is known 
that events and their perception are primary consider-
ations affecting popular thought and action. It is in 
this influence on public opinion that the public affairs 
function in government, and in the United States Navy, 




In the history of the development of the public 
affairs function in the United States Navy, the "turning 
mark11 at which the Navy shifted its course from early 
attempts to influence legislators to the mature con-
cept of direct responsibility to the nation and the 
people came in the Civil War. It was here that, in 
the jargon of the sailing ships, "the helm was put 
a 1 lee. 11 
While there is a wealth of literature written on 
naval subjects, there is a dearth of it dealing, even 
tangentially, with the subject of public affairs in 
the United States Navy. Even such an outstanding 
volume as Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer 1 s, Administration 
of the Navy Department in World War II, contains but 
a paragraph, in 950 pages of text, touching on the 
Office of Public Relations. 
The objective of this study has been to document 
the development of the public affairs function in the 
United States Navy from its earliest traceable beginnings. 
In setting the boundaries of this study, primarily it 
was necessary to consider aspects directly affecting 
the development of the public affairs function while 
noting other aspects of lesser bearing such as Navy 
actions with, and reactions to the mass communications 
media. Insofar as these operations were found to have 
exercised influence on the functional development of 
11 
public affairs in the United States Navy, they have been 
included. Also included in the same sense of relevance 
to this development was the tide of public opinion, 
reflected by the media and in Congress, and the movements 
which set political forces in motion -- the preparedness 
movement of 1915-16, and the peace movement in the years, 
1922-1928. 
Events were significant in the development of the 
public affairs function in the period under study. The 
Washington Naval Limitation of Arms Conference, 1921-22, 
and the bombing tests upon Navy ships conducted by 
General Billy Mitchell and a group of Army and Navy 
fliers, for instance, were events which led the Navy to 
establish an information function within the Office of 
Naval Intelligence in order to mount a counter-propaganda 
offensive. Events, too, by which the need for a strong 
Navy could be dramatized were pertinent to the func-
tional development of public affairs activities: the 
threats of the commerce raiders in the Civil War and 
those of the German submarines in World War I, and the 
cruise of the battleship fleet around the world, 1907-9. 
Executive leadership by the President and support 
either offered or withheld by Congress, too, had deep 
implications for Navy public affairs operations through-
out this study. 





Because of their nature, however, little has been written 
which would establish a link between interservice actions 
and reactions, and the influence of this stimulus remains 
obscure. 
There were many such areas of obscurity in dealing 
with such a politically oriented investigation: the 
role of the Secretaries of the Navy in their private 
meetings with individuals of the press and with officials 
of the Navy League; the influence of the President upon 
service actions carried by the Secretary of the Navy 
from decisions made in Cabinet meetings; the relation-
ships between the Secretaries and the Committees of 
Congress; the role of patronage, and the influence of 
spoils, and the relationships of Navy public affairs 
with the Committee on Public Information in World War 
I and, later, with the Office of War Information in 
World War II -- all remained outside the area of 
documentation. 
Also of importance to this study were the roles 
played by individuals such as John w. Jenkins, the first 
manager of the Navy'News Bureau. Though Jenkins conducted 
the day-to-day work of operating the Bureau, the policy 
decisions of what was released to the public and the 
manner and language of the releases seems to have been 
provided by Josephus .Da.niels himself. No documentation 
establishing the true relationship between the two was 
iv 
discovered and the activities of Jenkins remained obscure. 
The parameters of this study suggested many other 
areas of interest and pertinence which justified investi-
gation. Among these were: a study of the public affairs 
activities of Gideon Welles, and those of Josephus 
Daniels and Frank Knox, all of whom were former publishers 
who made significant contributions to the public affairs 
function in critical periods of the Navy's history; a 
study of the preparedness movement of 1915-16; and a 
study of Navy participation in exhibits, expositions and 
in international fleet reviews. Following 1941 were 
yet other subjects: the operations of the Office of 
Public Relations, whose beginnings were set in the period 
of this current study; the combat art program; and a 
survey of the censorship function in periods of national 
tension. These were but a few of the many parts of the 
total picture concerning public affairs in the United 
States Navy. The end point of the study was set at the 
establishment of the Office of Public Relations in May, 
1941, whose subsequent operations were a part or· the 
history of World War II. 
The methodology of this study centered upon a 
research plan which focused on two areas of primary-
source interest: the records of the Office Of the 
Secretary of the Navy, National Archives, and the Navy 





Histories, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Department. Additional material was sought in the 
files of the Bureau of Navigation, National Archives. 
The research in Washington was conducted in two ten-day 
periods during the summer, 1967. 
The guide to research used in the period to 1918 
was Harold and Margaret Sprout 1s, The Rise of American 
Naval Power, 1776-1918. Without its superb documen-
tation the project would have been infinitely more 
difficult since few, if an~ records predating 1900 
carry indexes which reveal the slightest trace of 
public affairs activity. Indeed, the whole problem 
of research through primary-source documents has been 
the difficulty in dealing with great volumes of leeter 
press, typewritten and manuscript materials to which 
no index in the area of public affairs has been 
compiled. 
The task would have proven impossible without 
the continued interest and active support of many who 
are fully qualified to call themselves historians. 
To each of them, and for whatever this study is worth, 
I owe a great debt. In guiding my first halting probes 
in shoal waters I must thank Admiral E. M. Eller, 
Director of Naval Histories Division, Navy Department, 
himself a former Chief of Information; his personal 
secretary, Miss T. I. Mertz, whose knowledge of the 
vi 
I. 1· 
intricacies of naval· histories has never ceased to 
amaze me, whose sailing directions have caused me to 
avoid innumerable uncharted reefs, and those patience 
has never worn thin despite any number of distress calls 
spread throughout a year of research; the staff in the 
Navy Department Library led by Mr. F. S. Meigs, and also 
the staff of the Operational Histories Division. 
Thanks, as well, are due and tendered to the 
staff of the National Archives, especially to Mr. 
Harry Swartz who spent unnumbered hours in obtaining 
the unobtainable and Mr. Lee Saegesser who pointed 
to channels through the shoals. 
To a special group of individuals whose personal 
experiences with the Office of Public Relations and 
its predecessors, the Public Relations Branch and 
the Information Section of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, contributed immensely to my understanding: 
Admiral (retired) Bernard L. Austin, Admiral (retired) 
John B. Heffernan, Miss Helen Philibert and Admirals 
Leland P. Lovette and H. R. Thurber, both of whom 
passed away before the research project could be 
completed; my sincerest appreciation. 
Debts of gratitude must also be accorded to 
Captain R. s. Jones, who got the project rolling on 
Navy tracks; Captain Pickett Lumpkin, captain Edmund 
L. Castillo, and captain William Thompson who contributed 
vii 
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generously of both their time and understanding of the 
development of the public affairs function. 
Special thanks are due, too, to the thesis committee 
who gave more than a full measure of patience, guidance 
and understanding: Professors Scott Cutlip, Richard 
Joel and James Fosdick. 
To my family, my deepest appreciation. It was they 
who bore the burden ••• 
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CHAPTER I 
The Beginnings of Public Affairs 
In the United States Navy: 
The Civil War and Beyond 
CHAPTER I 
The history of Public Relations in the United States 
Navy follows closely the evolution of the function within 
government. In the creation of the United States Navy 
itself can be seen the marshaling ot political support by 
the expedient of spreading the contracts for goods and 
services over as large an area and among as many indivi-
duals and companies as possible.1 The manner ot obtaining 
the needed support caused the riaval historians, Harold and 
Margaret Sprout, to conclude, " ••• it would seem a fair 
inference, trom official utterances as well as from cir-
cumstantial evidence, that the Administration aimed to 
popularize the Navy in a suft1cient number of states and 
communities, to insure legislation continuing it on a 
permanent basis."2 
or more marked influence upon public and Congressional 
opinion.however, was the press of international events. 
The depredations or the Barbary Corsairs and actions of 
the French privateers which later erupted into the Quasi-
Naval War with France combined to give proponents of an 
effective naval force leverage enough to enact the hotly 
debated NaVJ' Act of May 27, 1794,establishing the United 
States Navy.3 
With the election of Thomas Jefferson and the triumph 
of the Jeffersonian Republican party came a drastic change 
in naval strategy--a period or retrenchment and passive 
l 
2 
coast defense. 4 The cutback was in marked contrast to the 
active building program espoused by the Navy's first 
Secretary, Benjamin Stoddert5 and occurred in the critical 
period preceding the War of 1812. 
Failure of the Jeffersonian naval strategy was punc-
tuated by the nearly complete blockade of coast of the 
United States from Long Island Sound to New Orleans. The 
.futility of the gunboat defense policy and the bankruptcy 
of a militia system for national defenae was demonstrated 
6 to the American public in the burning of Washington. 
The function or Public Relations in the United States 
Navy was carried forth by the Navy's political leadership. 
In the Civil War, however, can be found the first halting 
steps taken by the Navy itself to provide the public with 
information about its actions. 
In the main, news or the Navy throughout the war was 
dependent upon battle reports. Secretary or the Navy 
Gideon Welles, himself a former newspaper editor, 7 would 
8 hand over the communiques to reporters in Washington. 
Not all of the reports were necessarily handed over, how-
ever, for the dictates of military security made certain 
disclosures inappropriate. In news of failures of the 
tJnion Navy's monitors in connection with the September, 
1863, attempts to capture Fort Sumter and Charleston harbor, 
release of information regarding deficiencies in the iron-
3 
clads was stricken by Welles from the reports, " ••• (it 
did not appear wise) to make any deficiencies in those 
vessels prominent 1n the official reports which were to 
be published ••• if monitors are weak in any part, there was 
no necessity for us to proclaim that weakness to our 
enemies ••• "9 
On several occasions Welles was distressed to find 
the Army garnering a major share of the limelight in actions 
which hinged on naval forces. He instructed Admiral Porter 
to make certain his battle reports were in ahead of those 
of the military commanders. Porter did at his next oppor-
tunity and the Navy, spurred by interservice rivalry, 
scooped the Army on news of the Battle of Vicksburg. On 
July 7, 1863, Welles wrote, " ••• Admiral Porter's brief 
dispatch to me was promptly transmitted over the whole 
country ••• I am told, however, that (Secretary of War) 
Stanton is excessively angry because Admiral Porter heralded 
the news to me in advance of General Grant to the War 
Department ••• He craves to announce all important information. 010 
The Navy and the Press 
It was common practice for correspondents to travel 
with Union armies and, to a lesser extent, with those of 
the Confederacy. News directly from reporters with the 
ships was rare. The difficulty of communicating with their 







between news from the front and the lack of it from block-
ade and river squadrons. 
A notable exception to this pattern was a New York 
reporter, B. s. Osbon,11 who accompanied the abortive 
relief expedition to Fort Sumter. The expedition was led 
by Gustavus V. Pox, later appointed the first Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. 
It was also Osbon who might, with some justification, 
be called the Navy's first public relations officer. 
Through certain connections, he won with Admiral Farragut 
a combination job as Signal Clerk and Secretary on the 
Flagship Hartford. In that position he was an eyewitness 
to the battle with the torts and the capture of New 
Orleans.12 He wrote and distributed the story to the New 
York papers. 
By the summer of 1864, Osbon had published a handbook 
on the Civil War histories ot ships of the Union Navy. It 
was an extremely useful reference work for news editors 
as well as for contemporary commentators. 13 By that time 
Osbon had established himself as a sort of clearing house 
for news about the Navy. He wrote Sunday articles which 
he sold to a group of 18 newspapers and claimed, at least, 
to have so established the first news syndicate in America.14 
-One of bis methods or operating this syndicate landed 
him in trouble in November, 1864. While the Powder Boat 
Expedition against Fort F1sher15 was being prepared, Osbon 
5 
obtained the details of the operation from Admiral Porter 
and wrote an advance for his newspaper subscribers with the 
understanding that it was not for use until after the 
expedition had been completed. 
On hearing a rumor that the attack had taken place, 
a Philadelphia editor printed the story prematurely, giving 
the enemy abundant information prior to the attack. The 
16 
editor reportedly was arrested and the paper closed. 
Following the successful attack more than a month 
later, Osbon was put under arrest and clapped into the 
old Capitol prison in Washington until nearly the end of 
the war. 17 
Information Versus Security 
One problem reporters encountered when they embarked 
in Navy ships was that of censorship. They found that 
Flag Officers of the Navy could censor their copy or, for 
that matter, oust :bhem without the story. 18 
The problem of censorship was not exclusive to the 
Navy, nor could the desire for censorship be laid to the 
ultraconservatism of naval officers. The problems of 
informing people through a public press without imparting 
useful and sometimes essential information to an enemy 
are myriad and worthy of several volumes. In a civil war, 
these problems became more complex. 
Perhaps the most damning of comments on intelligence 
6 
available in the press came from the log of the most 
successful of the Confederacy's commerce raiders, the 
CSS Alabama. Captain Semmes, upon capture of the merchant-
man SS Manchester bound from New York to Liverpool, studied 
a batch of newspapers found on board and wrote, "I learned 
from them where all the enemy's gun boats were, and what 
they were doing ••• Perhaps this was the only war in which 
the newspapers ever explained, beforehand, all the move-
ments of armies and fleets to the enemy. 1119 
Correspondents were not the sole source of news leaks 
of security information. Naval officers corresponding 
with the press caused Flag Officer s. F. DuPont to issue 
20 
an order prohibiting such correspondence to his South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron. On several occasions, vio-
lations of his order resulted in disciplinary action against 
the offenders. 
Rear Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the North 
Atlantic Squadron, also found it necessary to restrain 
his officers from corresponding with the press and issued 
a similar general order. It reflected a generally held 
view of the professional military dealing directly with 
the press, " ••• Th~ Commander in Chief is the person to 
communicate what it may be proper for the public to know, 
and it will be done in off~cial form. Writing for the 
press is not the right kind of employment for an officer 
"21 
of the Navy ••• 
7 
Information leaks in the Charleston campaign caused 
Admiral John Dahlgren to write to Secretery Welles, " ••• 
There are probably no means upon which the enemy has so 
relied for information as this insane propensity for 
22 
making public the most valuable items." 
For an Informed Public 
Meanwhile, the depredations of the Confederate commerce 
raiders, coupled with the threat of completion in :&igland 
of the Confederate-contracted ironclads, set the eastern 
23 
seaboard of the Union into near panic. 
The demand for warships to defend the harbors, to 
chase the raiders, and to patrol the fishing grounds and 
shipping lanes exerted extreme pressures on the President 
24 
and the Secretary of the Navy. Metropolitan editors, 
shipowners, mayors of port cities, governors of seaboard 
states and members of Congress urged, and none too gently, 
a departure from sound naval strategy or firm and unre-
lenting blockade in favor of helter-skelter pursuit of 
private or individual interests. 25 
Apart from the strategy of the war, there were 
several painfully learned lessons just as studiously 
ignored at war's end. One of these was the portent of an 
aroused but ill-informed public opinion and its resultant 






repeatedly found that it could not build, equip and man 
a fleet in times of emergency but had to build, maintain 
and train one over the years, it became just as unmis-
takably clear that it could not expect public understan-
ding of its mission and strategy without taking action to 
cultivate and roster that understanding. 
For nearly a generation following the Civil War the 
26 Navy languished and regressed. With little public 
interest in or concern for the Navy of the United States, 
there was no impetus for propagation of an information 
base to support naval programs, if, indeed, there were 
any naval programs. 
Exhibits to Inform the Public 
Yet another field o!'"~ublic relations activity was 
opened for the Navy by presidential fiat in 1874. President 
Grant, noting the upcoming exhibition in Philadelphia 
celebrating the lOOth anniversary of United States inde-
pendence, issued an executive order directing partici-
pation or the executive departments of the federal 
government, 
••• it is desirable that from the executive depart-
ments ot the government of the United States, in 
which there may '• articles aui~able tqr tbe pur-
pose intended, there should appear such articles 
and materials as will, wken presented in a collec-
tive exnib1tion. illustrate the functions and 
administrative facilities of the Government in 
time of peace and its resources as a war power, 
and thereby serve to demonstrate the nature of 
our institutions and tJ17ir adaptations to the 
wants of the people ••• · 
9 
The public relations intention of that order was carried 
forth in the direction ot many exhibits subsequently par-
ticipated 1n by the federal government. 28 
In Philadelphia, eight departments took part in the 
exhibit: Treasury, War, Navy, Interior, Post Office, 
Agriculture, and the Smithsonian Institution. The Navy 
contingent representing the Secretary of the Navy on the 
Exhibit Board was headed by Rear Admiral Thornton A. 
Jenkins -- in those days a figure of considerable rank 
for presentation of the Navy's message to the public. 
On the exhibition trail, federal participation, 
including that of the military services, continued through 
to the turn of the century and beyond. 29 
Perhaps the Navy's most elaborate exhibit was made 
as a part of the World Columbian Exposition held in 
Chicago in 1893. 30 A ship model of lathing was built on 
a brick foundation set on piles driven into Lake Michigan. 
It was open for touring and featured realistic interiors 
and exteriors, actual arms and equipment, and had fully 
dressed mannequins at various stations throughout the 
"ship." The total Navy exhibit oecupied nearly 50,000 
. . 
square feet of space and cost the Navy $125,468. A full-
time crew was detailed to set up and maintain the exhibit 
and a part of them, at least, actually lived in quarters 
10 
in the bottom-bound "ship." 
Aside from this rather small and fundamental activity 
there was little effort to interpret the Navy to the 
American public at large in the years described as 11The 
last years of the old Navy. 1131 
Naval progress of the 80 1s was advanced by the vigo-
rous leadership of Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt. 
One of the more notable tactics in Hunt's campaign to 
rebuild the Navy was to bring together selected Senators, 
Representatives and naval officers for discussion of naval 
policy. It marked a significant departure from previous 
( 
norms of professional action in the political realm and 
helped overcome mutual prejudices and misunderstandings 
between Congress and the Service.32 
The Navy's Oracle 
In 1890, an obscure Professor of naval history and 
tactics at the Naval War College published a book entitled, 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. The 
acclaim accorded Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan 1s theories 
of command of the sea propelled him to immediate fame.33 
Mahan had no connection with an information function 
34 in the Navy. Yet his books and articles, coming as 
they did at a propitious moment in naval affairs formed, 
in the opinion of the naval historians Harold and Margaret 
Sprout, the basis of an enlightened naval policy in the 
United States. 35 
11 
In Times of Tension 
When Theodore Roosevelt was appointed Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy in 1897, he brought to the Navy 
Department not only a thorough understanding of the use 
of naval forces in international affairs, but, also, a 
remarkable feel tor the public press and knowledge in 
how to use it. 
Perhaps the best example of Roosevelt's sagacity 
in press relations is given in Charles Brown's, ~ 
Correspondent's War, when the long delayed and eagerly 
sought message from Admiral George Dewey reporting the 
Battle of Manila Bay arrived in a Navy Department stuffed 
with some fifty news-hungry reporters. 
one of the officials on the scene was the Under-
secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt ••• 
Reading the message over the shoulders of deco-
ders, Roosevelt took it in instantly. While 
{Seereta~ of the Navy John D.)Long was tele-
phoning (President) McKinley for permission to 
make an announcement to the press, Roosevelt 
was giving out the news to reporters. Then 
Long emerged from his office, smiling as he 
faced the crowd to read in his musical voice 
the great news from Manila. He did not know 
that correspondents had already scribbled out 
their stories and messenger boys even then were 
pedaling wildly on their bicycles to the tele-
graph offices. Long's carefully censored 
version of Dewey's report appeared in the after-
noon papers alongside3~he more detailed account given by Roosevelt ••• 
The complete story told the colorful details, and there 
was no antmosity shown toward Roosevelt for having provided 
it. 
12 
The war with Spain gave the United States Navy a 
startling demonstration of the effects of public opinion 
upon strategy. 
Naval command of the Caribbean was the strategic 
key to the war in the Western hemisphere. 37 To counter 
the challenge of the Spanish Squadron under Admiral 
Cervera, Admiral William T. Sampson, Fleet Commander in 
the Caribbean, proposed two strategically sound plans: 
to take Havana before the arrival of Spanish reinforce-
ments; or to seize San Juan and subsequently locate and 
destroy the Spanish fleet upon its arrival in the West 
38 Indies. 
Sampson was given neither option. Public clamor 
fired by news reports, and congressional and group 
pressures compelled the Navy Department to direct him, 
instead, to confine his operations to blockade and 
cautious bombardments. The Navy Department further with-
held some of the best ships of Sampson's fleet and or-
ganized them into a "Flying Squadron" which was held at 
. . 
Hampton Roads against the obscure possibility of naval 
raids on the eastern seaboard of the United States. 39 
The approach of war built an increasing alarm. The 
Navy Department created a second defense force of several 
cruisers. This Northern Patrol Force was distributed 
along the coast from Maine to Virginia. 40 
The news that Cervera had sailed from the Cape Verde 
I . 
' i I 
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Islands on a Westward course brought panic bordering 
hysteria along the Atlantic coast as the days passed 
without further intelligence. 41 Congress directed the 
Navy department to mobilize the naval militia of the 
States. This Naval Auxiliary Force manned a makeshift 
"fleet" of Civil War monitors, and armed yachts and tugs, 
and to~k up defense stations from Maine to the Gulf. 42 
The resultant, nearly total disorder caused the naval 
historians, Harold and Margaret Sprout to comment, 
Only with the greatest difficulty did the Navy 
Department prevent the unreasoning and prepos-
terous panic from forcing a complete disrup-
tion of the fighting fleet, and the scattering 
of its units, to guard two thousand miles of 
coastline against wholly improbable, if not 
utterly i2tRossible, raids by Cervera•s decrepit 
cruisers. :.:S 
The role of the press in the Spanish-American War 
is unique in the annals of reporting. 44 The cooperation 
afforded correspondents by military and naval commanders 
was nearly limitless. 45 There were reporters with Dewey, 
dozens embarked in ships on blockade stations off CUba, 
and a fleet of them in dispatch boats darting about the 
ships, then flying off to Key West to file their stories. 
In the main, it was Navy Department policy to deal 
candidly with the newspapermen who were the represen-
tatives of the general public. In his diary Secretary 
of the Navy Long expressed the sentiment well after being 
14 
beseeched for additional details on the sinking of the 
Battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, " ••• the newspapermen 
cluster like bees about me ••• They are gathering infor-
mation for the public, and it is hardly worth while to 
be impatient with them when they are really the avenues 
through which the public, very properly, gets its 
information. 046 
Coverage of naval action off CUba, if not accurate, 
was certainly not wanting for number and activity of 
correspondents. The German Kaiser was reported to have 
been highly amused at the thought of the American fleet, 
accompanied by an entourage of press dispatch boats, 
awaiting an engagement with the Spanish. 
While the press "fleet" caused only a few problems 
. . 
to the maneuvering of Sampson's ships, its presence 
caused more than a few in the realm of military security. 
Press reports on fleet movements and possible intentions 
were relayed the same day to Madrid. The technological 
progress made in telegraphy had vastly complicated the 
problem of military security causing censorship units 
to be established at Key West, Washington, and at seven 
47 
cable offices in New York. 
Naval commanders furnished whatever information they 
could, 11 ••• Admiral Sampson fully recognized the demand 
of the country for the fullest information which could 
15 
properly be furnished, and placed no impediment in the 
way of this being supplied, beyond what military neces-
sity demanded. 1148 
Such were the faint beginnings of public relations 
in the United States Navy. The Spanish-American War 
had reinforced other trends developing in the society. 
As the United States stepped upon the international 
stage as a budding new power, her citizens were demanding 
more responsibility from their government. A part of the 
government's responsibility lay in keeping its citizens 
advised of its actions. At the turn of the century, the 
need for public relations was becoming apparent to the 
more astute naval leaders. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Influence of Theodore Roosevelt: 
The Turn of the Century 
Chapter II 
The war with Spain had pushed the united States 
into the international arena of world politics. The 
turn of the century presented this country with over-
seas holdings. The Philippines, Guam, American Samoa, 
and Hawaii - each a significant acquisition in the 
larger view of an agressive mercantile policy in the 
Far :East. The occupation of CUba and Puerto Rico 
seemed to heighten the need for an isthmian canal to 
link the Atlantic and Pacific. 
For the Navy, the new responsibilities that these 
possessions demanded were enormous. The strategy of 
Mahan, which had been sufficiently advanced to cope 
with problems or the Spanish-American war, were 
capable also or including the advanced position of u.s. 
1 
naval posture required by these far-flung commitments. 
Advancing technology and new construction had ad-
vanced the Navy of the United States to a point where 
its sea forces were comparable to those of BJ.ropean 
2 powers, save, of course, those of Britain_ In large 
measure, this was due to the active appropriations in 
each of the years 1898-1900. Partly through the popu-
larity for the Navy whiqh had carried over from the 
war, and partly through the continued stress in inter-
national affairs this impetus continued until 1901 when 
21 
22 
Congress refused to authorize any ships at a11. 3 
Naval policy following the war, as it had many 
times in the past, reverted to the pre-war modus 
vivendi and little thought was given to new responsi-
bilities demanded of the Bavy. With the reelection of 
McKinley in 1900 and the continued secretaryship of 
Long, there was every indication that the Navy could 
4 look forward to a continued policy of drift. 
In September, 1901, an assassin's bullet took the 
life of the President and sent striding onto the inter-
national scene a man infused with the importance of 
naval strategy to national security and fully conver-
sant with naval problems, Theodore Roosevelt. 
In his first message to Congress, President 
Roosevelt revealed the philosophy which was both to 
define and direct5naval policy throughout his admir:d.s-
tration, 
••• The American people must either build and 
maintain an adequate Bavy or else make up 
their minds definitely to occupy a secondary 
position in international affairs, not merely 
in political, but in commercial matters. It 
has been well said that there is no surer way 
of courting national disaster thap6to be "opulent, aggressive and unarmed." 
It was characteristic of the man to link the national 
interest with national security and to state both in 
terms of the wants of the people of the nation.7 
l . 
23 
Roosevelt began immediately to build the Navy 
a drive which did not slacken until 1905. Within four 
years Congress had authorized ten first-class battle-
ships, four armored cruisers, and seventeen lesser ships 
with the whole totaling over a quarter million tons dis-
8 placement. In the same period naval appropriations 
had climbed from $85 million to $118 million, a peace-
9 time record. 
Roosevelt's leadership in the building drive was 
characterized by pressure on Congress, backed by direct 
appeal to the people of the nation. Reflecting the 
Commander-in-Chief's ambitions, the recommendations of 
the General Board and of the Secretary of the Navy 
pushed for increased construction in an effort to gain 
comparability with the navies of Blrope.10 
Navy reaction to press comment became evident in 
this same period. In July, 1904, the Chief Clerk of 
the Navy engaged a New York clipping service for_ 
•ooonotices referring to matters connected with the 
· ull Navy, special articles, editorials, etc... Here 
was some positive feedback. 
Personnel Needs 
With the increase in fleet tonnage, the require-
ment for greater numbers of personnel in the Navy 
placed additional emphasis upon recruiting. Somewhere 
I . I , 
j, 
I 
12 in this period, the Navy found it helpful to develop 
a publicity organization as an aid to recruitment. 
In 1902 Roosevelt pa.id special attention to the 
Navy's personnel needs in his annual message to 
13 Congress. In 1905, this same message had become 
almost a plea. 14 
For the Navy's part, recruiting went on at an 
accelerated pace, but not always without its problems. 
One recruiting team in the midwest repeatedly found 
adverse and non-factual stories and comments about the 
Navy appearing 1n the local press just prior to its 
saneduled visits. These occurrences caused special 
mention 1n the Secretary's annual report to the 
President, 
••• the Bureau (Bureau of Navigation, prede-
cessor to the current Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel) believes that a more thorough and 
more widely diffused knowledge of the con-
ditions of life in, and opportunities aff-
orded by, the naval service is the best 15 remedy against.unjust and harmful criticism. 
The type of criticism to which the Navy objected 
can be seen in the Saud.a, Colorado, Mail in noting the 
arrival of a Navy recruiting party, " ••• If your son 
is an incorrigible and you think he will either go to 
the gallows or to the penitentiary, send him to the 
24 
N nl6 avy. Taking up the gauntlet, the Army & Navy Journal 
replied, 
The representative, fair-minded newspapers of the 
United States could render a most helpful service 
to the country by reminding their readers on every 
proper occasion that the Army and Navy are open 
only to bright reputable, cleanly and ambitious 
young men, that they are not reformatory insti-
25 
tutions, but organizations in which character, 17 
manhood and merit are indispensible to advancement. 
Whatever the problems of Navy recruiters in gaining 
publicity for their drives, some success must have 
attended their efforts. In November, 1907, the Bureau 
of Navigation received a letter from a publicity 
organization in Rochester, New York, offering to conduct 
a publicity campaign on behalf of Navy recruiting. The 
Bureau graciously turned down the commercial off er 
replying, 
••• The methods now being employed in obtaining 
recruits for the Navy have proven efficient and 
the results are very satisfactory ••• It has been 
the Bureau's experience that interesting news 
articles are eagerly sought after and there has 
been no difficulty in having published any items 
of interest regarding the naval service.lb 
Considerations of Image 
Sensitivity to the image of the Navy and its men 
was not confined to recruiters. In 1905, an employe 
of the Navy Department was dismissed for refusal to 
carry out a contract to let a part of his house to a 
26 
sailor because, " ••• his wife feared her •social position' 
would be affected if a man in sailor's clothes were seen 
going into or coming out of her house." The incident 
was considered important enough to be noted in the 
Secretary's annual report to the President.19 
A similar but previous happenstance supposedly 
gave rise to the Navy's first newspaper in Newport, 
Rhode Island. In 1901, a yeoman from the naval base 
reportedly saw the sign in a downtown store window, 
"Dogs and Sailors Keep Out." He was repulsed when he 
- ' 
tried to enter forcibly and returned to the base to 
vent his frustration by publishing an underground news-
paper decrying the outrage.20 
Information With Purpose 
'United States Naval Intelligence at the turn of 
the century consisted of but seven officers in the 
Navy Department and tour naval attaches overseas. One 
of its annual publications, Motes ~ Naval Progress, 
was an interesting reference work for comparative 
statistics on the world naval powers. In January, 
1902, the Kew York Sun noted praise for the work by 
a correspondent of the London Times, 
••• The Admiralty conceals its knowledge even 
from the House of Commons ••• even when the 
Parliament insists on obtaining a return of 
the fleets of the Powers, the bare return is 
given without any attempt at summarizing the 
results, or any endeavor to make the infor-
mation furnished of practical use for pur-
poses of discussion. We have to go to the 
American Naval Intelligence •• 1to obtain a summary of this information.2 
A modicum of press praise was accorded to the 
information function in the.Navy, " ••• the difference 
(between British and American intelligence) is wholly 
to the credit of our small intelligence starr."22 
Press Tours 
27 
In the informal organization of the period, infor-
mation was imparted in a number of ways. One such 
instance was a tour of the Navy Yard at Puget Sound 
for seventy-five members of the Utah Press Club in 
June, 1902. 23 Sponsored jointly by the Press Club of 
Seattle and the Commandant of the Yard, the guests were 
given a list of "rules" to be followed. Some of them 
were enlightening: 
Rule 2. Refrain from using unnecessary violence 
to persons not in government employ._ Take a 
fall out of anything in uniform, but abuse non-
combatants only after returning home, and then 
only on the editorial page. 
Rule 3. Do not pull the tail of the bull 
terrier belonging to the Commandant. Said 
terrier has no sense or humor, but has.been 
brought up to scrap first and leave arbitration 
to the United States Senate. 
Rule 4. Do not think that because you are a 
taxpayer and therefore a part owner of the 
t:Jnited States Navy, that you can carry the 





Rule 8. Coming from the interior, you may 
with perfect safety observe to the officers 
of the Wisconsin that the Oregon is a wonder. 
But don •_t get angry if an ~fficer replies that 
you don't know a camel from a cruiser. 
Ru.le 11. Don't ask if the band can play "suwanee 
River." They can play anything from the ~Dead 
March in Saul" to table stakes in the guard 
house. 
Rule 12. Walk on the grass, the walks, the 
regulations or on anything else except the 
water. 
The "rules" were made by the Yard Commandant, captain 
' ' William T. Burwell. 
The Navy League 
In December, 1902, a potentially formidable and 
certainly less inhibited agency for publicity was 
founded outside the confines of government, the Navy 
. 24 League of the United States. The League was fonned 
28 
by men who believed, 0 ••• the American people would have 
' to be educated to appreciate the cormection between sea 
power and America's new international responsibilities. 
Thus educated, they would exert pressure upon Congress 
to provide with generosity and promptness for a suit-
able peacetime Navy."25 
The extent of the Bavy•s involvement itself in 
formation of the League is not laloWD.. The Navy•s Office 
of Naval Intelligence had been following closely the 




The actual proposal for an American league was made at 
an annual meeting in New York of the Naval Order of the 
United States in November, 1902, presided over by Rear 
Admiral Albert Barker, Commandant of the New York Navy 
Yard. 27 Barker urged creation of the League as an 
adjunct to the Navy "to enlighten (the) people ••• on 
naval matters and tell them what a Navy means to the 
country and what it ought to mean to them."28 Approval 
for the group was obvious. 
In the League's creation was an organization which 
could bring to the attention of the American public and 
to Congress the salient issues which demanded a first-
class naval force and could challenge, as well, the 
anti-preparedness propaganda of the peace groups. 
To bring its message to the public's attention, 
the League planned to use several devices. 29 It 
foresaw speakers touring throughout the country; issu-
ance of press releases and information pamphlets to 
selected editors, Congressmen and opinion leaders; 
wide distribution of the League-produced magazine and 
local sections meeting regularly to discuss naval matters 
and celebrate commemorative oceasions.?O 
On October 6, 1906, the Navy League section in 
Philadelphia created one such occasion which was called, 
"Navy Day." Later in its history the Navy League would 
hold an annual celebration on October 27, the birthday 
or Theodore Roosevelt. This first gathering on "Navy 
Day" attracted over 2,000 members to Atlantic City 
where the featured speaker, Secretary ot the Navy 
Charles Bonaparte, vigorously attacked "talse and mis-
leading statements by peace groups" and a hostile 
press. 31 
In his annual message to Congress in December, 
1906, Roosevelt requested sweeping personnel changes 
tor the Navy but only one capital ship per year.3lA 
Here was a place where the League might use its influ-
ence to effect. The Navy, the League's magazine, 
32 
called for the League to act. In February, the 
League convention met 1n Washington and endorsed the 
President's program. Roosevelt's address to the dele-
gates who called at the White House revealed his hopes 
for concerted League action, 
••• The President and the Congress both need to 
be remipded that it is neqessary for the sake 
of America to encourage the upbuilding and the 
maintenance of the 'United States Navy ••• I want 
all ot you in your ~espective homes, through 
the organs of public opinion, by your influence 
upon your representatives at every branch at 
Washington to see that the needs of the Navy 
~re not forgotten in the future. The Navy has 
no one to speak tor it save those who speak tor 
it because or their devotion to the honor and 
the integrity or the 'United States; and I ask 
that you and those like you ~ake your voices 
heard for the general welfare amid the din of 
voices that speak only for special interests.33 
30 
31 
For all of the expectations visited upon the League, 
its initial performance proved disappointing. Hamstrung 
by financial difficulties, defied by public apathy for 
the subject of increasing the nation's arms, opposed by 
both peace groups and an increasingly hostile Congress, 
the League's operations until 1908 fell far short of 
its potential.34 
Membership in, and support for the League had been 
expected from industrialists and wealthy businessmen. 
The expectation never materialized. American industry 
and commerce were thriving and a big navy might have 
led to international tensions and ultimately to war. 
The disruption of commerce would have far offset the 
short term gains from increased defense spending.35 
Jlecommendations For A Bureau of Information 
In December, 1905, the President of the General 
Board, Admiral George Dewey, recommended to the 
Secretary that the Navy and the Army consider seeking 
legislation which would prohibit the publishing, in time 
of war or when war was imminent, " ••• any information of 
. 
a military nature which is not f'urnished for publica-
tion by the War or Navy Departments."36 The recommen-
dation presupposed, but did not specifically address 
the details of an information organization. 
Following a conference with War Department offi-
cials, Sec~etary Bonaparte replied that the time was 
32 
inopportune for such legislation. He did consider the 
recommendation appropriate, however, in time of national 
peril and directed the Board to draft a bill for sub-
mission at a later date.37 He admonished the Board to 
care.fully consider, " ••• any measure which would seri-
ously and inJuriously affect the legitimate business 
of the press or interfere with the natural, and indeed 
patriotic desire of the general community for prompt 
and reliable information respecting public affairs in 
time of war."38 
The General Board returned the proposed legis-
,' 39 
lation to the Secretary in April. Contained therein 
was a provision for presidential designation of officers 
for special duties in the preparation and release of 
military information, including the creation of what 
40 
might be called a Bureau of Information. The pro-
posal evidently was shelved to await a propitious 
moment, but thinking had progressed to an active interest 
in the problem in times of emergency if not in times of 
peace. 
Exhibitions and Naval Reviews 
For Blropean naval powers, the 18901 s were marked 
by international naval visits and naval reviews in great 
41 
races for prestige and popular support. The United 
States abstained from these extravaganzas until 1902 
33 
when President Roosevelt's invitation brought Germany's 
newest battleships into New York for display. The 
following year, four American cruisers under Rear Admiral 
Charles s. Cotton appeared in succession at Marseilles, 
Kiel and Portsmouth, England. In 1904, Roosevelt sent 
six battleships and eight cruisers to tour and call at 
the ports throughout the Mediterranean. 42 
In 1905, fleet visits were exchanged with the 
French, and the British Navy sent a contingent of six 
battleships to New York, where, interpersed with 
American ships, they formed a line in the Hudson 
stretching from Fifty-fourth Street to Grant's Tomb.43 
In the same year Roosevelt inaugurated a series of 
naval reviews in front of his home on Long Island Sound 
where, according to Hart, " ••• the President's lawn was 
packed with important guests. Wanting a good press 
for the Fleet, Roosevelt asked journalists to the 
parades to get them 1under the naval spe11.1 11 44 
In 1906, the President sent eight battleships to 
the Algeciras Conference which was meeting to settle 
the Moroccan dispute between France and Germany. The 
ships next went to the International Exposition at 
Bordeaux and then on to Portsmouth for the British-
Russian pageant. 45 The ships had just time enough to 
return to the United States for the April, 1907, 
34 
convening of the Jamestown Exposition 
The display, according to Collier's Weekly, "sur-
passed anything the Western Hemisphere had ever accom-
plished in that line ... 46 Squadron's of ships repre-
senting thirteen nations joined the entire Atlantic 
Fleet in Hampton Roads on public display. 47 General 
visiting aboard the ships to afford the public the 
opportunity to examine the vessels, parades, inter-
ship boat races and other sporting events -- all were 
included in the plan to familiarize the public with 
and to popularize the Navy. 48 Navy participation in 
49 the St. Louis Louisiana Purchase Exposition, where 
a full-scale mock-up of a U.S. Navy man-o-war was 
constructed, paled when compared to the full exhibition 
of the real thing. Navy,recruiters were on hand to 
take advantage of the spectacle. 
The Cruise of the Great White Fleet 
As the ships of the fleet rode at anchor in 
Hampton Roads, a rumor cropped up that the Jamestown 
display was nothing compared to what was coming -- a 
'round the world cruise of the battle fleet. 
The news of the cruise was announced by Secretary 
of the Navy Victor Metcalf in an interview in San Fran-
cisco in July50 Editorial and Congressional reaction 
to the announcement was immediate. Along the eastern 
seaboard voices were raised against stripping the 
Atlantic of its first line of defense in favor of a 
"Training Cruise" to the Pacific.51 
35 
The Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 
:Ellgene Hale of Maine, went so far as to declare that 
the fleet could not go because Congress would refuse to 
appropriate the necessary funds. Roosevelt countered 
the threat by replying that the Navy had sufficient 
funds to carry them to the Pacific and that if Congress 
should decide to leave them there, that was Congress' 
problem. 52 
Reaction in the international press fanned the 
flames in the Yellow Journals of the United States. 53 
Meanwhile, the Navy made preparations for the cruise 
and Roosevelt selected the journalists who would 
accompany the ships and tell the story the President 
wanted told. 54 According to Hart,55 
••• favorable accounts could be expected from 
writers who were also naval officers. The 
high-circulation Harper's Weekly was the out-
let for the stories of Lie~tenant Commander 
Philip Andrews and Marine Captain Henry c • 
.Da.vid ••• correspondents from big New York 
papers and the press associations (however) 
presented a problem. Men like R. H. Patchin, 
N. Rose, R. Zogbaum, J. R. Crowell, R. Berry 
and R. Bennett insisted that they were repor-
ters, n.ot publ1c1 ty men. '?o win berths on 
the cruise, however, all had to agree that 
every word would be passed upon by duly 
appointed naval officers. 




news by the wire services clicking word of their depar-
ture, the sixteen battleships which comprised the 
Great White Fleet weighed anchor and proceeded slowly 
in column past the Presidential yacht Mayflower and out 
to sea. 
Extravagant publicity had preceded the fleet's 
departure. It continued to accompany its every move 
as it sailed around the Horn into the Pacific, called 
at coastal ports and then proceeded on to the Far F.ast, 
thence to the Mediterranean and finally returned home.56 
The effect upon world opinion left in the wake 
of the ships was significant.57 United States and 
foreign press which had criticized the cruise at its 
inception heralded its success upon its termination.58 
The tributes, however, were not without reservation. 
"Publicity," said Hart, "was, in itself, a part of 
the voyage's history -- and also a source for it. 11 59 
The accounts of the correspondents who accompanied the 
ships can attest to the statement. The newspapermen, 
needing colorful stories to file, " ••• were creating 
what, in the jargon of the future, might be called an 
image. 1160 The "image," was not without its effect, 
however, and "veteran officers were beginning to under-
. 61 
stand the rudiments of public relations." 
One of the immediate effects was in the boost to 




to ~he publicity surrounding the voyage. 62 The overall 
popularization or the Navy was more important. 
As Roosevelt later recalled, " ••• My prime purpose 
was to impress the American people; and this purpose 
was fully achieved ••• Ho single thing in the history of 
the new United States Navy has done as much to stimu-
late popular interest and belief in it as the world 
cruise."63 
. 
That particular effect to dramatize a cause had 
been forecast by the London Spectator before the cruise 
began, 
••• All over America the people will follow the 
movements of the fleet; they will learn some-
thing of the intricate details of the coaling 
and the commissariat work under warlike con-
d1 tions; and in a word their attention will 
be aroused ••• we are sure that, apart from 
increasing the efficiency of the existing 
fleet64th1s is what Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. 
Certainly tb.at was true. If the effect did not 
get the message across to Congress in the waning ~ys 
or Roosevelt's administration, perhaps it wasn't lost 
on the American public at large. 
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Building for War and Establishment of 
the Navy News Bureau 
Chapter III 
With the departure from the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt and the succession of William Howard Taft, 
the question arose whether the naval policy of Roosevelt 
would carry over to his chosen successor. 
There was little question that Taft's foreign 
policy bordered on isolationism. 1 The import upon 
naval policy, which is so inextricably tied thereto, 
remained obscure. Taft's steps on the naval scene 
seemed to be governed by fear of a failure to keep up 
in the naval race with F.u.rope. 2 The result was that 
the ship construction program advanced by Roosevelt 
gene;ally was continued by Taft.3 
The naval policy of the ad.ministration did not 
enjoy Congressional support, however, and the recom-
mendations of the Navy General Board for four battle-
ships in both 1910 and 1911 were pared to two by the 
President in an effort to gain legislative support. 4 
Seeking to take his cause directly to the people, 
Taft staged dramatic fleet reviews in both San Diego 
and New York which provided platforms for public 
appeals by both the President and his Secretary of 
the Navy, George von Lengerke Meyer. The reviews 
were timed for November, 1911, just prior to the 
opening sessions of Congress. The efforts appeared for 
nought, however, for the Democratic-dominated House 
Naval Affairs Committee reported a naval appropriation 
43 
bill without provision for even one battleship.6 The 
administration's proposals were in considerable 
difficulty. 
Arousal of the Navy League 
44 
The Navy League, stirred to new life, began support 
for a continued building program in 1909. In February, 
following the convention held at Fortress Monroe to 
welcome home the fleet from its world cruise, the League 
released a resume of its convention platforms to the 
press of the nation. By March, ninety-five articles 
had appeared in fifty-eight newspapers. 7 
In April, the League's new secretary, Henry H. 
Ward, set out, with approval of the Board of Directors 
and the informal endorsement of the Secretary of the 
Navy, to publish for the first time a comprehensive 
book.let enumerating the planks of the League's plat-
8 form. Entitled, "Patriotic Reasons for the Navy 
League of the United States,• it was intended for 
release to editors and opinion leaders. Initial dis-
tribution was made in July to 5,000 carefully chosen 
individuals.9 Before year's end an additional 20,000 
were distributed as well as 40,000 pieces of three 
other pamphlets_. lo 
In 1910, League action was active in combating 
propaganda of the peace groups. In the upcoming debates 
on the naval appropriations bill of 1910-1911, the 
45 
League foresaw a major test. Two weeks before the vote 
was taken, the League sent letters to members in thirty-
three states with a listing of Congressmen known to be 
opposed to or not favoring the increased budget. The 
letters urged members to put pressure on their Congress-
men and to agitate in their local press.11 When the 
bill passed the House, the League stood to sha;re in -
some of the credit. 
By the time the bill had gone to the Senate in 
May, 1910, the League had held its annual convention 
and made wide distribution of yet another pamphlet 
urging increased appropriations for ship construction. 
The Senate measure passed increasing the number of shi.ps 
authorized by the House.12 While credit could not be 
laid solely to League efforts, the success attending 
their labors in pushing for greater preparedness did 
serve to increase their self-confidence and offer some 
assurance that League drives could expect tangible 
results. 13 
At the end of the fiscal year on March 30, 1911, 
League officials could look back with considerable 
gratification. Membership had grown to 7,000; over 
80,000 publicity releases had been issued with a high 
incidence of their use; and membership sections had 
become more active.14 The League was able to receive 
the congratulations of the Secretary of the Navy with 
15 
a feeling of accomplishment. 
46 
The League's annual convention was held in Washington 
in February, 1912. Guests attending included the 
President, the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of 
the Navy, and the Chairmen of the House Appropriations, 
Naval, and Foreign Affairs Committees. The delegates 
endorsed the President's two-battleship program in spite 
of the fact that the Democratic caucus in the House had 
16 gone on record in January against any capital ships. 
In March the League sent letters to its entire 
membership urging support for the building program and 
sent like information to about 200 selected editors 
suggesting ed1torials or news items. Press response 
was gratifying as a large number of newspapers came 
out in favor of the two-battleship program. 17 The bill, 
however, cleared the House as it had been reported out 
of the Naval Affairs Committee -- without provision for 
a single capital ship. 18 The Senate, however, inserted 
the two-battleship provision, and the bill went into 
conference. 
While the Senate-House committee was meeting, 
the League continued to press for the program. It 
sent a circular to 250 small country newspapers, to 
twenty larger papers and news services and to each 
Senator and Congressman. The Committee compromised 
on one capital ship. The bill of 1912, moreover, 
47 
provided for a personnel increase of 4,000 sailors and 
400 marines and for the construction of six destroyers, 
eight submarines, and four supply vessels. The total 
bill represented the largest naval appropriation in 
American history to that date. 19 
As the lame-duck Congress met to consider funds 
for the 1913•14 budget, the League was setting out 
again to provide support for an increased building pro-
gram designed to keep the United States Navy on a 
footing comparable to that of the major Ellropean powers. 
The Navy League of the United States had begun to~rform 
20 
with effect. It did so with the active cooperation 
of the Navy. 
It is noteworthy that, in the Taft administration, 
Congress significantly increased naval appropriations 
some sixty million dollars over the last four years 
of the Roosevelt administration. 21 At the same time, 
ship construction was curtailed. The difference lay 
essentially in pork-barrel legislation and patronage. 22 
Restriction on Information 
In November, 1911, a British magazine published23 
a lengthy and detailed article on the construction and 
operation of United States' submarines. The Navy Depart-
ment began an 1nuned.1ate investigation to determine who 
was responsible for the release of security information. 
I 
! ~ 
While later investigation pointed to a civilian 
24 
employe at the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, 
Secretary Meyer issued an order in December virtually 
stifling the free flow of any information to the mass 
media. 
General Order No. 139 
December 16, 1911 
No person belonging to the Navy, or employed 
under the Navy Department, shall convey or dis-
close by oral or written communications, pub-
lications, or any other means, except as may 
be required by his official duties, any infor-
mation whatever concerning the naval or mili-
tary establishment or forces, or concerning 
any person, thing, plan or measure pertaining 
thereto, or any information that might be of 
possible assistance to a foreign power, with-
out the express approval of the Navy Depart-
ment, and all articles containing detailed 
information concerning the naval establish-
ment or forces shall be submitted before 
publication to the Navy Department, Division 
of Operations of the Fleet, Office of Naval 
Intelligence for scrutiny. 
George von Lengerke Me~er 
Secretary of the Navy2' 
The test for the order was not long in coming. 
The following month, an explosion in the Navy Yard at 
Mare Island, California, brought immediate inquiry from 
the press. The Yard Commandant, acting under General 
Order 139 refused to give out information concerning 
the incident. The Vallejo Evening Chronicle, through 
its representative in Congress, complained of the 
repressive measure. Replying to Representative J. R. 
49 
Knowland, the Assistant Secretary outlined the reasons 
for the Commandant's refusal to give out the information. 
In a separate letter to the Yard Commandant, The Secre-
tary of the Navy amplified the intent of his instruc-
tion, "It was not the Department's intention ••• to 
forbid giving information of no military value to 
persons or newspapers: it is left to the judgment of 
commandants and commanding officers to decide what 
properly may be withheld.•26 Regardless of the inten-
tion, the statute remained on the books without modi-
fication. 
The schizophrenic nature of the Navy~s desire 
on the one hand to win support through the publicity 
activities of the Navy League and on the other to 
deny the press access to worthwhile subjects of interest 
seems anomalous. In February, 1912, while cooperating 
with the League's convention in Washington, the Secre-
tary of the Navy turned down a request from Gilson 
Gardner of the Washington Bureau of the Newspaper 
lihterprise Association for permission to place a 
correspondent on board a flotilla of torpedo boats 
during a cruise down the west coast. 28 The reasons 
for the denial were, "hardship·of the cruise and con-
siderations of security." The Secretary did offer, 
however, to have one of the officers of the flotilla 
50 
write the article.9 
In actuality, news of the Navy had traditionally 
emanated from the Navy Department; specifically from 
the Office of the Secretary. In February, 1910, F. R. 
Low, the editor of Power magazine, had written directly 
to the Navy's Bureau of Steam lmgineering asking to be 
put on the mailing list for news made publ1c.30 The 
Chief of the Bureau replied that "1nformat1on ••• g1ven 
out from any Bureau of the Navy Department must, under 
the order of the Secretary, come directly from his 
off1ce ••• n3l Low•s second letter to the Secretary was 
answered by the Assistant Secretary, 
The Department keeps no mailing list for the 
purpose of distributing news items. Any news 
for the press is given out verbally to various 
newspaper correspondents and to the represen• 
tatives of the various press associations, who 
make it a practice of calling at the Department 
daily for the R~rpose of gathering news in the 
manner stated.~ 
While it isn't obvious why t~e first reply couldn't 
have given Mr. Low the information he needed, it is 
clear that the function of informing the public through 
the mass media was firmly vested in the Secretary of 
the Navy. Perhaps, with a view toward press interest, 
\ the incident inspired the Secretary to stir the 
Bureaus for more information, " ••• with a view to 
supplying the public press ••• with items that may come 
I 
up of possible interest ••• the Department desires to be 
furnished with brief statements of such items ••• as can 
properly be made public. 11 33 
Wilson, Daniels, and the Navy 
51 
The succession of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency 
installed Josephus Daniela as Secretary of the Navy. 
Former publisher of the Raleigh News and Observer, 
Daniels had been, as well, Chairman of the Publicity 
Bureau of the Kational Committee and had served actively 
in Wilson's campaign. The importance of news was 
familiar to the new Secretary even if the Navy wasn•t.34 
On March 6, 1913, the day after he took office, 
Daniels sent a memorandum to the Bureaus and Offices 
of the Navy Department requiring that all articles 
intended for the press be submitted to him.35 The 
order was repeated in Apri136 and reemphasized in 
September: 
The Secretary of the Navy directs that 
all articles tor the press be submitted to 
him before they are given out. It is directed 
that all memoranda for the press prepared in 
the various bureaus or offices be sent to the 
Secretary of the Navy through his private 
secretary. 
It is further directed that initials or 
' identifying marks be placed at the top of 
press notices so as to indicate the Bureau 
or office preparing same. 
While the utmost publicity consistent 
with existing regulations and the National 
Defense is desired; it has become necessary, 
in view of certain recent unauthorized 
publications, 37 to insist upon a strict and 
careful compliance with the broad general 
requirement that all articles or information 
intended for publication or the press be 
revised in the Secretary's office. 
Chiefs of Bureaus and heads of offices and 
divisions will take such steps as may be 
necessary to fully acquaint the personnel ••• 
with the requirements of this order.3~ 
The last two paragraphs were additions to the 
first two memoranda, and an unequivocal announcement 
that Secretary Daniels intended to handle the public 
relations of the Navy Department himself, through the 
person of his private secretary, Howard A. Banks. 
Banks, a former North Carolina journalist, is 
known to have handled many public relations functions 
for the Secretary, not the least of which was coor-
dination of Navy participation in the Panama-Pacific 
Exposition in San Francisco, 1914-191639 
Naval Aspects of Wilsonian Policy 
Following Wilson's election, navalphiles and 
others interested in military preparedness had 
expected the President to follow in Taft's footsteps 
in advocating an active building program for the Navy. 
The expectations were based both on the Democratic 
party's platform and upon Wilson's published philo-
sophy concerning the utility of strong naval power 
in the protection of neutral rights. 40 
In his 1913 message to Congress, however, the 
52 
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President made no mention of naval policy, but simply 
endorsed the annual reports of the executive depart-
ments. 41 For his part, Secretary Daniels made no signi-
ficant departure from the proposals of.the previous 
administration but did scale down the recommendations 
of the General Board for tour battleships and a large 
number of smaller warships and auxiliaries to two 
42 battleships, eight destroyers and three submarines. 
The action was more surprising for its apparent 
lack of perception of growing world-wide armaments 
and their implications for u.s. foreign and naval 
policy. 43 While the Anglo-German naval equipoise and 
limitations of physical distance promised territorial 
security for the Western Bemisphere, the machinations 
of the Great Powers in the Far East portended a clash 
with American interests there. For the Navy, the 
implications pointed to the necessity of increased 
fleet strength and readiness.44 
Daniels, meanwhile, turned his major attention 
to the limitation of armaments, to the expansion of 
the domestic shore establishment and to welfare mea-
45 
sures for naval personnel. Nowhere did he address 
the strategic implications confronting the Navy, which 
was all the more surprising for in that year, the 
General Board was allowed to place its recommendations 
46 
upon the public record. For the first time this 
naval planning and advisory group was allowed to 
include an appendix to the Secretary's report and 
permitted to have a representative testify before the 
naval committees of Congress. 47 
The memorandum. of the Board focused upon the lack 
of orderly development of the Navy and the need for a 
long-term policy, " ••• founded on our national needs 
and aims." To this end, the Board favored "giving 
the widest publicity 11 to its own views on policy, 
"taking the people and the Congress into ••• full con-
fidence ••• inviting intelligent criticism as well as 
support.u48 In its first such statement, the Navy's 
planning body had enunciated a fundamental public 
relations policy admirably. 
The naval appropriations bill, after spirited 
debate in both House and Senate, was signed into law 
essentially as the administration had recommended it 
54 
-- just two days after the assassination of the 
Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914.Gon-
tributing to its passage had been the newly found 
voice of the professional Navy speaking with recog-
nition of the effects of public opinion upon national 
and naval policy. Captain Alfred T. Mahan had voiced 
the principle several years before, " ••• public opinion, 
55 
in operation, constitutes national policy ••• 1149 
Perhaps Secretary Daniels had played a role in the 
Board's expressed philosophy, although there is no 
evidence which might confirm such influ~~ce. On March 
10, 1913, an entry in his diary reads,HConferred with 
Naval (General} Board about the necessity of publicity 
--about the ways to secure accurate news to the people 
about the doings in the Navy. Too little is published 
and I planned to see that the public is acquainted 
with all that happens of interest. 11 50 
With Ellrope at War 
War in .Ellrope brought to America an anxiety as 
well as a sense of urgency. The traditional feelings 
of security which had marked American attitudes in the 
pre-war period crumbled before the spectre of unpre-
paredness. The drives of the preparedness groups, 
beginning in late 1914, gathered momentum during 1915 
due largely to public interest in the subject. 
The interests of the administration, however, 
were at considerable variance. The recommendations 
of the General Board for the building program in 1914 
exceeded only slightly those of the previous year.51 
Still, Daniels pared them down drastically to conform 
' 
to the economies of the adrninistration.52 In the 
Board's considerations of the deficiencies in enlisted 
personnel strength, the Secretary refused to publish 
I 
56 
the report until all specific references to the shortages 
were stricken from it. 53 
While a Literary Digest poll of newspaper editors 
revealed considerable support for increasing the armed 
forces,54 it was weighted in favor of the seaboard states 
whose natural interest ran in that direction. Inland 
opinion, according to a contemporary poll conducted 
by the Columbus {Ohio) Citizen, showed popular senti-
ment on the side of the administration.55 
The Great Preparedness Movement 
In the winter of 1914-15 the movement for pre-
paredness sponsored by private societies acting in all 
conceivable avenues began a great educational drive to 
bring Americans to the realization of the inadequacy 
of the nation's arms. Organizations such as the 
National Security League, the Army League, the Navy 
League, and the National Defense League began campaigns 
to agitate for greater preparedness on the part of the 
United States.56 
For their parts, both the Army and the Navy con-
tributed to the preparedness drive.57 11 ••• The Admini-
stration, reversing its earlier policy, came forward 
with a great armament program of its own and a 
supporting propaganda that equalled that of any 
pressure group in the field."58 
57 
Of the press activities of the Secretary of the 
Navy, little is written. l)l.niels did begin to hold 
twice-daily press conferences in his office for Washington 
newsmen. The beginning date of this procedure is 
uncertain. In addition, items of interest to newsmen 
during the period 1914-1917 were posted in the Navy 
Department. Normally, these notices were of a routine 
information nature and were titled, "Press Notices, 11 
or "Memorandum for the Press."59 Many of the news 
rel~ases60 began, "Secretary ianiels has announced ••• " 
or, "The Secretary of the Navy has authorized the 
announcement of ••• tt, leaving little doubt as to the 
authority for the release of information in the Navy. 
Several of the news releases provided verbatim 
transcripts of Daniels' speeches. But most noteworthy 
was the tempo and extent of the press release activity 
which picked up significantly in m.id-1915 and con-
61 tinued to do so through to the end of the war. This 
accent coincided roughly with the administration's 
decision to accelerate the strengthening of the nation's 
62 
military forces. 
A statement made by Daniels during the Congressional 
Investigations of 1917 concerning the Navy's lack of 
readiness for war is revealing of the Navy Secretary's 
philosophy of the function of information 
in government. Questioned whether the proceedings of 
the Committee should be made public, Daniels replied, 
Yes, it conveys facts that I think people would 
like to know and facts that they properly should 
know. My feeling in this war is that it is our 
high duty to give out to public information 
concerning everything we are doing, omitting 
only what expert military opinion says should 
not be made public ••• That is a duty that we 
owe to the public and there are good reasons 
why we must give that information out. 6The public should know everything possible. 3 
The application of this philosophy remained to be 
questioned. 
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In the years just prior to U.S. entry into the 
great war, both the activities of preparedness groups 
and international developments dramatized by events of 
the war combined with public opinion to secure legis-
lation supporting a record-breaking military estab-
lishment. 64 For the Navy, the appropriations act of 
1916 served as a milestone in the development of a 
modern seagoing force worthy of the name. While the 
building program received the major share of publi-
city, there were other significant provisions: the 
enlargement of the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, authorization and funding for the creation 
of a naval flying corps, major increases in both 
officer and enlisted strengths, and the establishment 
of an elaborate reserve organization. 65 Within that 
59 
naval act was sewn also an endorsement for the principle 
of disarmament -- a factor which would find larger sig-
nificance after the war. Perhaps, most important, how-
ever, was the long-sought mergence of foreign and 
military policy into an indefinable thing which could 
be called National Policy.66 
Daniels Versus the Navy League 
In August, 1917, a traditional tie was severed 
when Secretary Daniels issued the order, 
Directions are hereby given that after this 
date no officer, agent or representative of 
the Navy League is to be admitted to any ship, 
naval station or any naval reservation unless 
specifically directed by the Secretary of the 
Navy. Officers and men are enjoined to ~eceive 
nothing whatsoever from the Navy League.o7 
])lniels had long chafed under League critic is~ but 
an accusation made by the League implying complicity 
with certain labor elements during an investigation of 
a navy yard explosion in Mare Island was enough to dis-
rupt relations between the two totally. 68 
At stake was the vitality of the League itself. 
Though overtures were made by Robert M. Thompson, 
President of the League, the dissociation continued to 
the end of Daniels term. 
The Last Da.zs, Then War 
Appropriations do not establish fighting fleets 
they just provide for them. The building of the 
' _>'. 
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ships and the training of their crews take years. The 
Naval Act of 1916 gave recognition to the problem by 
establishing a five-year program for systematic develop-
ment and training of naval peraonne1. 69 
In the critical field of personnel, the shortage 
which Secretary Da.niels had denied existed in 1914 was 
partly compensated tor in 1917 by an emergency personnel 
measure authorizing an increase of 6,500 men.70 
Within hours after the President's signature, 
Daniels sent telegrams to more th.an a thousand news-
papers in the 'O'nited States asking them to print rront-
page notices of the Navy's need. According to Daniels, 
most of them wrote editorials as we11.71 
Appointment of Belknap 
The accelerated pace of events involving the Navy 
in early 1917 worked a burden upon the information 
function. In February, the Army and Navy Journal noted, 
The Secretary of the Navy has turned over to 
Lieutenant Charles Belknap, Jr., of the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, the work of 
reviewing Havy Department advises and making 
public those which do not fall under the ban . 
of military secrecy. The Secretary will 
continue his daily conferences with the press 
representatives. Lieutenant Belknap will aid 
the press, however, in ob~aining quick action 
on questions that ariae.7 
From scattered entries in his diarr' Daniels reveals 




In deed, if not in name, the Navy had appointed its 
first public affairs officer. 
Jenkins and the Navy News Bureau 
On April 17, 1917, eleven days after the United 
States had declared war, the Secretary of the Navy 
asked John Wilbur Jenkins74 to come to Washington to 
take over the duties of Civilian Director of Infor-
mation. 75 Jenkins took over his new duties just three 
days later.76 
Within a few more days, the same arrangement was 
made with Marvin Hunter Mcintyre, City Editor of the 
Washington Herald to become Jenkins' assistant.77 Both 
Jenkins and Mcintyre, though paid by and carried on the 
books of George Creel's Committee on Public Information, 
worked for the Navy and established the Navy News 
Bureau. 78 The Bureau was staffed by several newspapermen 
called to active duty. 
Throughout the war Jenkins provided the principal 
liaison with the War and State Departments as well as 
with the Committee on Public Information. He kept the 
new organization small, believing that a large staff 
would serve only to inhibit the speedy relay and release 
of news.79 
In the news releases there was little pattern in 
the subject matter to indicate what kinds of infor-
mation released by the Navy were of interest to the 
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Committee. 80 In nearly all cases, the Committee left 
news and security judgments to the War and Navy Depart-
ments, providing only policy guidance. If there were 
problems in authority, they seem to have been solveq 
81 between Daniels and Creel by private discussion. 
As for President Wilson, his criticisms or suggestions 
concerning the release of Navy information were made 
directly to Daniels without reference to Creel or 
82 his Committee. 
The work of the Navy News Bureau during the war 
concentrated on news of the convoys and the anti-sub-
marine operations -- the major naval activity. The 
Bureau also prepared and distributed transcripts of 
the Secretary's daily press conferences. In the main, 
the more important items were announced by Daniels 
in his twice-daily sessions83 With feature materials, 
stories were released in advance of publication time to 
allow the newspapers ample opportunity to set them in 
type. One series of features, prepared by Jenkins, 
contained biographical sketches of prominent naval 
officers and Navy Department bureau Chiefs.84 
Coordination of the work of the News Bureau within 
the professional naval circles of the Navy Department 
was accomplished by Lieutenant Commander (formerly 
Lieutenant) Charles Belknap, Jr., working in the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations.85 Major 
determinations concerning the release of information 
were subjects of discussion between the Secretary and 
Admiral Wil~am s. Benson, the Chief of Naval Opera-
86 tions, although Belknap was often a party to the 
discussion. It was Daniels who made the ultimate 
decision. 
At War's Fnd 
The termination of hostilities left the Navy 
News Bureau with a big job yet to be done -- the news 
of returning our forces from overseas. The organi-
zation had proved equal to the task of wartime demands. 
Few would criticize the work it had done. 87 Though 
the Creel Committee was disbanded without the recog-
nition it had earned, the public affairs function in 
the Navy went on to build a yet more effective place 
in the military service. 
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At War's End: 
The Reogranization 
Chapter IV 
War's end had produced a strange conflict of 
political ideologies and practical realities. President 
Wilson's objective in entering the war was to produce 
an enduring peace. Against this purpose were the hard 
facts of Japanese occupation of, and subsequent pre-
eminence in the German holdings in the Western Pacific 
and Great Britain's sea dominance in Bl.rope by virtue 
of the destruction of the German High Seas Fleet. 
To complicate the problem, political and military 
planners were confronted by rising expectations on the 
part of the American :Public for a lasting peace with-
out armaments. 1 
Of lasting implication, too, was the astounding 
development in military and industrial technologies 
for the Navy, the portents of submarine and aerial 
warfare upon the current naval strategy. 2 
Noting the dramatic rise of both Great Britain 
and Japan. as naval powers, and potentially naval rivals 
of the United States, naval planners in 1918 and 1919 
advocated a return to battleship construction which 
had been held in abeyance during the war in favor of 
increased destroyer production to cope with the German 
submarine menace.3 Continuation of the 1916 naval 
bill's construction rate would, by 1925, make the 
American Navy the equal of any in the world. 4 
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In December, 1918, the proposals of the naval 
General Board received President Wilson's endorsement 
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in his annual message to Congress. Secretary Daniels, 
as well, included support for the increased construction 
program in his annual report.5 This advocacy, however, 
was seen in different perspective from that of the 
naval planners. The administration intended to use 
these proposals as cnunsubtle influence for the Ell.ropean 
allies to conform to Wilsonian desires for the stabili-
6 
zation of world order and the reduction of armaments. 
Six months later, Daniels appeared before the House 
Naval Affairs Committee to reconunend abandonment of his 
previous proposal for a huge three-year building 
program, predicating the reversal on a renewed faith in 
the League of Nations. 
The operations of the Navy News Bureau, meanwhile, 
had continued uninte:rupted. In December, 1918, a 
fleet review in New York provided the Navy a fine oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its publicity operation. 8 Detailed 
advance planning; provisions for press, dignitary, and 
general ship visits; speeches and special events all 
were included in the p~try. Advance features on 
the ships and their conunanding officers, with the 
Bureau's imprimatur were issued to insure press interest 
in the event. 9 For John Wilbur Jenkins, it marked one 
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of his final projects with the Bureau. He was succeeded 
10 in April, 1919, by his assistant, Marvin Mcintyre. 
With the dissolution of the Committee on Public Infor-
mation in June, 1919, Mcintyre became formally an 
11 
employee of the Navy Department. 
The Popular Revolt Against Navalism 
Set against the accelerated building proposals of 
the Navy was the post-war tide of public opinion. Not 
only was the temper of American people to be measured 
in the nation's press, 12 but, perhaps more accurately, 
on the floor of the House in bitter debate over 
appropriations,13 and in other indicators such as the 
rapid and drastic decline of interest in the Navy 
League. 14 
From its high-water mark of preparedness and war-
time prosperity, the tide ebbed to low water--to post-
war depression and abiding concern for the cost of arma-
ments to keep the United States, unnecessarily in the view 
of many, on a par with Great Britain. When next the tide 
flowed, in 1920-21, it flowed with the strength of the 
peace movement, carrying upon its crest a popular fervor 
which washed across the nation, floating a platform which 
ended in the international limitation of arms con-
ferences in Washington. Influential newspapers, 
peace societies, churches of all denominations, 
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women's groups, labor groups -- all had a voice in 
affixing their support for an international detente. 15 
They had fought a war to end all wars! 
The Internecine Naval War 
In December, 1919, the Secretary of the Navy 
published a list of medal awards for wartime service 
16 
as a part of his annual report. On December 15, the 
Washington Post published a page one story bylined by 
Albert w. Fox $uggesting that Congress investigate 
the discrepancy between the actual awards and those 
17 
recommended by the Naval Awards Board. On December 
17, Admiral William s. Sims, the war's foremost naval 
commander and, then, President of the Naval War College, 
declined his medal. Sims' declination, tor alleged 
injustices in the awards, precipitated a rash of similar 
refusals from deserving officers and, with it, a storm 
of controversy. The aftermath was a Congressional 
investigation. 
The underground river which had been running at 
cross purposes to the Secretary came boiling to the 
surface. The question of just awards served to 
raise further and more fundamental inquiries into the 
administration of the Navy Department, questions which 
had been raised but not satisfactorily answered in the 
\ 
1917 probes. 18 Included were the Navy's inability to 
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exercise military command through an effective Chief 
of Naval Operations, failure of the Department to make 
adequate preparations for war, preoccupation of the 
Secretary with trivia and politics to the disregard of 
strategic considerations, and, as well, the propaganda 
campaign of Daniels, his News Bureau and his technical 
Bureau Chiefs to convince the general public that the 
Navy had been prepared for war in all respects. 19 
The internal strife in the Navy Department was 
paraded before the Senate Naval Affairs sub-committee, 
whose Chairman, Senator .Eugene Hale of Maine, took 
great care in cross examination to raise fully the 
points of relevance to future organization and 
operation of the Department. 20 Many of the Admirals 
who headed Bureaus in the Navy Department during the 
war, whose opening statements to the Committee were 
subject to Daniels' scrutiny, modified their positions 
during Hale's cross examination. 21 
As to the information aspects of Daniels' 
administration Kittredge felt compelled to write: 
••• (when the war came) ••• automatically the 
curtain was dropped, so far as the public was 
concerned, over the activities of the Navy 
Department. One of Mr. Daniels' first acts, 
on assuming office in 1913, had been to issue 
orders in the Navy Department that henceforth 
all public statements would be issued by his 
office. After war began, this order was more 
rigidly enforced than ever before. The 
country knew only what Mr. Daniels wanted it 
to know of what was going on, --and surely 
Mr. Daniels was painting a picture roseate 
enough for even the most belligerent citizen. 
Day after day a flood of notices poured out 
from the Navy Department of all the things 
that the Navy had done, was doing and was 
going to do. From the day that we declared 
war one would have imagined, from Mr. Daniels' 
official statements, that the whole of the 
Navy at once, 1~so facto, was transformed to 
a war basis ••• 2 
The vacillation of Secretary Daniels which had for so 
long festered in the breasts of many professional 
officers was recalled. The propaganda cover for the 
Navy's inadequate preparations had been an additional 
source of frustration for naval officers. 23 
The hearings themselves, according to Kittredge, 
were slanted in their press coverage by a Secretary 
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who knew how to take advantage of the press operation. 24 
In Sims' opening statement he noted Daniels' advantage, 
"In view of the public presentation of this case, which 
has resulted from no intent on my part, I am perhaps 
handicapped by lack of any connection with the press 
or experience in manipulating that important instrument 
of public opinion. 1125 That lesson was not to be lost 
on the professional Navy which had heretofore shown 
ultraconservatism in public affairs. 
Though rancor, dissension and recrimination 
characterized the hearings, a larger principle had 
been enunciated by Sims in his final conclusion of 
lessons learned in the war, 
The country must take a more active interest 
in the welfare of its first line of defense. 
It must insist on having full and correct 
reports of the condition of the Navy. It 
must demand and exact a full responsibility 
from the officials entrusted with the 
direction and administration of the Navy. 
Naval officers should be permitted a greater 
liberty of expression in order that the 
repetition of such a demoralizing tyrann~6 as that of Mr. Daniels may be prevented. 
The pronouncement made a good case for an open public 
affairs function in the Navy. 
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Daniels, in a term longer than any Secretary before 
him, had made many reforms in the service. Not all were 
popular, nor were all necessarily good. He had insti-
tuted a formal organization for the dissemination of 
news; however, the control he exercised over that 
operation was not above criticism. Within his tenure, 
the United States Navy had grown to a second rank 
among the world's naval powers -- though many events 
propelled the development in spite of the Secretary 
rather than because of him. Nonetheless, the information 
bureau created by Daniels was to continue on unbroken 
to the present day, largely through the efforts of 
subsequent civilian and naval leaders who saw, in the 






Harding and D1sarmament27 
President Harding entered the White House on 
March 4, 192~ with public commitments to undertake 
steps toward international agreements in limitations 
of armaments. In early April, his special message 
to Congress reflected this philosophy in a call for 
28 
a reduction in defense expenditures. On April 20, 
however, the administration disclosed its opposition 
78 
to curtailment of the building program authorized in 
1916. The apparent procrastination caused an immediate 
reaction in the disarmament movement, the proponents 
of which resumed their publicity campaigns. 29 
Noting the disparity between preparedness and 
disarmament news coverage, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. recommended to 
Navy Secretary Edwin Denby in March that the Navy 
undertake a program to select and send newspaper 
correspondents to a special course at the Naval War 
College.30 The purpose of the proposal was to increase 
the newsmen's understanding of the Navy. The recom-
mendation was forwarded to the General Board by Denby 
for further consideration. In April, the Board 
recommended31 that the War College ~nstitute such 
a program noting additionally, 
••• The war and movies and the Recruiting Service 
with its publicity bureau have done much to 
bring the Navy prominently before the people. 
But the Navy Department needs the active and 
continuous aid of the American press through 
the agencies of the Sunday paper and the 
illustrated popular weeklies to furnish 
serious information as to broad policies 
in an interesting manner to combat the 
efforts being made to reduce and even dis-
pense with the Navy. Popular articles by 
naval officers on live topics would also be 
of value. 
Though the problem was addressed from the lack of a 
broad base of information, no mention was made of 
the then functioning Navy News Bureau which continued 
its operation until September,192~ when it became the 
Navy Press Room. A lack of funds had forced abandon-
ment of the War College plan.32 It was also a funding 
problem which had forced a curtailment of the News 
Bureau's operation and staff.33 
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In September, the name Navy News Bureau was changed 
to Navy Press Room, 34 and a Naval Reserve Lieutenant 
Commander, Wells Hawks, became the Information Officer 
of the Navy?5 He was also the information staff. 
The Washington Naval Conference 
On November 12, 1921,the naval limitation of· 
arms conference convened in Washington. In a dramatic 
and calculated. announcement Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes proposed not only the disarmament plans 
for the United States, but offered commensurate 
measures for the other naval powers as we11.36 In a 
stroke, the leadership for the disarmament movement 
had been placed in the hands of the administration.37 
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Popular enthusiasm and support for the American proposal 
swept the United States.38 
The chief architect for the proposal in this 
fashion had been Hughes. He was ably assisted on 
the technical details by just three men in the Navy 
Department--Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore 
Roosevelt, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert 
E. Coontz, and his assistant, captain William v. Pratt. 39 
Coming as it did as a compl~te surprise, information 
regarding the proposal of the United States was at a 
premium. The details, together with their ramifications 
for other navies, were supplied mainly by Secretary of 
the Navy Denby in his daily press conferences. 40 It 
was no mean task. Several hundred journalists repre-
senting both the U.S. and foreign press were on hand 
for the conferences. 41 This method for the release of 
1nf ormation directly from the primary source was 
continued throughout the conference. 
The Fight for Naval Aviation 
During this s~e period, with public sentiment 
running high in support of limitations of armaments, 
the Director of the War Plans Division within the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations addressed a 
memorandum in January, 1922, to the Chief of Naval 
Operations recommending the establishment of a Press 
42 Relations office. The purpose of the office, as 
envisioned, would be f ourtold: 
To furnish correct information; to actively 
and definitely contradict incorrect public 
statements; to familiarize the people of 
the United States with the work and needs 
of the naval service, (and) to promote 
interest in the Navy. 
The rationale supporting the recommendation continued, 
" ••• it is but necessary to refer to the recent bombing 
tests to show the power of propaganda and the weakness 
of the lack of propaganda." 
The Office of Naval Intelligence concurred in 
the recommendation, which proposed location of the 
press relations office within Naval Intelligence, and 
added, " ••• information that is inconsistent or anta-
gonistic to the policy or views of the Department 
would ••• be more harmful than no publicity at all ••• 
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the closest liaison would be necessary between the 
publicity office and the head of the Navy Department."43 
The recommendation smacked of policy control for other 
than military security. However, the endorsement for 
an office of press relations included the suggestion 
for ordering an officer 
••• of special talent, rank and experience 
to Operations to act as publicity officer ••• 
where he would maintain close contact with 
the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence and 
the Bureaus and be responsible44or all information and news releases. 
Considerations of aviation and its effects on 
naval strategy had been of concern in the Navy 
Department for several years. In its recommendations 
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for construction in 1918, the General Board had requested 
an aircraft carrier, envisioning the advantages of 
airpower as an adjunct to fleet operations. 45 In 1919, 
provision was made for an air arm and permission granted 
by Congress on a proposal for conversion of a collier 
to a primitive aircraft carrier. 46 In 1920, the Board 
proposed to construct four large, high speed carriers 
in a three-year building program. 47 
While the propaganda activities of General William 
48 Mitchell captured the popular imagination and head-
lines, advocates of air power within the Navy were less 
vocal in their criticisms of the conservative elements 
within their service which inhibited aviation's progress. 
The Navy was sensitive to Mitchell's activities. During 
the fall, 1919, hearings conducted by the House Military 
Affairs Committee on a separate air service, Secretary 
of the Navy Daniels sent a letter to the Committee 
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Chairman asking that the Navy Department be given ample 
opportunity to present its views. He included a copy 
of a letter he had sent to Secretary of War Baker 
refuting in laborious detail many of the statements 
made by Mitchell. The whole package was the subject of 
a six-page news release distributed by the Navy News 
Bureau. 49 
As noted above, a press relations office had been 
recommended, partially, it would seem, to fight the 
public battle over air power. Following the bomping 
tests made against target ships and the sinking of the 
"impregnable" Ostfriesland in the Spring and Summer of 
1921, the press had heralded the doom of the battleship. 
The event forced upon naval planners a painful reevalu-
ation of naval strategy, a process all too reluctantly 
undertaken by many senior officers. 5° Counter-propa-
ganda was not the answer, although it made sense why 
the proposals for a press relations office contained, 
in a period of deep doctrinal controversy, provisions 
for policy guidance. It was also at this time that 
the Arms Conference, in December, recommended statutes 
imposing limitations on construction of aircraft carriers. 
Information tJnder Intelligence 
By February, 1922, the decision upon previous 
recommendations had been reached. The information 
function in the Navy was placed under Naval Intelligence.51 
1. In order to supply general Navy infor-
mation constantly requested from various 
societies and newspapers throughout the 
United States, an information section has 
been established under the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 
2. In order not to increase overhead expenses 
the work of this section will be delegated to 
the various Bureaus and Offices under the 
general supervision of the Director of Naval 
Intelligence. This delegation of special 
work for the present will be as follows: 
(a) Daily press handled by the Aide to 
the Secretary and an officer of the 
Information Section. 
(b) General Navy information to ~e collected 
and mailed as routine to such societies 
or papers requesting it. This work is to 
be handled b~ the Morale Division in 
Navigation.5 
(c) Information on specific subjects as 
requested. This work to be handled by 
Morale Di.vision in Navigation. 
(d) Pictures. This ~ork to be handled by 
the photographic section of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics. 
~. The Di.rector of Naval Intelligence in 
addition to supervising the work enumerated 
above will lend his assistance to individual 
writers on naval subjects and naval stories, 
in order that facts given may be correct. 
4. All Bureaus are requested to lend full 
assistance in providing accurate naval 
information not considered as confidential. 
5. No policies shall be enunciated by any of 
the agencies mentioned. The Secretary deter-
mines and announces policies. 
6. No statements derogatory to, or criti"cal 
of, other branches of government shall be 
issued. 
/s/ Edwin Denby 
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In March, 1922, Denby directed the Bureaus and 
Offices of the Navy Department to detail an officer 
and necessary clerical assistance to assist the Infor-
mation Section. "Officers so designated will meet 
at such times and.places as the Secretary may d1rect.u53 
On the first of May, a similar letter was sent to 
Fleet Commanders, District Commandants, and to 
Commanders of overseas stations directing them to 
appoint an officer to collect information and photo-
graphs from ships and stations under their respective 
commands and forward them weekly to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence. 54 · For the first time, the infor-
mation netWOJ'k had been spread throughout the military 
chain of command of the Navy. 
The first head of the Information Section was 
Commander Ralph A. Koch, who assumed his duties in 
54A February. At Koch's suggestion, two lieutenants, 
John B. Heffernan and w. F. Dietrich, were appointed 
as assistants. The precepts of the Information Section's 
operations with the press were to provide complete 
and factual answers to press queries. There was 
little activity in the initiation of press releases, 
but those that were provided were distributed to all 
on a strictly equal basis. The major portion of the 
news came from Secretary Denby himself who was avail-
able to press representatives every afternoon, or in 
I 
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the mornings by appointment. Liaison was maintained 
with the Secretary by Koch, who also maintained close 
contact with the publicity bureau in New York. 55 
Repairing the Rift 
By the fall of 1921 when the Limitation of Arms 
Conference was convening, the Navy League of the 
86 
United States had become all but defunct.56 Desperately, 
its leadership held on to see what results the Conference 
would have upon the United States Navy. They were 
appalled at Conference's end in February, but deter-
mined then more than ever to find an active role in 
building up the Navy.57 
To maintain the sea forces at full treaty strength 
became the League's objective. Powerful peace groups 
were on hand in Washington to urge further cuts in 
military appropriations.58 When the General Board 
recommended personnel strength below the level necessary 
to man a treaty-strength fleet and Secretary Denby 
further pared the figure in an economy move, the issue 
was drawn -- the Navy League had a worthy cause.59 A 
further cut by the Naval Affairs Committee brought an 
eventual compromise figure between that body and Denby 
which was far below fleet requirements. Though the 
League was highly reluctant to accept this figure as 
being in the best interests of the Navy, the 
'i 
realization that Congress would probably approve none 
greater and reassurances from the Secretary that it 
represented a temporary expedient, the League closed 
ranks behind the Secretary -- aware that internal 
dissension at this critical period would dismember 
any effort at concerted action. 60 
The League embarked immediately upon an educa-
tional campaign reminiscent of its operations of old 
-- publicity and editorial suggestions to newspapers, 
letters to the full membership urging them to exert 
influence upon their Congressmen, literature to 
influentials and legislators. -- all aimed at 
securing passage of the bill over opposition moving 
for increased appropriation cuts. The manpower bill 
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did pass, although an estimate of the League's influence 
cannot be made. 61 The small but loyal membership had 
returned to a program of action. 
In August, 1922, according to Navy League historian 
Armin Rappaport, the president of the League sounded 
out the Navy Department on a proposal for the estab-
lishment of an annual day "on which the people of the 
country would be reminded, through the concerted efforts 
of numerous patriotic organizations, of the Navy and 
its value to them. 062 The project was approved by 
then Acting Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and 
the cooperation of the Navy assured by a directive 




October 27 was selected, being the birthday of Theodore 
Roosevelt and the reported anniversary date of the 
submission of the first naval bill, and preparations 
for the celebration got underway with the blessings 
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of Denby and Roosevelt. The enmity between the 
League and the Navy Department which had come in the 
Daniels administration was thus healed and both the 
Department and the League could look forward to further 
cooperation such as was demonstrated in the League's 
first official Navy Day in 1922. 65 
In fact, cooperation with the League in 1923 
became firm. 
The connection between League and Navy pro-
ceeded directly from the society's head-
quarters to the Navy Secretary's office. 
The connection ••• was constant and con-
tinuous. The League's secretary, president 
and individual directors solicited advice, 
accepted suggestions, submitted releases 
for approval prior to publication, and 
generally kggt in close touch with the 
Department. 
Press Relations 
In February, 1923, a year after incorporation of 
the information function within naval intelligence, 
Denby issued a directive throughout the naval service 
pointing out the principles of the Department's concern 
for continued active operations with the press:67 
1. It is the right of the Congress and the 
people of the United States to be fully 
informed concerning the ships, men and 
operation of the Navy. 
2. The press of the country is the most 
important vehicle by which information can 
be disseminated. It is interested in placing 
before its readers through news columns and 
editorial comment, the condition of the Navy 
and the operation of its ships. It is, 
therefore, of importance to the country and 
to the Navy, that the press should be placed 
in possession of all facts in connection 
with the service except such as are military 
secrets. 
3. It is directed that all commandants of 
Naval Districts, Nayy yards and naval stations 
and Flag officers, recruiting officers, and 
officers on detached duty, take steps to 
establish and maintain cordial relation-
ships with the press of their localities 
and to keep in mind the Department's 
policy and guide themselves accordingly. 
4. The Director of Naval Intelligence has 
been instructed to cooperate with the various 
offices concerned and to furnish them with 
such information and suggestions as he may 
feel will further this object. 
5. The Commander-in-Chief, Commanders of 
Forces and squadrons and commandants or 
naval districts will take appropriate steps 
to bring these instructions to the attention 
of all officers and men under their command. 
/s/ EDWIN D»mY" 
Despite the increased emphasis by the Secretary, 
another proposal by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt 
for a course of instruction for selected press repre-
sentatives at the Naval War College met with failure 
again in 1923 through lack of funds. 68 
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In the winter of 1923-24, Denby found a new method 
for acquainting members of the press with naval operations -
embarkation with the fleet during maneuvers. 69 It was 
a program independent of funding restrictions. A press 
party of eighty-five editors and publishers embarked 
in fleet units during annual maneuvers in the Carribbean. 
Following the cruise, the newsmen wired their appreciation 
to the Secretary: 
The memories of this delightful voyage from 
Charleston to Culebra are indelible. It 
marks a contact between our Navy and repre-
sentatives of the press which we believe to 
be of marked mutual advantage. Every guest 
on this ship has already a clear conception 
of what our Navy is doing and what it stands 
for, and will be able to present our Navy's 
mission to the public in a more intelligent 
and broader way. We hope that this bene-
ficent educational process will continue.70 
The event was worthwhile for the Navy. It enabled 
the service to reach a receptive audience with a 
message71 and to demonstrate its points as well. The 
program appears to have been continued until 1936 when 
the problem of security forced a limitation on guests 
to include only wire service representatives who were 
also officers in the Naval Reserve.72 During this 
period, the program was enlarged to include prominent 
civilian guests as well as press representatives.73 





first time tor newa ot the fleet to be sent by wireless 
during battle maneuvers. 74 'l'he ottioer Who made the 
arrangements., Robert B. Camey,, was later to become 
Chief or Jfaval Operations. 
Organizational Development 
On March, 1924, Secretary ot the Navy Curtis D. 
Wilbur succeeded Denby.75 The change 1n administration 
appeared to have little etteot on the development ot 
the 1ntorm.at1on function throughout the naval service • 
.. /· A letter to all ships and stations 1n August, 1924, 
emphasized the importance ot ott1cers appointed to 
information duties being relieved by other otticera 
when detached to insure continuity of the inf'orm.ation 
input to the Information Section.16 Secretary Wilbur 
at this time was conducting press conferences 1n the 
~·- :Navy Department twice daily, at 10 a.m. and at 4 p.m •• 77 
An additional reminder was sent also to the Bureaus of 
the Department to stimulate the information input 
available for the Secretary's uae.78 
Assistance promised to outlying commands in the 
Secretary's letter ot Februar)", 1923, urging increased 
efforts in presa relat1ons79 came torth, first in 
1924, in a seven-lesson study course on news handling 
80 issued by the Bureau of Navigation, and, later, 
1n a compendium issued by the Information Section, 
Office of Naval Intelligence, in 1925,detailing the 
current status of United States and foreign navies 
in relation to each other and to authorized treaty 
strengths.81 
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In February, 1926, the Office of Naval Intelligence 
took preliminary steps toward organizing a special 
group of volunteer reserve intelligence officers. 
Intelligence officers in naval districts were requested 
to submit a list of qualified individuals, "preferably 
key people in the news and writing world, who in time 
of peace can be of value in keeping in touch with this 
office and, in time of national emergency, can be 
actively coordinated with the duties of Naval Intelli-
gence in this particular section as part of war plans. 1182 
Thus was begun the selection of a nucleus force for 
later augmentation of the information function. 83 The 
organization chart for the Information Section of 1926 
showed billets for one captain, as branch head, one 
commander, six lieutenant commanders and thirteen 
lieutenants.84 Only three officers manned the section 
and did the work,85 but there was obviously room to 
grow. 
The Tide of Events 
With the presidency of Calvin c. Coolidge, the 
attitude of the administration tended to center on 
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domestic prosperity and to withdraw from armament pro-
posals to keep the United States Navy at full strength 
allowed under the agreements of the Washington Con-
86 ference. With Japan and Great Britain building ships 
in the unlimited classes of cruisers and auxiliaries, 
a move to reach agreement on further limitations became 
especially strong in the United States.87 Consideration 
of another conference was a source of consternation to 
naval planners and navalphiles alike, for agreements 
in tonnage ratios were based on actual levels afloat, 
88 building or funded. In this category, a fleet in 
being or in the making, the united States was especially 
weak. Yet, there was no indication that the adminis-
tration would consider any but the most restrictive of 
building measures prior to entering another limitation 
agreement for fear of jeopardizing a spirit of inter-
national conciliation. 
Measures proposed by the General Board to bring 
the battleship fleet to treaty levels and to increase 
cruiser tonnage to a parity with Great Britain failed 
to receive the support of the administration and 
of the Congress.9o In February, 1927, when Coolidge 
proposed the Geneva Conference, the Navy was faced 
with the reality that it had not even been able to 














of eight cruisers authorized in the appropriations act 
of 1924. 91 The postwar mood of the American people 
simply did not support continued spending upon armaments 
when the possibility of international agreements might 
serve a better purpose. 92 The machinations of Japan 
in the Pacific did not seem to alter the mood, nor 
did the intransigence of Italy or France in proceeding 
upon their own courses and refusing to attend the 
conference.93 
From Within the Navy 
Noting the apathy of the general public for the 
subject of adequate armaments, a rash of articles 
appeared in the professional journals during the period 
1924-1930 -- each proposing new or better ways to 
influence, educate or indoctrinate the general public 
on the needs of the service and its importance to the 
national defense.94 At least some segment of professional 
opinion had taken cognizance of the problem. One writer 
commented: 
••• The Navy Department usually manages to 
hold up its end of (the government's) vast 
system of collecting and releasing news to the 
press, but in other sections of the country the 
Navy's publicity scheme is either non-existent 
or woefully inadequate. 
There are feelings within the Navy that the 
country has deserted it ••• The country has not 
deserted the Navy; the Navy has not made itself 
an integral part of the country. It has not 
succeeded in making itself part and parcel of 
-----------------------------~.,C'"=~~¢-'. 
the national life; it has not become real in 
the minds of millions of Americans • 
••• Such a failure can only be attributed to 
the lack of effective and sustained publicity, 
the lack of organization, facilities, and 
equipment for the gathering and dissemination 
of service new~5to the newspapers and public of the nation.~ 
In commenting on organization, the author paid 
tribute to the Army's information system and proposed 
that the Navy follow suit by establishing an effective 
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nation-wide information network. That author was Hanson 
Baldwin, later to become military editor of the New 
York Times. His comments indicated that the information 
function in the Navy had a far piece yet to go. 
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CHAPTER V 
Talk of Peace and Organization 
for War 
Chapter V 
The failure of the Conference for the Limitation 
of Naval Armaments which met in Geneva from June 20 to 
August 4, 1927, served as a transition point for national 
military strategy and for popular opinion. 1 As the 
Conference wore on, Americans became increasingly dis-
illusioned with the failure to reach an accord over 
the question of limitation of cruiser tonnage. 2 In fact, 
many Americans came to adopt the theory that the United 
States could better bring about an agreement by building 
a Navy great enough to force accord, or at least, by 
building as many cruisers as our defense needs requirect. 3 
Indeed, President Coolidge himself seemed to be 
influenced in that direction when in his annual message 
to Congress in December, 1927, he said, "Where there is 
no treaty limitation, the size of the Navy which America 
is to have will be solely for America to determine. 114 
The Department's recommendations for new construction in 
that same month reflected that thought and included 
twenty-five cruisers, five aircraft carriers, nine 
destroyers and thirty-two submarines, all to begin 
building within five years. 
Collaterally, a significant movement was beginning 
for an international accord in the outlawry of war.5 
On April 6, 1927, French Foreign Minister Briand had 
proposed that France and the United States enter into 
104 
105 
a bilateral agreement renouncing war as an instrument 
of national policy. The proposal captured the popular 
imagination and gathered momentum through the support 
of various peace groups and contingents within the press 
and Congress. In December, the United States amplified 
the proposal, suggesting the agreement be expanded to 
include the other powers.6 
The negotiations leading to the formulation of 
the pact were duly publicized in an effort to answer 
criticisms before they were raised.7 The Pact of Paris 
(more commonly called the Kellogg-Briand Agreement} 
was signed on August 27, 1928 by representatives of the 
United States and fourteen other powers. The treaty 
was eventually approved by almost all nations although 
Great Britain made certain reservations regarding the 
defense of her overseas empire. 8 
Though the Kellogg-Briand Pact had no power of 
enforcement and allowed "defensive war," public support 
for this instrument of peace was rekindled in the 
United States.9 From 1928-1931, Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg supplemented this peace machinery 
with a series of eighteen bilateral arbitration treaties 
with non-American nations. 10 
The Naval Appropriations Bill, meanwhile, emerged 
from the Naval Affairs Committee cut to fifteen cruisers 
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and one carrier. It passed the House after heated debate 
in March, 1928,but died when the Senate adjourned on 
May 29, without considering it-- a victim, it was 
believed, of the popular antagonism against military 
12 
spending. The bill awaited the next session of Congress 
and was passed by the Senate in February, 1929 in 
the same session considering, paradoxically, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact.13 In the last days of the Coolidge admini-
stration, the Navy had obtained a small portion of the 
ships thought by the Navy to be required by the inter-
national situation, but fleet levels remained far below 
authorized treaty strength. With the advent of the 
Hoover administration prospects foretold that they were 
14 quite likely to remain so. 
The Hoover Administration 
Herbert Hoover succeeded to the presidency deeply 
disturbed over Anglo-American relations, which had 
deteriorated -- largely over naval competition in 
cruiser construction. 15 The president lost no time in 
setting the diplomatic wheels in motion. In June, 1929, 
Ambassador Charles G. Lawes arrived in London and, two 
days later, began discussions with Prime Minister Ramsey 
MacDonald on many problems, including naval limitation. 
By July, MacDonald had reported to the House of Commons 
on the satisfactory results from the conferences and 
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recommended consideration of the deletion of five ships 
from the current construction program. 16 On the same 
day, Hoover announced suspension of planned construction 
on three cruisers.17 In October MacDonald arrived in 
the United States for an eleven-day stay and met with 
Hoover, where plans were laid to convene another Limi-
tation of Arms Conference in London in January, 1930.18 
At the Conference, attended by representatives of 
the tJnited States, Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Japan, work began to complete the job undertaken in 
Washington eight years earlier. The delegates addressed 
themselves to the cruiser problem and ratios in 
auxiliaries and submarines.19 After a great deal of 
maneuvering on technical issues, an agreement was 
reached in April. Though all powers signed the document, 
France and Italy subscribed to only relatively unimpor-
tant clauses. 20 
The Conference succeeded in fixing the upper 
limits in all categories of ships, thus tightening a 
gap left open in the Washington Treaty. British and 
American navies were granted parity in all ship types, 
while the Japanese, who retained the 10-10-6 ratio in 
capital ships, obtained a greater share in getting 




The results of the Conference, though disappointing 
to many peace advocates, left much room for expansion 
of the United States fleet to parity with Great Britain 
within the upper tonnage limitation. With the financial 
crisis which had been visited on the United States with 
the collapse of the stock market in October, 1929, 
however, such a building program was unlikely to be 
proposed by the Hoover administration. 22 
The Development of Information Policy 
Noting the lack of results of servicewide infor-
mation programs, not so much at the departmental level 
but throughout the lower echelons of command, the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, in March, 1930, wrote 
the commandants of the geographically divided naval 
districts emphasizing again, the importance of good 
press relations. 23 l!hclosed with the letter was a 
guide to the conduct of effective press relations which 
provided, as a keynote, a statement of Navy policy 
enunciated by Secretary of the Navy Wilbur on October 6, 
1928~ 
••• to furnish the public with full information 
on the Navy not incompatible with military 
secrecy, including its activities at home and 
abroad, its educational features, and its con-
tributions to ~cience and industry ••• 
It included, as well, a corollary to that policy: 
-------------~----------------------. --~-~---~-
••• it follows that reasonable effort should 
be made to correct the impressions made by 
published misstatements or misrepresentation 
of facts (not opinions) concerning the Navy 
and naval activities. Unless steps are 
taken to do this the reading public will be 
deceived and much or little harm will result, 
according to the gravity of the errors pub-
lished and ~he extent to which they are 
circulated. 5 
109 
The basic letter concluded with a request that 
commandants forward an analysis of operations with the 
press within their respective commands, "in order that 
a study or methods and results may be made and published 
••• for the general guidance of the service. 1126 
Secretary of the Navy, Charles F. Adams, followed 
up on the Director or Naval Intelligence's letter by 
issuing, on November 17, 1930, a directive outlining 
. 
the duties of the Information Section.27 cancelling 
all previous information instructions, the instruction 
established formal procedures as well as outlined 
information policy: 
2. The Information Section, Office of Naval 
Intelligence, is the Navy Department's central 
agency for supplying to the public full inf or-
ma tion of the Navy not incompatible with 
military secrecy. 
3. This work is accomplished by means of 
press relations; by cooperation with radio 
broadcasting agencies, motion picture, photo-
graphic and news reel companies; and by 
complying with requests made for general 
information about the Navy. 
/ 
4. The Information Section is governed by the 
following approved principles, applicable 
throughout the Navy Department. 
(a) to avoid any discrimination in dissemi-
nation of news. 
(b) to issue no statements derogatory to, 
or critical of, other branches of the 
government. 
(c) Neither to enunciate nor to comment 
upon policies. 
5. The Secretary of the Navy determines policies, 
and when these are to be made public, they 
normally shall be announced at daily press con-
ferences which are arranged for by the Aide to 
the Secretary assisted by an officer from the 
Information Section. 
6. Questions involving the supply of naval 
information to the public that concern the 
press, photographic agencies, sound and news 
reel companies, moving picture companies and 
broadcasting companies, when received in any 
of the offices of the Navy Department will 
be referred to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
Information Section ••• That office will then 
consult with the responsible offices con-
cerned, do preliminary work that may be 
necessary in arranging for representatives 
of the above agencies to witness naval 
activities, notify all parties interested 
and handle the required correspondence, 
always acting in accordance with the policy 
of the Navy Department. 
7. All bureaus and offices in the Navy 
Department will cooperate with the Infor-
mation Section in the accomplishment of these 
duties, and each bureau and office concerned 
will designate an officer with necessary 
clerical assistance to supply the Information 
Section with such data as may be requested, 
with news items of general interest for 
press releases, and with suitable illus-
trations when available. 
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Included as an enclosure to the letter was the same 
guide to effective press relations which had been cir-
culated by the Director of Naval Intelligence. 
The following day, the Chief of Naval Operations 
forwarded the Secretary's letter throughout the naval 
operating commands, "for the information and guidance 
of the naval service."28 
A memorandum from the Director of the Information 
Section to the Director of Naval Intelligence indicated 
in December that a survey of all naval districts had 
revealed that the Navy Department system was in effect 
and that all districts had reported satisfactory relations 
with the press. 29 The survey was taken to assess the 
servicewide diffusion of information policies and came 
on the heels of Hanson Baldwin's criticisms. 
Special Events 
In January, 1929, the aircraft carriers Lexington 
and Saratoga participated for the first time in the 
attack phase ofafleet exercise, simulating an attack 
on the Panama Canal~O So impressive was the performance 
of their aircraft that the 1930 maneuvers were scheduled 
to employ again, for the first time, a tactical unit 
built around the carriers. 
As a part .of the 1930 maneuvers, the carriers 
conducted a special demonstration for interested members 
of Congress and for the press~1 A special press party 
was embarked in the Lexington to insure adequate and 
complete coverage. Due to space limitations, the 
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representatives of the media drew lots to make an 
arrangement for pooling their material.32 The seven-
teen members of the press party were: four from press 
associations, three representing still picture services, 
three from the silent news reels and seven for sound 
news reels. Multiple representation was included to 
allow complete coverage from several vantage points. 
some of the representatives spread between a photo-
graphic aircraft during aerial maneuvers, on board 
the Lexington, and on board the Aroostook which 
maneuvered to a position close aboard the carrier 
during the flight demonstrations. Additionally, a 
special representative of Western Union was embarked 
to take the press files back to Hampton Roads 
immediately upon completion of the demonstration. A 
special communication circuit was held in readiness 
for the transmission of press traffic should that be 
required. 33 
The news coverage of this event was but a prelude 
for what was to follow. On May 7, 1930, one hundred 
twenty-five planes from the carriers Saratoga, Lexington 
and Langley began a three-day exhibition tour, flying 
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from Hampton Roads to New York and then on to Providence, 
Rhode Island, Boston and Lowell, Massachusett~ and 
Hartford, Connecticut. On their return flight, the 
torpedo, bomber, fighter and scout planes flew over 
34 Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and Norfolk. 
Accompanying these flying reviews were representatives 
of the press, who had, again, made pool arrangements 
for coverage from a special aircraft. 35 The two 
demonstrations, those flown from the carrier and the 
touring flying reviews, were staged, interestingly 
enough, Just a few days following the signing of the 
London Naval Treaty on April 22, 1930. 
Further Demise 
The remainder of the Hoover administration brought 
no encouragement to the advocates of preparedness. In 
1931, with Japan but only 5,728 tons below treaty 
allowances and Great Britain 20,874 tons below, the 
United States deficiency amounted to 153,698 tons. 
Needed to attain treaty strength, according to the 
United States Navy League, were: four carriers, three 
large and seven small-gun cruisers, twenty-five sub-
36 
marines and over 100 destroyers. The administration's 
proposals for that year were: one aircraft carrier, 
two six-inch(small-gun) cruisers, four submarines and 




failed to get action as the Congress adjourned in May 
without entering the bill on its legislative calendar.37 
Neither the Congress nor the President, it would 
seem, had any inclination to maintain the fleet at or 
near treaty strength. In September, Hoover announced 
a drastic cut in the naval building program for 1931-32 
and its elimination in 1932-33 in the name of world 
harmony and domestic economy.37 The Navy's leadership, 
under Secretary Charles F. Adams and Admiral William v. 
Pratt, showed little inclination to challenge the 
chief executive's policies or directions.38 
In the Far Fast, in Manchuria in 1931 and in 
Shanghai in 1932, signs of future trouble for the 
United States had begun to appear. The hope of a just 
and true peace through international conciliation 
appeared to be progressively dimming. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Navy 
The inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt brought 
to the White House a man who knew a great deal about 
the Navy. He had served for seven years as Assistant 
Secretary to Josephus Daniels, spanning the period 
prior to and during World War I. The domestic economy 
which President Roosevelt inherited was far from 
recovery.39 At the outset, it looked as though domestic 
considerations would influence a continuance of Hoover's 
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disarmament policies. 40 
A plan for warship construction was, however, 
included in the President's program for increased public 
works. On June 16, Roosevelt signed Ex:ecutive Order 
6174 which allocated $283 million or Public Works 
Administration appropriations for the construction of 
thirty-two warships over a three-year period. 41 
Internal Preoccupation 
The situations and events leading to international 
conflict and world war are known widely and need not 
be explored in this study. Among them: the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of Shanghai 
in 1932, Adolph Hitler's succession to Chancellor of 
Germany in 1933, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935, German occupation of the Rhineland and the 
beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the Japanese 
invasion of China in 1937, the Munich agreements over 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, and the climactic events leading 
to war in lll.rope in 1939. 
The failure of conciliation undertaken by the 
League of Nations42 infected popular opinion in the 
United States with the desire to remain neutral and 
avoid involvements in both Pbrope and the Far PB.st. 
Reflective of these opinions were the legislative 








the progressive neutrality acts of 1935-7. 43 Pre-
occupation with internal affairs was a characteristic 
of the time -- not only in the united States but in 
other nations of the world as we11. 44 Divergent 
national courses were bound for collision. 45 
Armaments and Talk of Disarmament 
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Through the leadership of the President and Carl 
Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, 
mustering the support of the administration forces in 
the House, the Vinson-Trammel Act ·was passed in March, 
1934. The bill provided authorization for construction 
to bring the United States Bavy up to full treaty 
strength -- the first comprehensive measure for ship 
construction since World War I. Unfortunately, the 
authorization did not gain appropriations to implement 
it. 46 
Under a provision or the Washington Naval Conference, 
the second London Naval Conference met in late 1935 with 
littie hope of success. The Japanese, who demanded but 
did not receive full parity in ship tonnage, withdrew 
from the discussions. Although an agreement was 
reached and a treaty signed in March, 1936, it was an 
instrument watered with escape clauses which held 
little meaning in light of the nonadherence of both 
Italy and Japan. 47 
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President Roosevelt concluded that it was unwise 
to fall behind in a rapidly rearming world and, in 
January, 1938, proposed to Congress a $1 billion naval 
appropriation. Known as the Second Vinson Act, th.e 
bill authorizing an increase in total tonnage of under-
age naval vessels amounting to forty thousand tons for 
aircraft carriers and authorizing three thousand air-
craft, was passed in May.48 Rearmament was under way. 
Development of the Public Affairs Function 
From a standpoint of public interest in and concern 
for the national security and military and naval policy, 
the early and m1d-1930 1s provided little opportunity for 
development of the public affairs function. Refinement 
and codification of public relations policies and pro-
cedures, however, continued. 
In 1932, the Navy Department issued a comprehensive 
set of instructions governing Navy cooperation with 
producers in the production of motion picture "plays. 1149 
The following March, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. 
Swanson50 issued a directive to all ships and stations 
detailing specific information which could be released 
concerning Navy ships under the Washington and London 
treaties and specifically restricting the release of 
information of a technical nature.51 
In 1935, the Department issued a General Order 
emphasizing the care which should be taken by officers 
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writing on professional subjects. The order noted 
that the Department would maintain no censorship on 
discussions or articles but cautioned, "unrestricted 
utterance or publication of fact and opinion may divulge 
information which it is not advisable to make public, 
and may constitute an offense against military dis-
cipline ••• " While a veiled threat, it was a notable 
improvement over the repressive General Order 139 
issued by Secretary Meyer in 1911. 
In August, Secretary Swanson reemphasized the 
manner in which he intended information to be made 
public in a memorandum to all bureaus and offices of 
the Navy Department:53 
/ 
The Public Relations Branch54 of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence has been asked by news-
papermen from time to time to corroborate 
items of indisputable Navy Department origin 
that have appeared in the press but which have 
not been cleared through its press section. 
Instances have occurred where a reporter 
was refused information by the Public Relations 
Branch on the advice of the bureau or office 
concerned and subsequently an opposition 
paper obtained the information by establishing 
contact directly with an officer or employee 
of the bureau or office. 
Such departures from the regular procedure, 
while seldom serious in themselves, tend to 
compromise the Navy Department's machinery 
for the simultaneous and impartial distri-
bution of public information concerning the 
Navy Department and the naval service. 
In order to preserve a strict impartiality 
and:"uniform treatment toward all correspondents, 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, to 
obviate confusion, to relieve all bureaus and 
offices of the annoyance of importunate 
queries and to insure the simultaneous 
release of officially visaed information to 
the public, all heads of bureaus and offices 
will take steps to insure that information 
suitable for publication is normally cleared 
through the Public Relations Branch (Press 
Section) of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 
To this end, officers of the several 
bureaus and activities of the Navy Department 
designated as liaison officers with the Navy 
Department Public Relations Branch will 
maintain close contact with the Press Section 
and furnish such items as are suitable for 
publication. Where circumstances make a 
departure from this procedure advisable the 
responsible official who releases infor-
mation to a reporter or special writer 
should communicate to the Public Relations 
Branch the substance of his remarks. 
/s/ Claude A. Swanson 
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Again in November, 1938, Secretary Swanson found 
it necessary to reemphasize the instructions55 because, 
"the ••• (instructions are) not in all cases being 
observed. It is directed that ••• (they) be brought to 
the attention of and strictly complied with by officers 
and civil employees of bureaus and offices of the Navy 
Department." The occasion for this emphasis, according 
to B. L. Austin, then a Lieutenant Commander in charge 
of the Press Section, was the multiplicity of n~ws 
leaks throughout the Department.56 Various stringers 
for the news media world.ng in the bureaus and offices 
were circumventing the news release policy. Admiral 
William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, insisted 
that the leaks be plugged and the central source of 
news become, and remain, the Press Section. 57 
The work accomplished by the Public Relations 
Branch is well summarized by the following exerpts 
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from its annual report, July 1, 1938, to June 30, 1939: 58 
Close liaison is continually maintained 
by the Public Relations officer with the 
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval 
Operations in order to keep his (sic) office 
properly informed on all phases Of policy • 
••• During the past fiscal year 900 formal 
releases of important news were made to the 
press. This compares with 550 such releases 
for last year (1938). These releases vary 
in length from l to 49 pages each. One 
hundred and fifty copies of each release 
are made available to the press at the 
Navy Department Press Room and at the 
National Press Club, and 30 copies are 
distributed for information within the Navy 
Department. The number of informal releases 
of information of interest to special groups 
is indeterminate, but is estimated to have 
increased during the year in about the same 
ratio as the formal releases. The Public 
Relations officer and the Press officer 
are available night and day, seven days a 
week, to answer queries of the press which 
have noticeably increased in number with 
the mounting tension in international 
affairs and consequent increase of public 
interest in national defense ••• 
The Public Relations officer and the Press 
officer attend all White House press conferences 
and inform the interested senior officers and 
the Secretary of any discussions of service 
interest. We also watch the ticker tape, 
newspapers and magazines and inform respon-
sible senior officers promptly of pertinent 
bulletins and articles ••• 
••• Biographies have been prepared and 
filed of all senior officers who have figured 
in press releases or for wh.irch specific 
requests have been received ••• 
••• Speeches and articles by naval officers 
containing data on current naval topics are 
I 
mimeographed and distributed to the public 
upon request ••• material and assistance 
furnished officers in preparation for 
speeches ••• arrangements are made for 
speakers before patriotic societies and 
similar organizations ••• 1ncluding radio 
broadcasts ••• 
••• Arrangements are made tor cooperation 
with broadcasting companies, including all 
major networks, in presentation of programs 
of factual naval interest • 
••• Arrangements are made for accredited 
press representatives and photographers to 
take passage in naval vessels to cover 
specific naval activities when requested 
and deemed to be of paramount interest. 
The coverage of Cruiser Division Seven's 
South American good will cruise is one ••• 
illustration • 
••• cooperation with all major newsreel 
companies in arranging for filming current 
naval activities of public interest • 
••• During the past year this office has 
answered approximately 6,000 letters in 
reply to queries for factual information 
from colleges, schools, individuals, 
societies, libraries, newspapers, magazines, 
writers, etc. Many of these requests require 
considerable research work ••• number of mimeo-
graph stencils out - 2,092. Number of sheets 
of mimeograph paper used - 495,600 • 
••• Photographs have been supplied to news-
papers, magazines, organizations, and, in 
some cases, feature writers, when requested 
and when impracticable to obtain them from 
other sources • 
••• This office arranges for still and 
motion picture companies to photograph 
naval subjects. U.S. Navy Photographer's 
identification cards were issued to ninety 
accredited photographers operating in the 
Severn and Potomac areas this year • 
••• cooperation with motion pictures -
. the Public Relations officer is a member 
of the Navy Department Motion Picture Board. 
He assists in reviewing and censoring of 
motion picture scenarios in which naval 







seventeen motion picture scenarios submitted 
to the Motion Picture Board, ••• five have been 
approved ••• two completed ••• and three are ••• 
in production • 
••• In addition to his usual activities, the 
officer in charge of this branch is Secretary 
of the Navy Department Navy Day Committee. 
Ground work for the celebration of Navy Day, 
October 27, is usually started in June. This 
office cooperates with the Navy League, the 
Naval Reserve and patriotic organizations in 
promoting the success of Navy Day. Seventeen 
articles and speeches, bearing on the subject 
of the Navy were distributed to the naval 
service as basic material for press and 
speeches on Navy Day ••• 
••• During the President's cruise in the 
Houston, August 1938, this office-was desig-
nated by the White House to handl~9news releases concerning the cruise ••• ' 
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The staff required to produce this work was eight: 
Commander Leland P. Lovette, Officer-in-Charge; 
Lieutenant Commander B. L. Austin, Assistant for Press 
Relations; Lieutenant w. G. Beecher, Jr., Assistant 
for Photography; two civilian assistants, Miss Helen 
Philibert for the Press Room and Miss Alice Costello, 
for the Pu~lic Relations Branch, plus two stenographers 
and a Marine orderly.60 
Two stories, mentioned only in the annual report 
as outstanding events, yield~d further insight into 
I 
the operations of the Public Relations Branch -- the 
fleet visit to New York in May, 1939, and the loss 
of the submarine Squalus in that same month. 
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During May, 6-16, a special contingent of the 
Atlantic Fleet arrived in New York for the opening of 
the World's Fair. 61 During its stay, over a half 
million visitors went aboard fleet units. Special 
groups of visitors, among them 100 publishers from the 
Newspaper F.ditors and Publishers Association then 
holding a convention in New York, over three hundred 
working press representatives visiting individually and 
in groups and five hundred Children of the American 
Revolution. Arrangements were coordinated by Austin 
and Miss Philibert from Washington and Lieutenant 
H. w. Gordon and two yeomen from the New York pub-
licity. office. Letters of tribute and appreciation 
for the outstanding arrangements were received from 
many guests: Kenneth Hogate, president of the Wall 
Street Journal; F.dward Bartlett, city editor of the 
New York Sun and many others including F.dward L. 
Bernays and T. J. Ross, prominent public relations 
counselors. New York Times military editor, Hanson 
Baldwin, commented, " ••• I think you did a swell job 
up here under considerable difficulties and that 
the Navy Department deserves commendation for sending 
you ••• it was a real help to us of the press and 
establishes a precedent which should be followed, 
in my opinion, in all such future fleet visits to 
New York ••• n62 
---------------------------------~~--"fl'-
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On May 23, 1939, the submarine Squalus was lost 
on a practice dive off Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Fifty-
nine of her crew were saved in rescue operations; twenty-
six perished. On a previous submarine accident with 
the S-4, members of the press had received no cooperation 
from the Navy, and had hired a tug to get to the scene 
where they were greeted with fire hoses turning them 
away from coverage of the salvage operations. Deter-
mined to provide full information in the Squalus dis-
aster, Austin went directly to Admiral Leahy and received 
full authority to arrange complete press coverage. A 
special telegraph circuit was installed in the press 
room in the Navy Department to facilitate direct 
communications with the recovery forces and special 
fleet units shuttled press representatives to and from 
the scene. 63 The sympathetic coverage obtained was 
brought about by a significant departure from policies 
at similar disasters in the past.64 
The last of the pre-war training instructions 
under Naval Intelligence, a 300-page manual consisting 
of monographs dealing with various aspects of public 
' relations organization and practice, was issued in the 
summer 1939. 65 On the first of September, war began 
in m..trope when Germany invaded Poland. 
Following declaration of war by Great Britain 
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and France upon Germany on September 3, the United States 
proclaimed its neutrality on the 5th. On the next day 
a United States naval patrol was established in the 
Atlantic and caribbean to observe the movements of 
belligerent ships. On September 8, President Roosevelt 
declared a limited national emergency, ordering an 
increase in the strength of all military forces -- one 
of many measures which followed in rapid order attempting 
to put the United States on a war footing. 
In January, 1940, Charles Edison assumed the 
duties of Secretary of the N,avy, a post vacated by the 
death on July 7, 1939, of Claude Swanson. Edison, in 
turn, was succeeded by Frank Knox on July 11, 1940, 
after the former had resigned in June. 
The Mobilization of Public Relations66 
In July, 1940, the Public Relations Branch of 
the DJ.vision of Naval Intelligence was staffed by 
thirteen personnel: the officer-in-charge; three 
officers and an experienced civilian assistant in the 
press section; one officer and an assistant who handled 
general information requests, pictorial and radio duties; 
plus four clerical personnel and two Marine orderlies. 
Commander H. R. Thurber became Officer-in-Charge 
on July 16. His first orders were to "build up the 
office for an emergency. 067 Records of Naval Reserves 
slated for war-time duty in public relations were 
reviewed and tentative selections were made of 
individuals who might head the individual sections of 
an expanded office. War plans, written in 1924 and 
revised through 1939, were reviewed and modified as 
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necessary. Although there was no legal requirement for 
reserve officers to enter onto active duty in 1940,68 
selected individuals were interviewed and asked to come 
on active service if their personal situations would 
permit. 
Plans for the expansion envisioned a director, 
an assistant director, and operational sections to 
include: administration, plans, press, radio, pic-
torial, scripts, civic liaison and naval districts, and 
a reference section. 
In 1940, three officers reported as section heads: 
Lieutenant (Junior Grade), Victor F. Blakeslee, USN, 
(Retired), in August, to head the scripts section which 
was charged with preparation of speeches for high-
ranking civilian officials and officers of the Navy 
Department and, as well, with assistance to writers 
and publishers; Lieutenant Commander w. M. Galvin, 
U.S. Naval Reserve, in September, former Secretary of 
the Navy League, to ~ead the plans section; and 
Lieutenant Commander E. John Long, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly on the executive staff of National Geographic 
magazine, in December, to take control of the pictorial 
-- ~~. 
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section which was, at that time, issuing approximately 
seven thousand photographs per year. 
In February, 1941, two more officers assumed duties 
as section chiefs: Lieutenant Commander James G. 
Stahlman, U.S. Naval Reserve who had volunteered for 
the duty, formerly editor and publisher of the Nashville 
(Tennessee)Banner, to assume control of the civic liaison 
and naval districts section; and Lieutenant Commander 
Norvelle w. Sharpe, U.S. Naval Reserve, former indepen-
dent radio consultant, to head the radio section. 
Lieutenant Commander, w. s. Wharton, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly of the editorial staff of the Oregon Journa~ 
reported a short time later and became the head of the 
press section in September, relieving Lieutenant 
Commander R. w. Berry, U.S. Navy, who had acted, as well, 
as the branch's Assistant Director. 
One of the primary jobs in reorganization was 
undertaken by Stahlman who made a tour of the naval 
districts to evaluate the effectiveness and needs of 
the servicewide information organization. 
Positive Steps 
In March, 1941, the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations issued a directive throughout the naval 
service outlining the proper function of public relations, 
declaring it a function of command and emphasizing, 
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" ••• it is not the function of Navy officers to endeavor 
to police or otherwise monitor publications, radio 
stations, or other media of information. It is the 
function of Navy officers to keep the public informed 
of the activities of the Navy, as compatible with 
military security. 1169 
Two days later, the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations issued a directive to the commandants of all 
naval districts which, effectively, insured the develop-
ment of a public relations organization throughout the 
shore establishment:70 
••• it is the function of naval command to give 
prompt and careful attention to the legitimate 
requirements of public dissemination agencies. 
In the Navy Department, this is accomplished 
through the Public Relations Branch which is 
a subdivision of Naval Intelligence. In each 
naval district, this shall be accomplished 
through a Public Relations Branch, ade-
quately manned and equipped. 
The commandant of each naval district will 
survey the public relations requirements of 
his district ••• cognizance should be taken of 
the advisability of placing or designating 
a public relations officer in each state, 
or in each large publishing center, or in 
each zone where there is an important naval 
activity. 
Requests for additional personnel and 
equipment for <;listrict public relations will 
be submitted not later than April 10, 1941. 
The directive included a sixteen-page guide outlining 
the basis of a public relations program by which the 
commandants could assess their needs. 
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Establishment of the Office of Public Relations 
In April, Secretary Frank Knox formally removed the 
public affairs function in the Navy from within the 
Office of Naval Intelligence and placed it directly 
under his own control:71 
1. The Office of Public Relations is estab-
lished as of 1 May 1941 as an independent 
office directly under the Secretary of the 
Navy, and it will have the same functions 
and responsibilities as those of the present 
Public Relations Branch of the Division of 
Naval Intelligence. The head of the office 
will carry the title of Director of Public 
Relations. 
2. The personnel, furnishings, and equipment 
of the present Public Relations Branch of 
the Division of Naval Intelligence will be 
transferred to the newly created office of 
public relations. 
3. All correspondence of the new office 
will form a part of the Secretary's files 
and will bear the office origim1ting symbol 
OOR. Correspondence antedating_ 1 May 1941 
will remain a part of the-files of the 
Division of Naval Intelligence. 
Thus had the function returned to the Office of the 
Secretary, where first it was formally established. 
On May 1, 1941, the Office of Public Relations 
began operations. Acting as its head until the May 
27 arrival of Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn was Commander 
H. R. Thurber. On that date, the personnel of the 
Office of Public Relations numbered fifty-five. Another 
thirty-eight were on the way. 




Lieutenant Commander Waldo F. Drake, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
formerly on the staff of the Los Angeles Times, ordered 
to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet as Fleet Public Relations Officer and Lieutenant 
Commander S. B. Wright, U.S. Naval Reserve, formerly 
of Paramount News, as Fleet Public Relations Officer 
for the Atlantic Fleet. 
On May 9, following the creation of the Office of 
Public Relations under the Secretary, the Chief of 
Naval Operations directed naval district commandants 
to transfer their public relations offices from the 
cognizance of Naval Intelligence to a separate status 
directly under the commandant's control.72 The frame-
work for the new organization, by now, was complete. 
The public affairs function which had begun 
informally at the inception of the Navy, followed a 
tempestuous path. It now faced its greatest challenge. 
In his address to the first assemblage of public relations 
officers in July, 1941, Secretary Knox sounded the 
keynote for future public affairs operations: 
••• May I try to impress upon you ••• how vitally 
important it is that we do get ••• (naval affairs) 
into current discussion and reading, because, 
after all, we are not going to have much 
trouble whatever in getting the necessary 
appropriations for the enlargement of our 
naval strength, because right now we have 
a popular fear to support us. The time will 
come when those fears will subside, but yet 
' 
1 
it will be just exactly as acutely necessary 
for our future safety and security that the 
sea-power and air-power that we are now 
building up shall be retained against a 
future danger as it is that we shall build 
it up in the first place, and if we are 
going to have that kind of popular support 
for an adequate Navy in the future -- when 
our present alarm shall have subsided and 
our fears gone by -- then we must take 
advantage of this time when the people 
are interested in the Navy to make them 
so thoroughly Navy-minded that when the 
time comes for pruning expenditures 
and cutting down expenses there shall 
- al ways be present in the minds of the 
people as an automatic reflex that if 
we want to be safe, we llif~e got to be 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter VI 
A retrospective view of the development of the 
public affairs function in the United States Navy must 
consider, as well, the political and social contexts 
which fostered its evolution. 
In its earliest practice, in the formation of the 
United States Navy, such public affairs functions as 
there were were directed at marshaling political support 
for legislative action. The limited success of that 
campaign, however, primarily was attributable to 
external factors -- the actions of the Barbary corsairs 
and the French privateers -- which dramatized the need 
for an adequate seagoing force. 
The War of 1812 demonstrated to Americans the 
inadequacy of a military and naval strategy based on 
defensive considerations -- reliance upon militia and 
upon concepts of the Navy as a passive coastal defense 
force. The strategic lessons which should have been 
apparent from that war went unlearned and continued to 
have effect upon the public affairs function throughout 
the following century. 
The Civil War, by its nature, brought to the fore 
a requirement for information of military and naval 
operations to be disseminated directly to the citizenry 
through the media of mass communications. 
There were, as well, other factors which hastened 
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the development of the public affairs function in this 
period: the technological progress made in the tele-
graph which could speed information across the 
continent, broadening the information consumer base 
and, thereby, the requirement for more information; 
interservice competition for both funds and manpower 
which sought support through popular appeals; and the 
requirements of military security which presaged the 
need of a formal organization which could operate in 
the information environment without divulging infor-
mation of military value to an enemy. 
It was in the Civil War that the essentiality of 
an informed public was demonstrated graphically to 
naval strategists when a widespread fear along the 
eastern seaboard clamored for a departure from sound 
strategy in favor of a heterogen.eous posture of frag-
mented forces -- the first firm inkling that public 
opinion in operation, especially an alarmed opinion, 
had profound implications for naval strategy. 
In the wake of the Civil War came the natural 
revulsion to military preparedness. Not so much a 
characteristically American syndrome, as so often it 
has been described, but, rather, a more characteris-
tically human desire to rebuild a nation and reestablish 
political order. 
The Civil War had brought attendant progress in 
technological development -- progress which had deep 
meaning for naval strategy. The use of armor plate, 
the potential of steam propulsion, the capabilities 
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of high-velocity naval rifles and exploding shells --
all demanded of the Navy an active transitional program 
as well as a doctrinal revolution. To facilitate these 
changes required, in the period between the Civil War 
and the Spanish-American War, the understanding and 
the support of the public. These were the forces 
which operated to sustain the public affairs function 
in the Navy. 
Cooperation by the federal agencies in exhibitions, 
beginning.. with the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition 
in 1876 and continuing through to the Panama-Pacific 
Exhibition in San Francisco in 1914-16, reflected, in 
President Grant's direction for cooperation,a concern, 
" ••• to illustrate the functions ••• of the government 
in time of peace and its resources as a war power, 
and thereby ••• demonstrate the nature of our insti-
tutions and their adaptations to the wants of the people ••• " 
-- a conscious attempt to interpret the government to 
the people. 
The writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 1890 1s 
heralded a revolution in naval strategy. Though his 
theories were widely acclaimed by naval strategists, 
ti' d 
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accepted by political theorists and pragmatists alike, 
quoted and expounded upon both in and out of the halls 
of Congress, their diffusion to the American public at 
large taken for granted, the popular hysteria which 
swept the eastern seaboard of the United States at 
the outset of the Spanish-American War urging a complete 
departure from the dictates of sound naval strategy 
demonstrated clearly the fallibility of information 
dissemination. The concept of command of the sea was 
challenged seriously by the popular demand for a 
strategy of coastal defense. 
News coverage of the Spanish-American War was 
unique in the annals of reporting. Virtually uninhibited 
travel by reporters and nearly unlimited access to 
operations provided detailed, if not always accurate, 
accounts throughout the military campaign. Again, 
considerations of military security were raised by the 
intelligence community in noting Spain's use of these 
press accounts. This concern, coupled with the success 
of the Japanese in keeping hidden the movements of their 
fleet prior to the Battle of Tsushima (May, 1905) in 
the Russo-Japanese War, led the Navy's General Board, 
in Decembe~ to recommend the creation of a Navy 
Information Bureau to exercise control over information 
made public in time of national peril. 
The administration of President Theodore Roosevelt 
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advanced the mergence of foreign and military policy 
with a consideration for the effects of public opinion 
upon that policy. A natural outgrowth from this 
philosophy was the Navy General Board's enunciation, 
in 1913, of the need for naval policy to be made public. 
Roosevelt's administration was marked, too, by a 
popular appeal for continuous and orderly development 
of military forces as a foundation of national military 
power, a requisite with the emergence of the United 
States as a world power. The presidential leadership 
of public opinion took many forms. In naval affairs, 
the most dramatic moves to popularize the Navy were the 
fleet reviews and the round-the-world cruise of the 
battleship fleet. 
In this same era was established an independent 
civilian body whose purpose was to strengthen the U.S. 
Navy through direct appeals to t'he people of the nation 
-- the Navy League of the United States. Though the 
Navy's role in the ~reation and development of the 
League remains obscure, active Navy cooperation with 
League events doubtless had salutary effects. 
The building program of President Roosevelt 
brought yet another naval need into focus -- that of 
increasing numbers of personnel. The attendant require-
ment for sustained publicity campaigns on behalf of 
.d 
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recruiting encouraged the Navy to establish recruiting 
publicity bureaus in the major news centers of the 
United States. Once established, these operations lent 
themselves admirably to Navy information programs. 
In the Taft administration, the lack of a progressive 
naval policy saw increased appropriations become the 
target of spoils while necessary overseas base develop-
ment in support of far-flung responsibilities went 
wanting -- providing yet another example of the need 
for a definitive policy backed by public understanding 
and support. 
The administration of President Wilson was not 
without political objectives. The progress of inter-
national events, however, were to frustrate those 
objectives and precipitate the world into devastating 
war. To the extent that Wilson's objectives departed 
from international political reality as seen by military 
and naval strategists, there was bound to arise a 
climate of discontent, discouragement and frustration. 
Within this climate was fostered a greater appreciation 
on the part of the Navy for the value and importance of 
public understanding of military and naval policies. 
With the United States• entry into the war came 
the most ambitious program of information and education 
yet attempted -- the formation of the Committee on 
rd 
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Public Information. The Navy's part in this program 
was carried by the Navy News Bureau, created especially 
for the purpose of informing the nation about the 
details of the naval war effcrts. The formalization of 
that news organization in 1917, established a pattern 
of operation responsive to the informational needs of 
the nation. The realization that the policies which 
dictated this operation represented solely those of 
the administration caused further evaluation of the 
utility of such a function during congressional 
investigations of the Navy Department in 1920. 
Following World War I, the united States found 
itself unable to withdraw from international affairs. 
Though it remained aloof from membership in the League 
of Nations, the country still concerned itself with 
the reestablishment of world order. Popular interest 
provided the support for peace movements which mani-
fested themselves, in 1922, in the naval Limitation 
of Arms Conference in Washington. The resultant threat 
to the maintenance of naval forces felt by naval strate-
gists to be necessary to continued world peace, coupled 
with the collateral threat posed by the developing tech-
nological advances of air power, led naval planners, 
in 1922, to establish within the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence an information function designed to combat anti-






it was the means of appeal for popular support. 
In an effort to propagate a greater understanding 
of the Navy's role in national security affairs, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
proposed, in 1921 and again in 1923, that a special 
course of instruction for selected members of the press 
be instituted at the Naval War College. Though restric-
tion in available funds precluded beginning that 
project, a plan was initiated by Secretary of the Navy 
Denby to embark editors and publishers in fleet units 
during portions of the annual fleet training exercises. 
The first "press cruise" took place in the winter, 
1923-24, and the program continued annually thereafter 
until 1936. 
Consolidation of the information function within 
the Navy Department began in 1922. While Secretary 
/, 
Denby carried on the precedent of conducting the daily 
press conferences himself, he directed the bureaus and 
offices of the Navy Department to assist the Infor-
mation Section of Naval Intelligence by appointing an 
officer who would have cognizance over informational 
affairs. He also required that timely information be 
submitted to the Department as it occurred. 
To spread the information network throughout the 
naval service, Denby, in 1923, emphasized the value of 
rd 
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good press relations and directed all naval district 
commandants to establish contact with press represen-
tatives in their respective areas. Assistance was 
provided by the Director of Naval Intelligence in the 
form of guides to press relations, study courses in 
news handling and materials suitable for public release 
on the United States and world navies. 
In 1926, the first steps were taken to create a 
Naval Reserve nucleus qualified for special duties in 
public relations in the event of mobilization for war. 
Planning for this eventuality continued until imple-
mentation in 1940 when carefully selected and specially 
qualified individuals were asked to come on active duty 
in the Public Relations Branch of Naval Intelligence, a 
year prior to the activation of the Naval Reserve. 
The popular opinion which had firs~ supported 
President Wilson in his quest for conciliatory settlements 
of world disputes, supported, as well, his policies to 
enter the war to make "the world safe for democracy." 
In the post-war period, this same opinion turned a deaf 
ear to preparedness advocates and supported the limitation 
of arms philosophies of President Harding. Finally, in 
the administration of President Coolidge, that opinion 
turned to concern for internal prosperity and development. 
With peace secured by international agreement, it seemed 
d 
147 
to the largest segment of American people that there was 
little to be concerned over in the state of readiness of 
their armed forces. Though the Geneva Conference of 1927 
ended in failure, preoccupation with internal development 
remained only slightly broken and was soon reinforced 
by the Kellogg-Briand peace pact of 1928. 
The pacifist policies of President Hoover further 
kindled the country's hopes for peace and promised 
to a nation whose economy was deeply depressed, some 
respite from the burden of defense expenditures. 
The agreements of the London Naval Limitation of 
Arms Conference, in 1930, brought still further hope 
for the avoidance of a naval race. At the end of the 
Conference, the United States was still far under the 
ship tonnages allowed by the agreements and, with the 
economic situation of the nation in difficulty and 
considering the political objectives of President Hoover, 
it was quite likely to remain so. 
Meanwhile, the Office of Naval Intelligence, acting 
through the Secretary of the Navy, continued to refine 
its information procedures and attempted to further 
sophisticate its operations throughout the service. 
Special events such as the demonstration of naval air-
craft from the deck of the aircraft carrier Lexington 
and the touring flight demonstration over the major 
cities of the northeastern seaboard were staged in 
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May, less than a month following the agreement in London. 
While there is nothing written officially which would 
link the events, it is unlikely that the show was without 
purpose. Although the London Conference had placed a 
limit upon aircraft carrier tonnages, it had not been 
able to reach any agreement on limitation of aircraft. 
From the outset, it appeared that the administration 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt would be forced to concern 
itself with internal development in order to recover 
from the depression. The tide of international events, 
however, forced a modification of that thinking as first 
the Japanese, then the Italians and, finally, the 
Germans and Russians embarked upon courses of conquest. 
The failure of the second London Naval Limitation 
of Arms Conference in 1935-36 set the stage for world 
rearmament. In January, 1938, President Roosevelt asked 
Congress for a $1 billion naval appropriations bill. 
The "two-ocean Navy't measure was passed in May over the 
voices of the pacifists and the United States, belated 
as usual, found herself with both feet planted in the 
greatest naval race in history. 
The mobilization of public relation activities 
began in 1940 and continued through to the United States' 
entry into the war. Utilizing the Naval Reservists who 
l~ 
had been specially selected and trained, or who were 
otherwise qualified by the nature of their civilian 
occupations, the Public Relations Branch of Naval 
Intelligence expanded in less than a year from thirteen 
personnel to fifty-five by the end of May, 1941. 
Additional plans had been implemented to create, within 
the naval districts as well, the nucleus force of quali-
fied Reservists. Public Relation officers had been 
placed, also, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets 
commands. 
On May 1, 1941, the public affairs function in the 
Navy became, once again, an independent function respon-
sible directly to the Secretary of the Navy. Later, 
through the efforts of Admiral Ernest J. King, the 
office became responsible also to the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 
Conclusions 
Within the period of this survey, the nature and 
role of the Armed Forces of the United States have 
changed: adapted to the shifting requirements of both 
the society these forces serve· and to the political 
and social institutions they are created to defend. 
Throughout this development has run the thread 
of political consistency., Military power, or the lack 
of it, is political -- in being as well as in use. 
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The question of whether to raise and maintain 
standing armies and navies has not been long a major 
issue for the people of the United States, but, rather, 
the degree at which they should be maintained, and at 
what cost to a democratic society -- that is the question. 
The answers, such as they are found, form the fabric 
of our national policy. 
From its beginnings, the Navy has sought to gain 
support for the maintenance of both its efficiency 
and its combat capability. That role is implicit in 
the political leadership of the service, in the office 
of the Secretary of the Navy. 
It was within the office of the Secretary, then, 
that the public affairs function had its natural 
beginnings. Nor is it surprising to find that the 
function reached its peaks of refinement under three 
secretaries who had been newspaper publishers: Gideon 
Welles, Josephus Daniels and Frank Knox, and in periods 
of its greatest need: the Civil War, World War I and 
World War II. 
or cardinal consequence in advancing the develop-
ment of the function were the extraordinary requirements 
of naval forces for orderly development -- war was too 
late. The complex demands of technological progress --
i 
d .g ~ 
of building ships and training crews to man them --
required both orderly and constant attention. The 
problem became how to demonstrate the need, how to 
enunciate the national policy in terms meaningful .to 
the body politic, and how to translate meaning into 
dollars and cents support. 
The needs of the service evolved from the needs 
of the nation. The requirements of national security 
policy were translated into terms of funds, men and 
ships by which that policy could be supported. The 
multifarious nature of policy determinants involved 
complex considerations of both national and inter-
national interests. Catalysts, events, internal and 
external rivalries, effects of technology, wants and 
fears -- operated in both positive and negative ways 
to hasten or retard policy development. This was the 
environment in which the public affairs function had 
to operate. 
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From its beginning attempts to influence legis-
lators, the public affairs function in the United States 
Navy proceeded to the time of the Civil War when it 
shifted its approach to the more mature managerial 
concept of responsibility to the broad base of political 
support the people themselves. This point marks 
the beginning of the public affairs function in its 
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operational sense -- the "turning mark" where the helm 
was shifted and the course changed. 
Throughout its short history, the public affairs 
function and its development had been characterized 
by reaction rather than by initiative. Eich of the 
milestones passed came as a result of political or 
practical problems faced by the Navy. Perhaps this 
was because the evolution of the function developed 
along a political model: never had the function known 
rational progression. Programs were designed to 
overcome problems of the present; seldom anticipating 
future evolution. Interpretation of the Navy to the 
public was the goal -- interpretation of the public to 
the Navy never envisioned. 
Partly this was due to the absolute nature of 
military operations. Senior officers, knowing they must 
succeed or fail, survive or perish with available forces 
on hand in any crisis, found little interest in public 
hopes for disarmament which, they felt, were unjustified 
by the international situation. Conflict in interest 
stood as a b'ar to mutual understanding. Men who had bled 
knew that bleeding was less when training and capabilities 
were greated; that less of the nation's treasure was spent 
when spent continuously on orderly development rather than 
in huge crash programs. The concepts were difficult to 
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convey to a public who saw a chance for a detente, a 
hope for disarmament and the opportunity to devote their 
energies to peaceful pursuits. The question of balance 
and the quest for understanding fostered the growth of 
the public affairs function. 
Competition certainly played its part. Competition 
for funds; strong interservice rivalries for manpower, 
monies, and functional assignment; competition against 
peace groups and advocates of disarmament and with other 
segments of society striving for public attention and 
support. 
The nature of the society demanded that the public 
have knowledge enough to provide support in the degree 
required. But, how much knowledge could be imparted 
in a free society without endangering,fighting ability 
by informing an enemy? The question of military security 
and censorship versus freedom of information, too, spurred 
the development of the public affairs function. 
Yet the demands for information to the public had 
great significance to the vitality of naval policy. In 
its first public pronouncement, the Navy General Board 
placed on record its recommendations to the Secretary 
of the Navy on naval policy. Included as an appendix 
to the Secretary's annual report in 1913, it addressed 
the public affairs function: 
*:'td 
••• In the opinion of the General Board any 
rational and natural development of the Navy 
looking to the continuance of peace and the 
maintenance of our national policies demands 
the adoption of, and the consistent adherence 
to, a·governmental naval policy founded on our 
needs and aims. To give life to such a policy 
requires the support of the people and the 
Congress; and this support can only be obtained 
by giving the widest publicity to the policy 
itself and to the reasons and arguments in 
its support, and taking the people and the 
Congress into the full confidence of the 
Government, inviting intelligent criticism 
as well as support. The General Board believes 
that only a lack of understanding ••• by the 
people at large prevents the adoption of a 
consistent naval policy; and recommends to the 
department a system of extended publicity 
in all matters relating to naval policy, 
acting through patriotic organizations, the 
press, or by whatever means a knowledge of 
the naval needs of the Nation may be brought 
home to the people of the country ••• 
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Behind that statement lay the most perplexing 
problem confronting the public affairs function: The 
basic consideration of responsibility. Did naval 
policy rest with the Commander-in-Chief, and, thereby, 
naval public relations policy with it? Or did the 
public affairs function, as the national security 
function, have a greater responsibility directly to 
the people? In questions where the best professional 
judgment varied with that of the Chief Executive, who 
should know of it? Who controlled the policy governing 
public affairs? Why was control necessary? To what 
purpose was it exercised? 
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In 1941, the public affairs function in the Navy 
found itself soon to be responsible to two authorities: 
---the political suthori ty embodied in the Secretary of 
the Navy, and the military authority vested in the Chief 
of Naval Operations. Theorists who saw in the function 
a discharge of basic responsibilities to the people of 
the nation in keeping them fully informed could afford 
to disabuse themselves of that nation. The public 
affairs function had grown from the Navy's requirement 
to win a broad base of support for its policies. 
Looking ahead to the post-war reorganization of 
the defense establishment and the creation of the 
Department of Defense in 1948, would serve to highlight 
the problem. When military objectives were in consonance 
with political policies, there were few problems for 
public affairs. When the two courses diverged, however, 
the concert became cacophony. The problem, in this later 
period, was transferred up yet another notch in the 
bureaucracy. With this important exception: the military 
organization under the Department of Defense had lost its 
voice. 
The organization, in 1941, of the Office of Public 
Relations was the product of the many forces which had 
preceded it; had demanded it. It was not enough to 
realize that, for the Navy, the helm had been put "a'lee, 11 
but, further, to consider what course the ship would 
steer and whose hand was on the helm. 
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APPENDIX A 
Excerpts from Commander H. R. Thurber Memo 
to the Director of Naval History; "Navy 
Public Relations, July 1940 - May 1941." 
••• From July 16, 1940, to 1 May 1941, I was officer 
in charge of the Public Relations Branch in the Navy 
Department, and was under the Director of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. From·l May to 27 May 1941, I was 
attached, as acting director, to the Office of Public 
Relations, Navy Department, public relations having 
been transferred as of 1 May from cognizance of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy ••• 
••• When I reported for duty as officer in charge, 
the Public Relations Branch, Navy Department, was manned 
by 2 other USN officers who had recently reported, 2 USNR 
officers, 2 experienced civilian assistants, 4 civilian 
clerical personnel and 2 enlisted Marines. The branch 
handled press relations, radio, photographic and other 
phases of public relations in 3 rooms located between 
the 8th and 9th wings on the front corridor of the 2nd 
floor of the Navy Department. The former press section 
officer remained on board until turnover was completed. 
Personnel attached were capable, and the branch was 
operating on principles which had been established over 
a period of years. lUblic relations offices in the 
Naval Districts were, in total, below peacetime operating 
strength. 
The directive issued to me was "to build the office 
up for an emergency". War plans for.such a contingency 
existed, having been written in 1924 and revised through 
lr939. Those plans were analyzed, and, after some changes, 
action was taken on the task assigned. 
The first step was that of obtaining additional 
numbers of experienced personnel. Records of Naval 
Reserves slated for war-time duty in Navy Public 
Relations were reviewed and tentative selections made 
of those who would head the various sections of a war-
time Office. There was no legal requirement for these 
Reserve officers to enter service in 1940; however, 
selected candidates were interviewed and asked to enter 
active service provided their personal situation would 
permit. This procedure was effective, although the 
time element often appeared protracted as activities 






With additional personnel, and a general speed-
up of public relations because of the international 
situation, it was necessary to obtain larger operating 
space and in a location that was more accessible to 
members of the press, radio and photographic services. 
The entire NaV¥ Department was beginning to expand, but 
space (7 rooms) was acquired in August 1940, on the 
first floor, front corridor, next the center (main) 
entrance to the Navy Department. 
Problems of actual public relations were carried 
forward toward solution, and are discussed under indi-
vidual headings, in the order: OPR organization, press, 
radio, pictorial, scripts, civic liaison and naval 
districts, reference section, voluntary censorship, 
special projects, comments. 
During the period the foregoing were taken in hand, 
the international situation affecting Navy public 
relations developed rapidly. The Acting Secretary of 
the Navy signed in September 1940, contracts for the 
tt$4,000,000,000 Navyn (200 combatant ships, 2400 air-
planes, expansion of the naval shore establishment); 
fifty over-age U.S. destroyers were given to the British 
in exchange for the right to lease British naval and 
air bases in the Western Atlantic; the Selective 
Service and Training Act was enacted; the export of 
iron and steel scrap to Japan was prohibited; and 
Germany, Italy and Japan signed a treaty of alliance 
which contained a threat against the United States. In 
January 1941, the President addressed Congress on "the 
four freedoms", and his budget message requested an 
additional eleven billion dollars for the natior:al defense 
program. Repairs to British men-of-war, damaged in the 
sea war, were undertaken in u.s. naval shipyards. In 
March 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease bill, and 
the President stated the great task of the day was to 
"move projects from the assembly lines of our factories 
to the battle lines of democracy - Now! On May 27, 
1941, an unlimited national emergency was declared. 
OPR ORGANIZATION. 
In July 1940, the Navy Department's Public Relations 
Branch (referred to hereafter as OPR) had an officer in 
charge (Commander, USN) three officers and an experienced 
civilian assistant in the press section, and one officer, 
with an experienced civilian assistant, who handled 
general information requests, pictorial, radio and such 
other duties as were assigned. 
War plans for OPR called for a Rear Admiral as 
director, a deputy director, a press section, radio 
section, photographic (stills) section, Motion picture 
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section, and general information section. Provisions 
were made for liaison with Navy public relations branches 
in the Naval Districts and with Navy public relations 
representatives afloat. 
The mission of OPR, as evolved from u.s. Navy Policy, 
was to make available_ to the public through press, radio, 
pictorial, and other media, all information concerning 
the Navy that was compatible with military security, in 
order to keep the people of this country informed of 
the activities and conditions of the Navy. Decision 
was made in July 1940 that in order to carry out this 
mission, OPR 1s motto should be •service, consistent 
with security ... Because of the.international situation 
and the country's current response to threats against 
our national security, it was determined that attempts 
to "sell the Navy" to the country were irrelevant and 
should be firmly and scrupulously avoided ••• 
To further the accomplishment of OPR1s mission, 
personnel acquired were assigned to carry out functions 
for which they were judged best-fitted, with the follo-

















Pictorial Section • 
Scripts Section. 
Civic Liaison and Naval Districts Section. 
Reference Section. 
By the middle of May 1941, the foregoing organi-
zation was operative, although sections were not com-
pletely staffed. 
During the growth of OPR in the period under review, 
the undersigned acted as "Director", with the assigned 
responsibility of enunciating and effectuating approved 
public relations policies of the Navy. Lieutenant 
Commander (now captain) R. w. Berry, USN, acted as 
"Assistant Director", as well as officer-in-charge of 
the Press Relations.Section until September 1941 when 
the latter duty was assigned Lieutenant Commander (now 
Captain) w. H. Wharton, USNR, formerly of the editorial 
staff of the ORBlON JOURNAL and who had reported in for 
duty in the spr!ng of 1941. 
Administrative. Lieutenant (now captain) H. W. 
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Gordon, Jr., USN was in charge of the "Administrative 
Section" throughout, and had numerous additional duties 
until relieved of them by incoming personnel. The 
Administrative Section had cognizance of accrediting 
press, radio, magazine and photographic representatives 
to the Fleets; of the business management of OPR -
personnel, budget, equipment, space, orders, travel; 
of mail distribution and files; and of the reference 
library, which eventually became a separate section. 
Correspondence handled through the Administrative 
Section during the period under comment totalled 
26,533 letters, representing answers to queries for 
factual information from the press, colleges, schools 
societies, publishers and individuals, and correspondence 
initiated by OPR. 
In anticipation of the 11war 11 influx of correspon-
dents, writers, radio broadcasters, and photographers 
into the Fleets, and the attendant administrative and 
policy details, arrangements were made in April 1941 
with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to. 
have Lieutenant Commander Waldo F. Drake, USN of the 
LOS ANGLES TIMES, ordered to PacFlt staff as Fleet 
PUbllc Relations Officer, and with the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, to have Lieutenant Commander 
(now Commander)Stuyvesant B. Wright, USNR, formerly of 
PARAMOUNT N&IS, ordered to his staff as Fleet Public 
Relations officer. 
In addition to assistance in the forming of three 
Fleet units for combat photography, and of the combat 
artist group the Administrative Section worked with 
U.S. Marine Corps Representatives in formulating plans 
for Marine combat correspondents. 
Plans. Lieutenant Commander (now captain) W. M. 
Galvin, USNR, former Secretary of the Navy League_ of 
the United States, was placed in charge of the "Plans 
Section"l on his entry into active service in September 
1940, with the responsibility of evaluating and making 
recommendations on Navy public relations problems. 
Specific tasks initially assigned were: (1) future 
organization of Navy public relations ashore and afloat 
for efficient war service; (2) war liaison of Navy 
. public relations with other current and ~respective 
government public relations activities; l3) constant 
review and analysis of public reactions to the Navy's 
activities with a view toward improvement in the Navy's 
public relations. Task (1) was completed in late 
1originally, uAnalysis Section"; later "Research 
Section. n 
I' 
October 1940; task (2) in January 1941; task (3) was 
immediately operative and was subsequently expanded 
170 
in February 1941. Lieutenant Commander Qfllvin 1s section 
was increased to five officers by May 1941, and during 
the interim contributed numerous plans whose implemen-
tation will be included hereafter in the outline of 
activities of other sections. 
PRESS 
The Press Relations Section (hereafter referred to 
as the Press Section) expanded in this period from 3 
officers and 1 experienced civilian assistant, to 9 
officers and 2 experienced civilian assistants. 
Press Section cognizance was as follows: 
a. Preparation and distribution of press 
releases. 
b. Answering requests from the press, and 
from individuals with respect to Navy news. 
c. Maintaining close liaison with the press; 
with presS-conferences of the President, the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Secretary of War; and with the Navy 
Department bureaus and offices. 
Pretaration and distribution of press releases. 
Preparat on of releases was carried out under the super-
vision of the officer in charge of the Press Section, in 
consultation with the "Director" whenever matters of 
policy were involved •. During the period covered by 
this summary, 1644 formal releases were made to the 
press, varying from 1 to 88 pages. (During the pre-
ceding fiscal year, 1216 such releases were made; 
during the year before that, 900). The number of 
informal releases of information is indeterminate, but 
it is estimated to have increased during the period 
covered in about the same ratio as the formal releases. 
Distribution of each formal release was made within the 
Navy Department press room and at the National Press 
Club. No mailing list was maintained. 
Answering Requests. In accordance with tradition, 
the officer in charge of the Press Section was "on call" 
for 24 hours each day. As additional personnel.reported 
and were given a familiarization course, a system of 
"watch officers" was inaugurated in order to provide 
answers to queries which were increasing materially as 
international tension mounted. In November 1940, a 16-
hour Press Section watch was set; and in May 1941, a 
24-h~ur watch was activiated. 
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Liaison. The move of OPR to new quarters in August 
1940 permitted of increased facilities for representatives 
of the press assocations and large daily newspapers 
having Washington bureaus. This closer liaison provided 
for more accurate reporting of Navy news, and for 
correcting misstatements or inaccurate statements con-
cerning the Navy. 
The 11 D1rector", OPR, maintained clo:se liaison with 
the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief \or •Naval Operations, 
and delegated this responsibility when necessary. The 
officer in charge of the Press Section arranged for 
regular conferences of the Secretary of the Navy with 
the press, briefed the Secretary in advance, and arranged 
for record and distribution of his remarks. The officer 
in charge of the Press Section attended press conferences 
of th~ President, and a Press Section representative 
attended press conferences of the Secretary of War. 
Commencing in August 1940, the undersigned directed 
that closer contacts be established with the bureaus and 
offices of the Navy Department. The Press Section was 
able, as personnel increased, to carry out this direc-
tive by creating "teams" to develop newsworthy details 
hitherto dormant •. 
Navy Radio News. In December 1940, the Press 
Secti9n commenced Issuing Navy Radio News to the Fleet 
and outlying stations. The United Press had been 
supplying a news digest to the Navy Department (Com-
munication Watch Officer) for dissemination to the Fleet, 
but in October 1940, expressed a desire to terminate 
this service at the Navy's earliest convenience. 
Negotiations conducted by the undersigned resulted in 
having this digest continued in modif'ied form, and 
supplied to the "first watch' officer in the Press 
Section. Here it was further edited and augmented 
with news of particular Navy interest, for radio trans-
mission to the Navy. This improved service met a long-
felt desire for last-minute news to the Fleet and out-
lying stations. 
RADIO 
The Radio Section of OPR was not formalized until 
February 1941. Lieutenant CQmmander N. w. Sharpe, USNR, 
{former independent radio consultant) who had been per-
forming the functions of officer in charge of the Navy's 
radio public relations while still attached to the 
Press Section, was named as head of the Radio Section in 
a new OPR organizational paper, and was assigned an 
assistant. (In June, two additional assistants reported 
to this Section.) 
4, 
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The Radio Section had cognizance of arrangements 
for Navy participation in national broadcast programs, 
of answering queries from radio news broadcasters, of 
assistance in script preparation for addresses by naval 
personnel, and of liaison with commercial broadcasts. 
Arrangements for·the Navy's participation in 
national broadcast programs included those necessary 
for 16 addresses by the Secretary of the Navy, 2 by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 5 by the Chief of 
Naval Operations, and 23 by various high-ranking 
officers; for 19 national news events, such as the 
ceremonies attendant upon launching of major naval 
vessels; for Navy Day programs; for Christmas Day 
programs; for 38 nationwide recruiting programs; and 
for consideration of numerous, varied requests from 
national broadcasting companies. 
National radio news broadcasters received much of 
their assistance from the Press Section but there were 
numerous calls on the Radio Section for additional, 
11 background" material. 
While script preparation was not visualized as a 
permanent function of the Radio Section, nevertheless 
much of this was carried out as a service, particularly 
in the 1940-41 recruiting programs, in which OPR 
assistance was requested by the Navy Department's Director 
of Recruiting. Script preparation included 11 addresses 
on recruiting for particular phases of the Navy 1s needs, 
and 293 recruiting ntag-linesn for nationally-known 
entertainment leaders and national news commentators, 
all of whom requested this as a privilege. 
Liaison with commercial entertainment broadcast 
{adve~tising) programs was a problem which was met by 
a directive, drafted by the officer in charge of radio 
relations, and signed by the Chief ot' Naval Operations 
in December 1940. This permitted commercial enter-
tainment broadcasts afloat and ashore, provided the 
Navy were not directly identified with the product 
advertised, and further, that each broadcast would 
include a statement to the effect that the program 
had been staged for the entertainment of naval per-
sonnel concerned and did not constitute an endorsement 
by the Navy of the product advertised. 
During this period, preliminary arrangements were 
started {in January 1941) on the request of a national 
broadcasting company, for short-wave radio broadcasts 
of entertainment and morale value to the Navy overseas. 











security and conununications problems for these broad-
casts were solved and the project was in readiness for 
future, war use. 
The Radio Section entered into the Navy's educa-
tional campaign on voluntary censorship, and by parti-
cipation in three major panel discussions assisted in 
arriving at a satisfactory understanding between the 
Navy Department and the broadcasting companies of 
the security problems involved. 
As a result of its monitoring of broadcasts, the 
Radio Section reconunended in May 1941, that Japanese 
language broadcasts from Hawaii be eliminated. This 
recommendation was translated into a draft letter, 
subsequently sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to 
the Conunandant Fourteenth Naval District. 
PICTORIAL 
The Pictorial Section of OPR was established in 
December 1940 under Lieutenant Oonunander (now Captain) 
E. John Long, USNR, formerly on the executive staff of 
the NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE ••• Cognizance of this 
new section was assigned as follows: still photographs 
news, features and advertising; motion pictures - news, 
feature shorts and productions; artists - arrangements 
and display; posters. These responsibilities pre-
viously had been assigned various members of OPR staff, 
who continued to assist Lieutenant Conunander Long until 
additional personnel reported for duty. By May 1941, 
there were three officer assistants, an experienced 
civilian assistant and two clerical personnel in this 
Section. 
Still Shoto,raphs. Prior to December 1940, the 
growing num er o requests for Navy "still" photographic 
material had placed a heavy load on an understaffed OPR2. 
Problems of procurement, laboratory processing, editing, 
clearing for security, and ready availability had been 
analyzed, but progress in solving these was slow. In 
December 1940, the Navy was issuing, on request, about 
7,000 still photographs a year. Conunencing in January 
1941, as a result of more expeditious clearance arrange-
ments with the Department's security agency, official 
2As an example of the work involved in meeting 
requests for pictorial cooperation, over 1500 photos, 
together with script cafitions and layouts were reviewed, 
for the "Navy Day Issue' (October 1940) of LIFE Magazine, 
which had resulted from.negotiations between LIFE 
editors and the undersigned in early August. 
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Navy photographs were displayed in the Press section in 
connection with news releases, and more rapid cooperation 
was made possible in supplying photographs requested by 
pictorial magazines and newspaper rotogravure sections. 
Twenty-two pictorial Navy features of large scope were 
requested by leading magazines, and over four hundred 
Navy photographs were used in rotogravure sections during 
the period of this report. In the advertising field, 
numerous requests from 21 national advertising agencies 
were met by assistance in reviewing layouts, copy, 
photographs, and furnishing material and photographs 
for nationwide advertisements having the Navy as the 
main background. In May 1941, by improving the quality 
and variety of naval photographs and the production line, 
the Pictorial Section was issuing approximately 1,000 
still photographs a day. 
Motion Pictures. Arrangements were made with 
motion picture news reel companies during the period 
under review for coverage, on their request, and for 
security clearance, of 46 Navy news events of national 
interest. Cooperation was extended five major motion 
picture companies for feature shorts of 22 Navy subjects 
which were requested and were subsequently cleared by the 
Department's security agency. Arrangements were made 
with news reel companies for film and editing in the 
make-up of a new and up-to-date recruiting film, entitled 
"The Battle". OPR cooperated in the review and scripts 
of 13 major motion picture productions, of which 10 
were cleared, as suitable, and 3 rejected. Close 
relationships were maintained with the "Hays Organi-
zation", which resulted (March 1941 ), in holding up · 
shipments to the Japanese government of news reels 
showing U.S. Navy activities; in the forming of Naval 
Reserve units of camera men and technicians for research, 
and of three Fleet units for combat photography; in 
assistance to naval recruiting; and in supplying naval 
subjects for motion pictures to be distributed in Latin 
America for furthering the "good-neighbor" policy. 
Artists. Prior to establishment of the Pictorial 
Section, foundations were laid by the undersigned for an 
art project as a phase of the Navy's public relations ••• 
A number of artists, etchers, and illustrators were 
interviewed, and arrangements inaugurated to start the 
shore phase. Mr. Vernon Howe Bailey, an eminent etcher 
and water color artist, was obtained through financial 
contract with the Bureau of Ships, and was started in 
the spring of 1941 on a comprehensive record of ship-
building which subsequently had been partially displayed 
in art exhibits throughout the country, and reproduced 
in magazines and in rotogravure sections of metropolitan 
newspapers. In March 1941, Mr •. Griffith Baily Coale, 
president of the National Society of Mural Painters, 
was selected as the prospective officer in charge of 
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a group of naval artists. Commander Coale 1 s work as a 
combat artist and a writer, his cooperation in obtaining 
other outstanding naval combat artists, and his enthusi-
astic leadership in this field are too well-known to be 
repeated in this commentary. Eventually, under Lieutenant 
Commander Long's later guidance, an experienced "curator" 
served during the War to correlate the many phases of 
this activity. This art project will have a lasting 
value in the Navy's public relations. 
Posters. In pursuance of requests from litho-
graphing firms and from the (President's) Office of 
Facts and Figures, the Pictorial Section cooperated in 
supplying Navy material for Navy recruiting posters, for 
"spy" posters being prepared by the Society of Illus-
trators, and for the THINKAMERICAN series of posters. 
Correlation of photographic activities. As a 
result of the increased demand for Navy still photo-
graphs and motion pictures during the emergency period, 
the photographic facilities available to OPR became 
seriously overtaxed by the spring of 1941. A study of 
laboratory facilities available led to the submission of 
a memorandum by OPR, embodying specific suggestions for 
revision and improvement of the entire framework of Navy 
photography. As a result of this memorandum, the Secre-
tary of the Navy convened a Photographic Board. The 
report of this board, on which OPR was represented by 
Lieutenant Commander Long, set forth principles that 
guided official Navy photography throughout World War II. 
Following the submission of a memorandum from OPR 
in the spring of 1941, a board was convened to revise 
General Order Number 96, which governed the taking and 
publication of photographs of naval subjects for pub-
lication, General Order No. 179 resulted, and gave a 
workable solution for this subject during World War II. 
SCRIPTS. 
The Scripts Section was formed in August 1940 under 
Lieutenant (jg) (now Captain) Victor F. Blakeslee, USN 
(Ret.), a capable writer, and was assigned cognizance 
of: 
a. Preparation of addresses for the Secretary of 
the Navy, the Under-secretary of the Navy, the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, and for high-ranking naval officers. 
b. Preparation of "ceremonial" statements for 
the Secretary of the Navy;. 
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c. Assistance to writers and publishers in pre-
paration of books, magazine articles and pamphlets. 
Scripts preparation and assistance for addresses 
totalled 31 during the period under review, the addresses 
varying in length from fifteen to forty-five minutes' 
delivery time. 
"ceremonial statements" prepared by the Scripts 
Section numbered 92, and included such subjects as 
Alnav~ for the centenary observance of Admiral Mahan 1 s 
birth , for Navy Day, for Thanksgiving, tor Christmas, 
for Army Day, for the founding of the Marine Corps; 
congratulatorY messages to national patriotic organi-
zations; Chief of Naval Operations" messages to the 
commanding officers of naval ships.being newly commis-
sioned. 
Assistance to writers and publishers imposed an 
increasing challenge to the resourcefulness of the 
Scripts Section. In the book field, the manuscripts of 
24 authors were reviewed, and suggestions for additional 
material or changes were accepted by the authors. In 
the magazine field, aid was given to LIFE for eight 
major articles on the Navy; to FOR'1't1Rlf'1"or three Navy 
studies; to the SATURDAY ~NG POaT for four exposi-
tory articles on the Navy~ the N'XTIONAL GBJGRAPHIC 
MAGAZINE for four illustrated Navy articles; to 
COLLIER'S, COSMOPOLITAN, AMERICAN, LOOK, POPULAR SCIFNCE 
MOH'.Mtt#Y, ARCHiTEdftJRAL FORUM, MACH!Rl'Rf, Ms wm, 
AidklcAN FOREIGN skHVICE JOURNAL, ARMY ORDNANCE ASSOCI-
ATION :oURNAL, for feature Navy articles In their field; 
to Nelson Rockefeller (Coordinator for Commercial and 
Cultural Relations Between the American Republics) in 
illustrated magazine publications for circulation in Latin 
America. 
3In connection with the Mahan centenary, OPR pre-
pared a suitable ceremonial message for press release 
by the President, made arrangements for a wreath-laying 
ritual at Mahan 1s grave, and aided the Naval War College 
in observance of the day. 
40ne of these, "Ships, Men - and Bases" by the 
Secretary of the Navy (with Fletcher Pratt) was reprinted 
free-of-charge by the POST publishers in pamphlet (color 
illustrated) form, and 20,000 copies distributed "for the 
Navy Department in the interest of National Defense". 
"' ___ .__ ________ ~--------------------2-~ 
Pamphlet assistance included preparation for the 
Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee of an 
illustrated booklet (Senate Document No. 53) on"The 
United States Navy", for congressional distribution; 
prev.aration for the American Council on Public Affairs 
of 'The United States Navy in National Defense" by 
Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, for a nationwide 
sale; review of four major pamphlet studies on the 
national defense by the Foreign Policy Association; 
review of material submitted by the Navy League of the 
United States. 
CIVIC LIAISON AND NAVAL DISTRICTS SECTION. 
This Section was not formalized until late in February 
1941, and was then placed in charge of Lieutenant Commander 
(now Captain) James G. Stahlman, USNR, owner and pub-
lisher of the NASHVILLE BANNER, who had volunteered to 
the Secretary o? the Navy in January for Navy public 
relations duty. Prior to the establishment of this 
Section, its functions were carried on by the Adminis-
trative Section. 
Cognizance of the Civic Liaison and Naval Districts 
Section? included liaison with Public Relations Officers 
in the Naval Districts, and~cooperation with welfare, 
patriotic, civic, fraternal, educational, entertainment 
{USO) and other civilian organizations (decentralizing 
to Districts whenever feasible} • 
••• In February, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Stahlman 
was sent on a tour of the Districts to investigate prob-
lems of the public relations officers. As a result of 
this tour, closer liaison procedure was established and 
a directive was signed by the Chief of Naval Operations 
for further increases in Districts• public relations 
personnel. A "Guide to Navy Public Relations", initia-
ted by the undersigned, was prepared by the Section, and 
issued in March, 1941, to6the Naval Districts7by the Chief of Naval Operations • A further letter was pre-
pared by the Section, at the direction of the under-
signed, and issued to the naval service by the Chief of 
Naval Operations in March 1941, for guidance in connection 
with the Navy's campaign for voluntary censorship. Plans 
were formulated in May for a conference of public rela-
tions officers from the Naval Districts in Washington in 
the summer of 1941. 
5Later changed to the Naval District Section. 
6cNC Serial 380616 of March 19, 1941. 





Civic Liaison. Requests of national civic groups8 
on OPR for speakers, Navy exhibits and naval parti-
cipation in celebrations were originally handled by the 
Administrative Section, decentralized wherever possible 
to the Public Relations Officers of the Naval Districts. 
This function was gradually taken over by the Civic 
Liaison and Naval Districts Section, and turther decen-
tralized to the Districts. 
REFERmfCE SECTION. 
The Reference Section was established February 1, 
1941, under the supervision of Miss Helene Philibert, 
with experience of over twenty years in the Navy 
Department's Press Section. Miss Estelle Philibert, 
a capable statistician, was enrolled as assistant. 
Inspection was made of the systems in the New York 
Public Library (government publication section), and 
the libraries and "morgues" of the Associated Press and 
the New York Herald Tribune. 
In late February, organization was started of ref-
erence material hitherto accumulated by the Press and 
other Sections. Binding, arranging, and indexing of 
press releases (from July 1919 to date), assembly and 
indexing of Congressional hearings and bills on the 
Navy, indexing digests of Navy contracts, consoli-
dation and indexing of biographical material, binding 
and arrangement of histories of all u.s. Navy ships and 
air squadrons, and assembly of authoritative Navy his-
torical reference material continued with commendable 
speed and efficiency. By May 1941, the Reference Section 
not only had been able to meet the numerous demands of 
other OPR sections, but also had assisted materially in 
supplying a remarkable volume of source material 
requested by other bureaus and offices of the Navy 
Department. 
VOLUNTARY CENSORSHIP. 
The international situation affecting Navy public 
relations developed ••• (sentence obscured) ••• m1litary 
value to the Axis powers was unrestricted, except for 
that issued by the Navy Department. I discussed this 
problem with the Director of Naval Intelligence and 
recommended that a letter be sent by Secretary Knox to 
8 The Navy League of the United States was lacking in 
active leadership and finances in 1940, but commencing 
early in 1941, under the presidency of the Honorable 
Sheldon Clark, assumed a positive role in supporting a 
national information program on the Havy. 
,, 
179 
all U.S. press, magazine, radio and photographic agencies 
requesting their voluntary cooperation in the avoidance 
of publicity - unless announced or authorized by the 
Navy Department - on certain subjects. This recommen-
dation was based on the following factors: 
a. Agreement in Joint Army and Navy Board 
reports dating back to 1937, that censorship of these 
agencies in time of war should be limited at least 
initially, to voluntary, self-imposed censorship. 
b. The probability that the U.S. would be 
totally embroiled in World War II, and allied with the 
British. 
c. The fact that in World War I,, a "list" or 
code for-specific guidance in voluntary censorship had 
not been available until seven weeks after hostilities 
began. 
d. The thought that an educational period in 
voluntary censorship would be mutually beneficial to 
the agencies concerned and the Navy. 
As a result of this recommendation and further dis-
cussions of a draft prepared by the undersigned,, 
Secretary Knox sent the following confidential letter to 
over 3,,200 agencies: 
"December 31,, 1940 
"Dear 
"As the present emergency has become more 
critical, many news, magazine, radio and photo-
graphic agencies have requested me to advise 
them as to the manner in which they can make 
their services more helpful to the Navy. This 
cooperative attitude is much appreciated. 
"Speaking not only as Secretary of the Navy 
but also as a former newspaper publisher, I 
believe that if further assistance is requested 
of publishing agencies in the interests of national 
defense, it will be gladly extended. 
At the moment, the Navy finds itself seriously 
hampered in the proper conduct of its preparations 
for the present emergency because of dissemination 
to the public - and thereby to unfriendly powers -
of certain details concerning these preparations. 
"Your cooperation, therefore, is requested after 
January 15, 1941 in avoidance of publicity --
unless announced or authorized by the Navy Depart-
ment -- on the following subjects: 
11 (1) Actual or intended movements of vessels 
or aircraft of the U.S. Navy, of units 
of naval enlisted personnel or divisions 
of mobilized reserves, or troop move-
ments of the U.S. Marine Corps: 
11 (2) (Mention of) "Secret" technical U.S. 
naval weapons.or development thereof: 
11 (3) New U.S. Navy ships or aircraft; 
"{4) U.S. Navy construction projects ashore. 
"In making this request, I wish to assure you 
that the Navy Department will continue to release 
information concerning the foregoing subjects to 
an extent that is consonant with public interest 
and with the effectiveness of the Navy's pre-
parations. 
"A similar confidential letter is being sent 
simultaneously to all the listed American press, 
magazine, radio and photographic agencies. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ FRANK KNOX. 
Secretary of the Navy" 
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Replies to this letter were practically 100 per cent 
in acceptance. There were natural questions arising from 
such a proposal:e.g. - Would there be similar "lists" 
from other government departments? Would there be some 
Navy agency available for rapid decisions on clearance 
for news material of questionable security? Would the 
Navy's "list" be changed, or eventually made more specific? 
The National.Press Club, in Washington, undertook to 
approach these problems by arranging an "off-the-record" 
forum on press censorship, 14 March 1941, to which Mr. . 
Lowell Mellett (President's Office of Facts and Figures), 
Major General Robert c. Richardson, Jr. {Director of 
Public Relations, War Department) and the undersigned 
were invited in order to answer questions proposed by 
leading journalists and publishers. Transcriptions of 
this (and a second) forum were sent by the National 
Press Club to all publishing media in the U.S. for infor-
mation, but not for publication. 
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On 17 March, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
in furtherance of the voluntary cens§rship campaign, 
issued a letter to the Naval Service amplifying the 
intent of voluntary censorship, attaching a digest of 
existing security regulations, and applying inter-
pretations in clarification of the Navy's public relations 
policy: "To keep the public informed of the activities 
of the Navy, as compatible with military security." 
The undersigned subsequently was designated to 
follow up on this campaign: at the second Forum of the 
National Press Club, 10 April 1941, in an address before 
the annual convention of the American Society of News-
paper F.ditors, Washington, D.C. 18 April 1941; in a 
national radio forum with three prominent New York edi-
tors on CBS "People's Platform", New York City, 19 April 
1941; in an address at the annual convention of the 
National Association of Broadcasters, St. Louis, Mo., 
13 May 1941; in a panel discussion (again with Mr. 
Mellett and Major Gen. Richardson) for Mid-Western 
editors at the University of Missouri, 14 May 1941; and 
by addresses at numerous other, less formal meetings. 
The foregoing steps, supplemented by considerable 
correspondence and by discussions in U.S. trade journals 
of the publishing world, did not entirely solve the many 
problems of voluntary censorship. There were lapses and 
errors in judgement, not all of which were on the part 
of the press or due to the voluntary system. However in the 
May 3, 1941 issue of EDITOR & PUBLISHER, the leading 
article, which was on Voluntary Censorship, noted that: 
"In both the Navy and War Departments, news-
papermen assigned to coverage say access is not 
as free today as it was a few months ago; yet 
it is agreed that the news product is greater -
more releases are issued daily and press confer-
ences are conducted with greater regularity than 
in the past ••• commander Thurber describes it as 
•more constructive coverage, with emphasis on 
news which does not run head-on into the cate-
gories suggested by Secretary Knox• ••• Cited as 
evidence that voluntary censorship is workable 
both branches of the service report an almost 
universal practice of submitting questionable 
news for clearance before publication." 
And in the SATURDAY EVENING POST of 26 September, 1942, 
the following qonclusion was reached in an article on 
"Now Your News' is Censored": 
9CNo Serial 247216, prepared by OPR. 
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"Pearl Harbor had caught neither the military 
nor the American press with its guard down, so far 
as censorship was concerned. For more than ten 
months before that fateful Sunday a full-dress re-
hersal of censorship had been carried on. Although 
bearing the title of •voluntary co-operation•, it 
actually amounted to a wartime censorship on naval 
matters ••• It managed to conceal an extremely impor-
tant movement of the fleet at one stage; it put 
our building program into the mystery category; 
and it allowed the establishment of outposts at 
remote spots that have never been revealed to this 
day ••• 
11Whatever its merit or fallacy, Knox 1s 1volun-
tary co-operation' did help train the. American 
newspaper editor to police himself and his works, 
and to recognize the difference between news that 
would give 1aid and comfort to the enemy• and news 
that wouldn't. When (Byron} Price took over the 
reins of censorship in December, not only did the 
newspapers and radio have the benefit of this 
experience but they had been voluntarily operating 
for the two weeks after Pearl Harbor under a mili-
tary censorship put into effect by the Army and 
Navy." 
SPECIAL PROJECTS. 
Navy Day, 1940. 
The officer in charge of the Administrative Section 
of OPR branch was secretary of the Navy Department Navy 
Day Committee. Ground work for the celebration was 
started in July, in compliance with detailed requests 
from the Navy League, the Naval Reserve and patriotic 
organizations. 
The slogan for Navy Day, 1940 was "KEEP THE NAVY 
STRONG". Eleven articles and speeches on the subject 
of the "Two-Ocean Fleet", and similar appropriate 
material were distributed to the Naval Service as basic 
material for press and speeches on Navy Day ••• 
••• cooperation was extended in securing speakers 
at Navy Day events under the auspices of Naval Reserve 
organizations, American Legion, Military Order World 
War and other patriotic organizations, as well as city 
and state committees. The Maryland Navy Day committee 
and the Propeller Club of Baltimore sponsored the Navy 
Day banquet at which Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval 
Operations was principal speaker. Other programs of 
interest were held in the principal large cities. 
.. 
One of the events of Navy Day which created wide 
interest was the unveiling or a bronze plaque in honor 
of William Chauvenet, co-founder of the Naval Academy 
at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. 
Industrial Mobilization. Acting upon a suggestion 
from the late Lieutenant Commander Leslie P. Jacobs, 
USNR, who entered OPR service in March 1941, letters 
were prepared for signature of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and sent in April 1941 to the Commandants of 
Naval Districts in the United States, directing that 
arrangements be made for addresses by notable Navy per-
sonnel at private industrial plants holding Navy con-
tracts. Lieutenant Commander Jacobs also suggested the 
awarding of "E",s for excellence of production, an idea 
which was formalized later under the Industrial Incen-
tive Division, of OOR. 
Liaison with Bureau of Public Relations, War 
Detartment. Close liaison was maintained with the public 
re ations personnel assigned the War Department. With 
the reporting in February 1941, of Major General Robert 
c. Richardson, Jr., as Director of Public Relations, War 
Department, interchange of ideas increased. The person-
ality and-·ability of that officer added greatly to the 
voluntary censorship campaign initiated by the Navy, and 
rapidly furthered by the Army. In the establishment of 
this pleasant liaison, there were many benefits that 
became evident when service public relations came under 
the test of war conditions. 
Security. The growth of Navy public relations 
during the period under review added to the volume of 
work placed on the Security Branch, Office of Naval 
Intelligence, which was responsible, among other duties, 
for security clearance of all OPR projects. This branch 
was conveniently located adjacent to OPR and was in charge 
of Commander (now Captain) J. s. Phillips, USN, with' 
Lieutenant Commander (now captain} E.S. Barnhardt, USN 
(Ret), as his deputy. Cooperation of these officers in 
timely clearance was outstanding, and their suggestions 
for time-saving methods were invaluable as the work-
load on OPR increased. 
COMM»frS. 
Certain organizational and admi~strative problems 
for future planning of Navy public relations are evident 
from the preceding summary. Three are noted briefly. 
a. Training. A school, or course, is recommended 
for public relations personnel, the curriculum to include 
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instruction in selected aspects of the art of public 
relations, the Navy's organization, the Navy's policy, 
and naval strategy and tactics. Arrangements for atten-
dance of Naval Reserve personnel who are scheduled for 
public relations duty at the "naval phases" of such a 
school, and for sending this personnel on Fleet maneuvers, 
is recommended. 
b. Public Media. An OPR program for forum dis-
cussions-on Navy public relations problems with rep-
resentatives of the public media is recommended, subjects 
for discussion to include those necessary for famili-
arization of representatives of the press, radio, photo-
graphic magazine and other public media with the Navy's 
organization and policy, with the current operating Navy, 
and with naval strategy and tactics. 
c. Security. The mission of Navy public relations-
to keep the public informed of the activities of the Navy, 
as compatible with military security - raises many thorny 
problems of security in peacetime, and (under voluntary 
censorship) in wartime. A "code" is suggested for 
guidance not only of the Navy, but also of the public 
media - this 11 code11 to be issued to the Navy, and to be 
included in forum discussions noted in b, preceding. 
Emphasis on wartime security is requisite. An approach 
to this latter problem is suggested in order to increase 
understanding and responsibility; namely, to study avail-
able enemy estimates of U.S. losses each action of World 
War II, with a view to arriving at an approximate 11 code 11 
of what can and can't be released from a standpoint of 
security, this "code" and the study from which it resulted 
to be supplied the Navy and the public media as noted 
above. 
In concluding this summary, the undersigned again 
desires to pay tribute to his hard-working, effective 
associates who produced, and who gave Navy public rela-
tions a good name in and outside the service during the 
period under review, and in addition established a sound 
nucleus for the subsequent, wartime expansion of personnel. 
H. R. THURBER. 









Commander H. R. Thurber, USN 
Secretary - Mrs. Katherine Womack 
Lt.Comdr. R.W. Berry, USN 
Secretary - Mrs.Mildred Fussell 
Lt. H.W. Gordon, Jr.,USN 
Secretary-Miss Shirley Hoffman 
Orderlies 
Sgt. R. W. Hines, USMC 
Pfc.Norman T. Hatch, USMC 
Pvt. Edward Murphy, USMC 
Messengers 
Mr. Robert Brouillette 
Mr. Louis Sutter 
Switchboard Operator 
Mr. Clayton Holt 
Lieut.Comdr. W. M. Galvin,USNR 
Secretary-Miss Lena F.dwards 
Lieut.Comdr. L.P. Jacobs,USNR 
Lieut.Comdr. E.W. Jenson,USNR 
Lieut. H.R. Awtrey,USNR 
Dis. A.N. Welles, USNR 
Lieut.Comdr. R.W. Berry,USN 
Secretary-Mrs. Mildred Fussell 
Lieut.Comdr. W.S.Wharton,USNR 
Lieut. T. Krum, USNR 
Lieut. (jg) F.B. George, USNR 
Lieut. (jg) A.A. Allen,USNR 
Ens. A.G. Newmyer, USNR 
Ens. W.S. Dooley,USNR 
Ens. A.A. Hoehling,USNR 
Chief Printer L.E.Ruggles,USN(Ret.) 
Mrs. Louise Daniel& 
Clerical: Miss Helen Harvey 
Ylc Thomas M.Hopwood 
Y3c Wade Sherier 
Y3c David H0lman 
Lieut. Comdr. N.W. Sharpe,USNR 
Secretary-Miss Louise Baumann 
Lieut. J. K. Jones,USNR 
Lieut.Comdr. E. J. Long,USNR 
Secretary-Miss Theresa Hasson 
Lieut.Comdr.S.B.Wright,USNR 
(Detached to FPRO, US Atlantic 
Fleet in May) 
Lieut. G. W. Goman, USNR 
Lieut.(jg) R.C. Whitman,USNR 
Miss A!ice M. Costello 
Clerical: Miss Helen Hartl 
TABLE 1 
Scripts Section 




Lieut.(jg) V.F. Blakeslee,USN(Ret) 
Secretary-Miss Iris Gaff ee 
Lieut.(jg) H. Howe,USNR 
Lieut.Comdr. J.G. Stahlman,USNR 
Secretary-Miss Jo Anne Scheier 
Miss Helere Philibert (Collateral 
duty with Press Section until 
September 1941) 
Miss Estelle Philibert 
Mr. Earl Odom 
Miss Cleo CUster 
Miss Elaine Donley 
Miss Peggy Jurgens 
Miss Marjorie Kem 
PERSONNEL AND SPACE SUMMARY, MAY 1941 
On Hand Coming 
Officers 25 13 
Civilian Assistants 4 1 
Artists 2 2 
Civil Service (Clerical 
Messengers, etc.) 18 20 
Yeomen 3 2 
Marines 3 0 
Space (Rooms) 9 5 
2 
TABLE 1 
_ _. ________________ ~-·~-.... ~.~ 
Date 
